Terrorism in Indonesia: The Role of The Indonesian National Armed Forces in Counter-Terrorism

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Abstract

Where national defense and national security have been separated as the result of Law No. 34 of 2004, the Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI) has the least role in the country's counter-terrorism strategy. Following the enactment of new regulation, TNI has adopted a new counter-terrorism form through its Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW). The methods pursued by the TNI as well as the social capital that is deeply rooted in Indonesian society have resulted in an institution unlike those found in Western nations. The TNI remains involved in the fight against terrorism despite the new regulations that explicitly give it a limited role. This is demonstrated through a series of TNI actions cracking down on terrorism in Indonesia. Interviews and observations were used as primary data, and secondary data, including meeting notes and details about troop deployment in counter-terrorism efforts, was obtained from related documents. Through its analysis of the role of TNI in counter - terrorism, this study about MOOTW can be helpful to every country.

Keywords: *Terrorism, Counter – terrorism, Indonesian Armed Force, Primary global security, Indonesian government.*

Introduction

Terrorism has become one of the primary global security issues because it threatens human security in many countries. The development of terrorist movements threatens many countries very sovereignty because of their desire to establish new states or change the state's ideologies in unconstitutional ways, targeting civil society and security forces with armed violence. In 2018, the United States Department of State (2018) released its *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017–Foreign Terrorist Organizations,* related to active and re-emerging foreign terrorist organizations, such as Islamic extremist groups like Al Qaeda, the Real Irish Republican Army, and related organizations.

In Indonesia, terrorism has become a serious threat to national security. Attacks carried out by terrorist groups have caused many casualties among both civil society and security personnel. The motives of these terror groups are also diverse, ranging from separatism to religious designs (Garnesia, 2018; The National Consortium for The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2019). Terrorism in Indonesia is not only associated with right wing movements driven by religious motives, although that particular brand is major news, but the Indonesian government also pays the same attention to similar issues motivated by separatism.

Terrorism in Indonesia is not a new thing, having emerged in Indonesia since 1977. There are at least eight organizations identified as terror groups, including: Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, FRETLIN, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, Mujahidin Eastern Indonesia, the Free Papua

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Movement (OPM), Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) (Garnesia, 2018; The National Consortium for The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2019). Based on data released later, during the 1977–2018 timeframe, the most attacks, 116, were launched by GAM (Garnesia, 2018) as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Organizations identified as terror groups

Source: (Garnesia, 2018)

The Indonesian government's efforts to fight terrorism have been carried out in various ways, both preventive and repressive in nature. Many security actors are also involved in preventing terrorist attacks, including the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), which coordinates with the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), and the National Police. The involvement of TNI in counter-terrorism is based on the consideration that the terrorist activity endangers many people lives and threatens Indonesian integrity as a unitary state. Terrorist groups use violence, such as armed attack, bombing, and the taking of civilian hostages to fulfill their goals. These matters have driven the government to involve the military in counter-terrorism actions.

The new terrorism movement carried out by Islamic militant groups does not only target places of worship of other religious communities, but also public spaces, police stations and offices, and even mosques. These groups want to replace the state ideology and system with a caliphate promoted by the Islamic global terrorism network, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS.

Another category of terrorist groups acts as a separatist movement. OPM in Papua, GAM in Aceh, and Moluccan Separatism in Maluku are examples from this category. In the case of OPM, although the movement did not have affiliation with any global terrorism network, they receive support from several political elites and governments of other countries (Febrianti et al., 2019). In 2005, the Indonesian government reached an agreement with GAM to carry out a peace process, the result of which was ceasefire and government recognition of Aceh as a region with special autonomy status.

Attacks carried out by terrorist groups pose a serious threat to the safety of many people. These deadly attacks reinforce the significant problem posed by terrorism for the rest of the world (Lutz & Lutz, 2013). They use a new and very deadly way of creating fear and terror in a society. The terror incident itself is not carried out without a purpose, as described by Fortna (2015). Terrorism in the broadest sense is the use of intentionally indiscriminate violence as a means to terrorize, or create a gripping fear, to intimidate with a financial, political, religious, or ideological aim.

In order to provide a stronger legal basis to guarantee protection against criminal acts of terrorism, changes were made to Law Number 15 of 2003, the Eradication of Terrorism Act, which became Law No. 5 of 2018. Under the new regulation, an additional article regulates the TNI's task with regard to acts of terrorism as part of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Specifically, it will be merged with the main tasks and functions of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI).

Some previous studies have examined military involvement in counter-terrorism (Duyvesteyn, 2008; Ejime, 2017; Suorsa, 2018). However, this research differs from those studies in its exploration of a counter-terrorism role for the TNI specifically directed against threats to the safety of the nation and state.

Literature Review

Counter-terrorism

There is no single definition of terrorism that includes all connotations and denotations (Kaplan, 2011). As mentioned by Sudirman and Kurniasih (2018), the subjectivity in defining terrorism is inevitable since its emphasis heavily on political and state-centric point of view. Thus, contemporary political rhetoric refers to terrorism as an accusation rather than a descriptive term. Some studies show inconsistencies and inadequacies of existing academic and legal definitions, as well as the contradictions between them (Meisels, 2009).

When policymakers face terrorism, they are confronted with an intangible threat, so their subjectivity is inevitable in determining what and who is the true threat to security. Community members (civil society elements, academia, and mass media) often engage the government in ideological debates about this subjective factor.

Those also refer to the purpose of defining terrorism itself. Social scientists aim to describe the phenomenon in a way which will better our sociological and psychological understanding of it and enable us to confront this modern challenge more successfully (Waldron, 2004). In some cases, political or ideological agendas direct definitions of terrorism by heads of state and politicians. Naturally, they usually define terrorism as a form of violence which is carried out exclusively by non-state groups (Meisels, 2009). However, several other experts consider that terror is not only carried out by non-state actors, but also by state actors (Black-Branch, 2017; Jackson & Richard, 2010; Stohl, 1984), which guarantees that there is always debate about its definition.

Kaplan approaches terrorism through four strategies as unconventional tactics, violence against innocent targets, and having intense coercive shows the broad definition of terrorism (Kaplan, 2011). Kaplan's definition also extends the view of terrorism in relation to one group and certain faith, as, for example, Islamic fundamentalists. According to Kaplan's model we can examine Breivik's action (2011) in Norway, or McVeigh's action in the bombing of the American Federal building (1995).

Terrorism has built itself up by broadening its actions. Initially carried out by capturing planeloads of hostages and enacting bombing actions, they now find new methods like attacking officers, houses of worship, killing priests, and even developing mass actions against the government. This reflects the shift of acts of terrorism from "foreign enemies" to "domestic" ones (Moghaddam, 2009).

Regarding the reasons why someone takes action in support of terrorism, each individual has their own reasons, which may differ from the motives of the terror organization itself. One reason may be related to the income they get, so to overcome the problem of terrorism, the government feels it necessary to pay attention to development and provide additional income (Rübbelke, 2005). This method shows that

combating terrorism can be done in various ways, not only using armed force (repressive) but in preventive and persuasive ways, one of which is increasing people's income.

Regarding threats and violence perpetrated by various terrorist groups, the government's efforts to reduce the level of violence committed by terror groups are very important. Counter-terrorism actions are considered essential to enhancing security for the society, as well as maintaining national stability. More security makes a successful terror attack less likely and motivates more people to attend public places (Dev & Grabiszewski, 2019).

Defending or preventing terrorism is a process in which governments, the military, law enforcement, business, and intelligence services combine military practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies. An anti-terrorism strategy is an attempt by a government to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks by utilizing national instruments of power to prevent them from using violence to instill fear and force governments or citizens into achieving terrorist goals (Stigall et al., 2019).

Research Method

With the use of qualitative methods and both primary and secondary data, the research was conducted. We obtained primary data by observing the Indonesian National Armed Forces for six months and interviewing some informants from the Indonesian National Police (Polri), and Indonesia Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies (LESPERSSI) Security Sector Observer. A triangulation technique was used to select informants.

Several national police and counterterrorism activities were observed by the TNI. Initially, all available data was reviewed, followed by descriptive analysis that led to inductive conclusions.

A three-stage process is followed for data analysis:

1. Data reduction: A selection process was carried out in this stage, with data abstraction from field notes being simplified and streamlined. During the roughly one-month research period, abbreviations were made, categories were categorized, themes were focused, boundaries of problems were determined, and memos were written.
2. Data presentation: The purpose of this stage is to regularly organize and compile all information into a compact format that is easy to read and understand.
3. Drawing conclusions or verification: Based on observations, field notes, and statements from informants, conclusions are drawn.

Discussion/Analysis

Terrorism in Indonesia

Based on the statement of the deputy chairman of the House of Representatives, Fadli Zon, there are three things that cause terrorism to flourish in Indonesia. First are domestic factors related to poverty, as well as limited education and religious knowledge. Second are international factors related to foreign support for terrorism network(s), and third is a narrow understanding of transmitted religious values (Hukum Online, 2016). The terrorism movement in Indonesia can be seen as emanating from two motives, the first being religious radicalism and the second, separatism. The escalation of threats from these groups is widespread and jeopardizes the integrity of the state, especially as the embrace of terrorism by both elements has received international attention (Sobandi, 2011; Zaidan, 2017)

Religious motives are not the only factors that encourage the existence of religious terrorism movements

in Indonesia. There are other factors that also influence the rise of religious terrorism: economic factors, where poverty and poor conditions have become the main causes of terrorism; limited education, where poor understanding of Islamic values has rendered many people susceptible to superficial indoctrination (Mubarak, 2012). Likewise, terrorist groups based on separatist motives and desires to break off from Indonesia are also caused by economic factors, such as poverty and low levels of education (Zaidan, 2017).

The roots of religious terrorism in Indonesia can be traced to the Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic State movement (Galamas, 2015). This movement was a manifestation of the rebel leader S. M. Kartosuwiryo's so-called "disappointment" in the secular government of President Sukarno. The movement began in West Java and spread to Central Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi. Ideologically, it was a combination of frustration at the marginalization of Islam in the new constitution and disappointment rooted in the reorganization of the Indonesian People's Army that did not accommodate the Islamic paramilitary forces.

Acts of religious terrorism followed, with various subplots of causes and perpetrators, until the Bali bombings I and II of 2002 and 2005 changed the Indonesian government's view of acts of terrorism (Galamas, 2015). Attacks perpetrated by the militant separatist group, Jemaah Islamiyah, killed 202 people, most of them tourists. Enactment of new anti-terrorism regulations by the government of the Republic of Indonesia formed the basis for the government's counter-terrorism response.

In 2016, BNPT announced that there were 2.7 million Indonesians involved in a series of terror attacks near a Jakarta shopping mall. Even that number does not include followers and sympathizers of terrorist networks. The larger number constitutes approximately one percent of the total population of Indonesia, not including those who indicated affiliation with ISIS. That number reached some 0.004 percent, or approximately 1,000 people. BNPT currently estimates 10–12 core terrorist networks in Indonesia, not counting smaller cells. This terror network, has spread to all parts of Indonesia, even to remote areas. This would include the Santoso's network operating in eastern Indonesia. The most prominent group of late is the Bahrun Naim network, allegedly involved in the 2016 attacks on Jalan M.H. Thamrin Jakarta, a major Jakarta thoroughfare, near the Sarinah shopping mall. The network already exists in Java, Bima, Aceh, and other regions.

Like other religion-based terrorist groups, those that base their movements on separatist motives have also been around for a long time in Indonesia. The GAM is a separatist organization in Aceh, Indonesia's westernmost province, in northern Sumatra. This organization was founded on December 4, 1976 to fight for Aceh's independence from Indonesia (Budi, 2012; Haq, 2010). The OPM is an organization formed in 1965 with the goal of releasing the Papua provinces from Indonesia (Schreuer, 2005). Although there was a polemic over whether both OPM and GAM should still be considered as terrorist groups, both have previously taken civilian hostages. In 2003, GAM kidnapped civilian hostages in (Liputan 6, 2003); and the hostage-taking of 1300 residents in Tembagapura, Papua, by the OPM in 2017 (Hermanto, 2017).

Military Role in Counter-terrorism

Military involvement in MOOTW, specifically with regard to terrorism, has also been regulated by the Article 10 of the Republic of Indonesia's Defense Law No. 3 of 2002. The involvement of the Indonesian National Armed Forces in handling terrorism crimes is considered key to its role assisting the Indonesian Republic's National Police (Polri) and BNPT. Military involvement in helping the police and BNPT to deal with terrorism is at least based on a consideration that the terrorism movement has affiliated with a network of global terrorist organizations, whose actions not only endanger the safety of many people but also threaten their country's sovereignty.

Although the task of assistance involves the deployment of military force to carry out MOOTW, the operation remains based on a democratic political decision involving a joint decision between the president and the House of Representatives. As an implementation of TNI's professionalism, the TNI is obliged to carry out this task responsibly and remain under the supervision of the civil political authority. In its implementation, TNI also coordinates with Polri and BNPT.

Since the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) issued the MPR Decree number VI/MPR/2000, concerning the separation of TNI and Polri, and MPR Decree number VII/MPR/2000, regarding the role of the TNI and Polri, there has been a separation between the two agencies. In the new order government, these institutions were merged into the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), but during the reform era, the existence of ABRI was abolished, asserting that the TNI's duty was in the defense sector, and the National Police in the field of internal security. Based on the MPR Decrees of September 30, 2004, the TNI Bill was passed by the House of Representatives (DPR).

Law No. 34/2004, concerning the TNI, states that the military must act as a state defense instrument. In carrying out its duties, the TNI must follow state policy and political decisions. As a national defense instrument, the main task of TNI is to prevent all forms of military threats against state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the safety of the nation. On the other hand, TNI can also be assigned by civilian political authorities to carry out MOOTW for the maintenance of internal security from all kinds of threats to state sovereignty, such as the emergence of separatism, terrorism and armed insurgency. Meanwhile, the implementation of MOOTW carries the task of maintaining security and public order, carried out based on the principle of assistance to the National Police (Article 7 of Law No. 34/2004 about the Indonesian National Armed Forces).

The significance of the TNI in combating terrorism as a complex threat to the country can no longer be denied. The specifications that have been upheld by the TNI are quite entrenched in Indonesian society as a holdover of the struggle from the Dutch era. The institution is not just a formal entity like those in the Western countries. TNI's cultural roots spring from the social roots of the Indonesian people themselves. Their professionalism is to oversee the community and fully collaborate, because the level of public confidence in TNI personnel is still quite high, especially at the village unit level.

Preventive efforts, pursuit, protection, preparation, and mitigation are the main roles of the TNI in combating terrorism. Fulfilling this role demonstrates that the TNI has a great sense of responsibility to help create safe conditions as a support system for the police.

TNI has made a significant contribution in handling terrorism. The terror prevention unit is one of the team's given responsibility for handling terrorism. They have the responsibility to deal with acts of terrorism in the East Java region. In 2005, the Infantry Battalion Raider received orders from the Regional Commander to carry out a chase-and-ambush operation against the person behind the Bali 2 bombing, Azhari Husin. The same team was also involved in handling terror threats in Surabaya and the pursuit of terrorists in Malang, Tuban, and Banyuwangi.

In Indonesia, anti-terror special forces are not only owned by the police with the power of the Special Datasemen 88 (Densus 88). The TNI also has a number of anti-terror units, including Special Detachment 81 Kopassus (Army/TNI AD), Jalamankara Detachment (Navy/TNI AL), Bravo Unit 90 (Air Force/TNI AU), and Joint Special Operations Command (Koopssusgab). In countering terrorism, special forces or units from the TNI have an important role in assisting the government and the National Police to limit and overcome the movement of terrorist groups.

According to Hughes (2011), counter-terrorism is not limited to the armed military domain alone. Terrorism counter-terrorism policy in a democratic country requires specific actions with a concept to

be as ideal as possible. The specification of the issue of terrorism in preventive and pre-emptive measures requires a mechanism which Hughes later relates as the "CONTEST" (Counter-terrorism strategy), which is an acronym for the official implementation of the British government's handling of terrorism strategies. Hughes (2011) has stressed a strengthening in institutional cooperation and internationally.

Hughes (2011) tried to compare policies in Britain and America as a liberal democracy with steps that support the citizenry from the point of view of military institutions. This is because armed handling only applies to the scale of the terrorist attacks. So, that each specified threat requires specific and individual solutions.

This approach became the main focus for Hughes in seeing the role of armed government institutions in democratic countries or even in countries that are culturally religious (non-democratic), such as Saudi Arabia, which he considers to still require a cautious measure in the handling of civilians. This approach is used conceptually because, in taking steps in a liberal-democratic country, it is necessary to avoid or minimize acts of violence by repressive governments that are capable of inviting state terror or fear of civil society in general.

In the Indonesian context, the concept of combating radicalism and terrorism has entered a more civilized stage. Since the separation of the TNI and the National Police, terrorism has been categorized as a serious security threat, which is the main task of the Police. However, in carrying out comprehensive actions according to the CONTEST standard, there are indications of countering terrorism in both the upstream and downstream stages (the Police and the State Intelligence Agency).

By reflecting on research conducted by Hughes (2011), a democratic government will experience the dilemma of facing the threat of terrorism on a global scale. Armed institutions, which are needed as important instruments in dealing with terrorist movements, are ideologically confronted with the threat of human rights actions if they stray beyond their proper limits. That is not to mention the existence of a bully effect, referring to actions or indications of strengthening of military institutions such as the TNI.

Even though the country through the BNPT and Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88 (special unit of the Indonesian National Police for combating terrorism) has been trying to prevent and take action to pressure radical groups who carry out terrorist acts, in reality these actions still occur in Indonesia. Therefore, efforts to eradicate terrorism cannot be done partially or separately, but must be integrated with various methods involving several parties. In certain contexts, the state through the government can ask the TNI to help the police to pursue terrorists or groups, especially if the group has threatened the country.

In the case of handling terrorism, the police and the TNI have significant contributions to make. Several military units, such as Special Detachment 81 Kopassus (Army/TNI AD), Jalamankara Detachment (Navy/TNI AL), Bravo Unit 90 (Air Force/TNI AU), and Joint Special Operations Command (Koopssusgab) have participated in handled terror activities. These teams have the responsibility for handling acts of terrorism. In 2005 the TNI received an order from the commander to carry out a chase-and-ambush mission against the main actor behind the Bali Bombing 2, Azhari, who at that time, according to intelligence information, was hiding in the Batu City area of East Java. Dr. Azhari bin Husin is the person suspected of being the brain behind the 2002 and 2005 Bali Bombings and other Jemaah Islamiyah attacks. Azhari and Noordin Mohammed Top were the most wanted fugitives in Indonesia and Malaysia.

The ambush was carried out after the commander received an intelligence report. He immediately ordered the TNI to ambush Azhari. However, based on orders from the commander, the raid involved Detachment 88, a special police unit for terrorist cases. The involvement of the military in counterterrorism is handled according to legal and political judgments and House of Representatives supervision. TNI was asked to help the National Police in the pursuit of several terrorist groups in Central Sulawesi.

In the case of the OPM rebellion, the TNI was asked to assist the police in responding to the terror committed by the OPM (now also called an armed criminal group). In the most recent case, in March 2020, the government, represented by the Minister of Home Affairs, asked the TNI and Polri to strengthen security in Papua in order to stop the terror that was again carried out by the OPM. The Home Affairs Minister revealed that the terror had lasted for a week, as the group had driven some 1,500 terrified residents from a number of villages in Tembagapura and forced them to evacuate to the City of Timika. (Chairunnisa, 2020).

Preventive

Preventive action against the threat of terrorism is considered the most effective, especially compared to others that prioritize physical or armed strength. Preventive measures include surveillance, so that people do not take steps that are contrary to applicable laws and regulations.

Building public awareness about the importance of maintaining Pancasila as the state ideology, and maintaining national unity are more important than physical measures. Pancasila lists Indonesia's national values, as prescribed by President Sukarno in 1945: belief in God, Indonesian nationalism, civilized humanity, democracy, and social justice. Preventive efforts can be considered more efficient than counteracting radicalization and separation carried out by extremist and separatist groups. Efforts to overcome terrorism cannot be done partially by only prioritizing hunting and arresting terrorists, because if the roots of the terrorism problem are not resolved then the existing network will still be able to develop.

In combating terrorism, the main thing, according to the informant, is to take preventive measures. Preventive action is carried out by an educational process and connection with the community. This process also needs to involve several important social elements, such as community and religious leaders. The involvement of such figures creates a kind of social supervision. Community and religious leaders can help the government and national security agencies to provide good education about religious teachings, nationalism, and unity.

Terrorism prevention efforts cannot ignore the role of the wider community and social environment. The contribution of the community is huge, both in the context of severing the ideology of terrorism, detecting the presence of terrorist groups, and controlling the network of violence. The community and social environment play important roles in detecting and preventing the growth of terrorist networks. In fact, their preventive roles can be optimized to break the chain of terrorism at its roots. A social environment that does not care about community activities can be exploited by terrorist groups to sow and grow their fertile movements. From existing cases, we can see how the patterns of terrorist recruitment still rely more or less on the same patterns, namely through friendship, family, and closed-door meetings. But it cannot be denied that the social environment can also contribute to fertilizing a terrorism network if the community tends not to care about what is happening around them. On the contrary, if the community is active and concerned with the environment, it can play a role in inhibiting and preventing the growth of terrorism.

There are at least two models of community life that have been utilized by terrorism networks. *First*, urban communities. The life culture of urban communities tends to be individualistic and not care about each other. They are not familiar with each other are often used by terrorist groups to hide in the midst of society. In a city community that is very busy with its affairs, terrorist groups are free to arrange and plan various forms of crime.

The results of the study show that the daily activities carried out by terrorism networks commonly successful in deceiving the surrounding communities. Members of terrorist networks can disguise their activities as

"normal" tasks common to all. Therefore, it is not surprising that people are often shocked when the authorities announce that their neighbors are members of terrorist networks. The appearance that one presents to the community is one of a good person, especially when viewed in moral and ritual expression. Here it can be stressed that there were no crimes or mistakes in their routine activities and rituals.

Second, base society. Base society is a community of people who share a common ideology and ideals of struggle with terrorist groups. Based on this similarity, terrorist groups have the freedom to carry out various kinds of criminal plans. Instead, of meeting resistance from the surrounding community, terrorist groups are often protected and even positioned as heroes by the base community.

In certain foreign countries, terrorist groups are able to hide in the midst of base communities. Such is often the case in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where not a few of the local people become protectors for radical groups like the Taliban. In a national context, the experience of terrorist groups hiding and moving behind the larger base society is minimal.

This kind of experience does indeed occur in certain regions in Indonesia, but it is very rare compared to the entire archipelago which, in essence, will reject the existence of terrorist groups in their communities. Of course, this is a very encouraging reality for all parties. The attitudes of community and religious leaders, chaplains and boarding school elders, who firmly reject terrorism and provide a correct understanding of religious teachings to the students and the surrounding community, shows that Indonesian people continue to preserve their culture of tolerance and mutual cooperation. Instead of protecting the outlaws, the community is often proactive in reporting things that are considered suspicious in the surrounding environment.

The prevention model above can also be used to deal with terrorist groups motivated by separatism. Only an effort to encourage social and economic equality is needed, because the initial motive for separatism is due to social and economic *in*equality. The TNI, among others is also carrying out a social approach to religious leaders, the community, and culture, by posting TNI personnel in each village. Citizens are also encouraged by government help with community education, development, and health programs. In the case study in Papua, several TNI personnel helped educate students in remote areas with reading lessons, arithmetic, and nationalism. They were also tasked with helping to build roads, bridges and school buildings. For the health sector, medical personnel from military units are assigned to provide health assistance to the community.

Chasing Terrorist

Chasing terrorist groups is another step taken jointly between the police and TNI personnel. Chasing terrorists is also categorized as carrying out tasks in an effort to overcome the threat of terrorism. Based on information from the informants, the involvement of the TNI unit starts with requests from the police. This is based on laws and regulations governing the main tasks of the police force in the security sector. Although acts of terrorism can threaten the country's sovereignty, as long as the police feel they can handle them independently, they are fully the responsibility of the police. However, if the TNI is needed, it must be ready and willing to help.

Related to the involvement of the TNI in the pursuit of terrorist groups, in a statement, the TNI Commander emphasized that the TNI's position was only to mobilize personnel assistance and provide strategic input to the police. TNI-Polri conduct operations together with the purpose of creating stable domestic security despite the numerous kinds of armed security disturbances carried out by terrorist groups.

TNI assistance to the police in pursuit of terrorist groups did not only happen once. Based on investigators' reports and information conveyed by several informants, it is known that in 2014, the TNI

and the police jointly arrested suspected terrorists in Surabaya, East Java. The police even said that the arrest was a form of synergy between the TNI and National Police in security activities.

The importance of anti-terrorist efforts is not only the reaction to criminal acts they may have committed, but also to prevent their movements from attracting new members. Intelligence reports say terrorists have begun recruiting children under the age of 10 to be trained and that it is feared that they will build networks to form terrorist cells. Therefore, to prevent the occurrence of such undesirable activities, such as community recruitment, pursuit operations against them must be carried out quickly and efficiently.

Where the need is to pursue and capture terrorist groups, the TNI personnel is trained to search for clues and in tracking. Of course, this is very useful in facilitating the pursuit of terrorist groups. The soldiers in the TNI are trained on a regular, gradual, stratified, and continuous basis.

Preparation and Mitigation

Referring to (Richardson, 2006), an effective counter-terrorism strategy objective is not just limited to eradicating terrorists, but also preventing acts of terrorism. In the Eradication of Terrorism Act of 2003, the nuance of eradication still feels strong because the Act was passed following the 2002 Bali bombings so that it is strategically focused on eliminating terrorist groups not on the chain effect of the event.

Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 and the bombing on Bali on October 12, 2002, terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and JI have become priority targets in the fight against terrorism. In preventing and overcoming terrorism, the government continues to be guided by tested, reliable principles, namely, to carry out preventive and repressive measures supported by efforts to strengthen the legal framework as a basis for proactive steps, especially in exposing terrorist networks. On the other hand, preventive and repressive efforts will not run well if there is no preparation and mitigation process for handling terrorists.

The exchange of information and other assistance can be used to prepare for and mitigate terrorist attacks domestically and with foreign agencies. As part of its efforts to limit the space for terrorists, the government continues to encourage appropriate authorities to improve airport, seaport, and border controls, including funds flow, both domestic and international. This is a strategy in the effort to mitigate the threat of terrorism, because without these actions it will be difficult for the government and officials to be able to monitor the movements of terrorist groups.

In the effort to control the threat of terrorism, there are a number of other mitigation measures established by the government as part of the preparation process, including: TNI, police, and government agencies will be responsible for controlling and supervising the use of explosives, chemicals, firearms, and ammunition. Aside from academics, community leaders, religious figures, and government agencies, the military, police, and government agencies also conduct in-depth assessments. The holding of cultural titles and lectures on national insights, and the dissemination of literature on the dangers of terrorism, creates a positive public perception of the government's steps to combat terrorism in Indonesia, is part of terrorism threat mitigation.

For the TNI to prepare and mitigate the threat of terrorism requires primary sources and information networks, along with coordination with the Police and National Intelligent Agency. The role of the TNI in building a support system against terrorist threats confirms that this institution is a strong pillar of the security system.

There is every reason to expect that in the future we will see a greater variety of terrorist attacks, with more complex and massive formations. In addition, the selection of targets to be attacked has been expanding. They are no longer limited to the West, but may include domestic people such as law

enforcement officials, especially prosecutors and judges. In this case, the fight against terrorism must be approached comprehensively and cover numerous aspects, such as: prevention, investigation, justice process; formulation and drafting of anti-terrorism law; and efforts to correct the root causes of terrorism. And if classified, these factors would be included:

1. Implementing a military strategy: A major focus of military operations is the destruction of terrorist groups by means of underground operations. It is imperative that anyone planning or assisting a terrorist plot understands that he or she will face punishment and hunting down. It will disrupt their operations, drain their finances, and invade their hideouts. Military operations will be unaffected if this succeeds. Teaming up with Detachment 88/Antiterrorism from the police and anti-terrorist units from the TNI will be more effective. It is imperative to overcome obstacles to implementing the SOP and Act with a long-term view, since terror threatens Indonesia's credibility and development in security terms. An attack on the government could put an end to all the government's plans in the blink of an eye.
2. Political strategy. Due to the threat of terrorism, the political system needs to be reorganized. It is crucial that political elites speak with one voice, unlike in the past, to deal with terrorist problems in an efficient and unanimous manner. Several differences of opinion emerged among the political elite following the Bali Bombing. There must be political pressure on eradicating terror aimed at radical terror groups and not Muslims by including Islamic political figures in the handling of cases. A broad consensus is needed at the national level. As a matter of national security, political alliances play an important role.
3. Cultural strategies. It is the government's responsibility to assist and make sure young people are aware of matters related to religious and nationalist education, along with community leaders, religious leaders, and cultural figures. It has been reported that several of them have been scouted and made into cadres. The "doctrine of heaven" easily indoctrinates young members of the group into killing and dying. It is important to sensitize young people to return to their community and to understand the meaning of martyrdom and jihad. Through strategic policies that are effective and on target, acts of terrorism in the country will be more easily overcome. As for separatists, a cultural approach is needed because community leaders have a strong influence on citizens. They can help suppress terrorism carried out by separatists.

Social Communication

Overcoming terrorism in a social framework is a more subtle preventive measure. The TNI, in general, follows a social communication approach. This process must be based on a sense of need and agreement to build understanding. Dialogue between religious and cultural leaders, together with the government and community representatives requires the same concept of speech space, such as where discursive space is built. Discourse must be built in with the desire to minimize the suspicions of each party.

Terrorists who target the government on the basis of belief are an extension of Western imperialism. On the other hand, the state is obliged to maintain stable security and is very cautious about responding to the actions of radical groups that may be strongly related to the interests of foreign agents. Intensive dialogue involves various elements related to the community, specifically religious leaders.

New breakthroughs can be made only if the dialogue process in the discourse runs efficiently. Dialogue is a domain of knowledge and culture in solving problems. It requires concepts, mature thinking, empathy, and strong communication, with all its variants. Foucault (1976) presents the main issue with regard to position and point of view from which the person speaks and institutions which encourage the person to speak, and who store and distribute the things said. Therefore, in the process, several aspects of power and history that will shape the thoughts and knowledge of that person will be measured. And these thoughts and institutions can be seen through the representation of the real actions of the parties.

Conclusion

As part of Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts, the TNI has undergone several phases. TNI's primary task, according to Law No. 34/2004 concerning the TNI, is to maintain the Republic of Indonesia's territorial integrity and sovereignty because of the separation of the TNI from the National Police for defense and security.

Law Number 15 Year 2003 Concerning the Eradication of Terrorism leaves limited space for involvement of the TNI in counter terrorism. Through the MOOTW, the TNI now has a stronger voice in counterterrorism efforts under Law No. 5 of 2018.

Regarding the operations that have been carried out by the TNI in counter - terrorism in Indonesia, TNI has made a real contribution, as shown by intelligence and counter-intelligence actions, and the chase for terrorists. Disregard the position of the TNI as a supporting element, based on socio-cultural ties owned by the TNI as a people's army. The concrete manifestation of the TNI's role is seen in the capture of the people responsible for Bali Bombing 1 and 2. Together with the National Police, the TNI has succeeded in eliminating terrorists and developing approaches to prevent the spread of radical views in Indonesia. The pattern of social communication carried out by the TNI has produced significant results.

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