As defined by Pakistani authorities, the “basic issue” is Kashmir, but a more fundamental fear of India and Pakistan's national identities drives their strategy. Pakistan has been addressing the Kashmir conflict in a piecemeal fashion, without a coherent strategy or end aim. Since Pakistan’s partition, majority of Pakistanis have claimed that the Boundary Commission misled them. Pakistan's measures in response to this perceived wrong, from protests at the United Nations (UN) to military adventurism, are generally ad hoc and used for temporary ends. The rise of Hindutva, the supremacy of the Pakistani military and the spread of Islamic extremism all have contributed to the impasse. Since the first Kashmir war, Pakistan's policy is not altered. Its bilateral and international diplomatic efforts have been limited to maligning India and portraying the bilateral strategy as failing. Also, it looks unwilling to fix the issue with India. It has not abandoned a military solution. Pakistan pushes for the UN Resolution (UNR), but its efforts to execute Clause II are insincere. India’s aggressive attitude to Kashmir demonstrates that it does not want to follow UNRs. It adopted its political agenda rather expressing Kashmiris' wishes. Whenever bilateralism fails to settle the Kashmir issue, it might be viewed as not solving it on Pakistan's terms. Diplomatic stalemates came from Pakistan's nationalistic goal inside bilateralism. According to an analysis, The Kashmir position of Pakistan includes both military and diplomatic methods. When Pakistan felt its military might could capture Kashmir from India, it used force. Pakistan refuses to consider additional bilateral problems to indicate that bilateral conversations are fruitless. This halted bilateral talks. Pakistan is unrelenting in pursuing its “central issue” and only mentions plebiscites and UNRs. Since India opposes this concept, Pakistan argues that bilateralism will not solve the problem