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The Interaction of the Ottomans with the Foreigners A'laj in Algeria during the Ottoman Era

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Abstract:
During the Ottoman period, Algerian society was divided into two main groups: urban residents and rural dwellers. Each group comprised various social categories, each differing in size and social status. Among these social groups, the Ottomans and the *A'laj* (foreign converts) had particularly distinct interactions in urban centers.
The term *A'laj* referred to Muslims of European origin—Europeans who were formerly Christians and had converted to Islam, becoming known as *'Alj* or *'Uluj*. Their presence in Algeria during Ottoman rule led them to occupy various political, administrative, and leadership positions. Their integration with the Ottomans fostered interactions across diverse domains: social, cultural, political, and military. This research paper seeks to explore these areas of interaction, addressing the following main question: What were the spheres of interaction between the Ottomans and the *A'laj* in Algeria?

Keywords: *A'laj*; Ottomans; Algeria; Navy; Janissaries.

Introduction:
The term *A'laj* (singular *'Alj*) originally meant "a coarse man" or "a man with a beard," and was commonly used to mean "infidel[1]." They were also known as *Ṣaqāliba* (Slavs), a term referring to a people of mixed European and Asian origin. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī described the *Ṣaqāliba* as "a people with red complexions and flowing hair, bordering the lands of the Khazars in the highlands of the Romans." He also noted that *Ṣaqāliba* lands lay between Bulgaria and Constantinople. Culturally, the *Ṣaqāliba* were divided into two main groups: those aligned with the Eastern Orthodox Church and those with the Roman Catholic Church. The term *Ṣaqāliba* was also applied to prisoners captured by German armies from across Europe and sold to Al-Andalus as children and youths. They quickly learned Arabic, converted to Islam, and some even acquired vast estates[2].
In Al-Andalus, the *Ṣaqāliba* played a significant political role as their numbers grew. They eventually formed a distinct social class that left a cultural legacy. They migrated to North Africa during the Reconquista, arriving from diverse European backgrounds—including Germanic cities, Italy, France, Catalonia, and Galicia in northern Spain—through purchase, raids, or Mediterranean coastal incursions, and sometimes as diplomatic gifts.
In the Zayyanid period (central Maghreb), the *Ṣaqāliba* or *A'laj* were raised as Muslims and trained in palace duties, serving the royal harem. They also formed special military units and palace guards, held leadership roles, and occupied ministerial and chamberlain posts. One notable figure was Hilāl al-Qaṭlānī, originally a Christian captive from Catalonia, who was taken to Granada and later gifted to the Zayyanid Sultan ʿUthmān Yaghmurasan. He became known as Mihlal al-Qaṭlānī and was among many *A'laj* who held political and social influence in Tlemcen, forming a significant corps of commanders and officers in the Zayyanid army[3].

The Meaning of *A'laj* in the Modern Era:
In the modern era, the term *'Alj* referred to prisoners of war who became Ottomans through their roles and functions[4]. These *A'laj* were Christians captured in raids and sold—usually to influential individuals who raised them alongside their biological children. These youths often readily abandoned their ancestral religion and adopted the faith of their new masters, sometimes even inheriting their positions.
Another group of *A'laj* included those who, having despaired of ransom, sought to improve their social status by renouncing Christianity[5].

[1] Jamal Eddine Abu Al-Fadl Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab, Vol. 4, (no edition), Dar Beirut for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 1968, p. 360.
[2] Abdelaziz Filali, Tlemcen in the Zayyanid Era, Vol. 1, Marqam Publishing, Algeria, 2007, p. 184.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Mahfoud Ramoum, Culture and Acculturation in the Algerian Urban Society During the Ottoman Period (1519–1830), Master's Thesis in Modern History, supervised by Kamal Filali, Emir Abdelkader University, Constantine, 2002, p. 54.
[5] John P. Wolf, Algeria and Europe (1500–1830), translated by Abu Al-Qasim Saadallah, National Publishing Foundation, Algiers, 1986, pp. 163–164.

According to Haedo, *A'laj* were "Christians by blood and descent who willingly became Turks." They also included Europeans who voluntarily came to Algiers, renounced Christianity, and sought safety and security[6].
In foreign literature, they were often referred to as "apostates from Christianity." Many had fled the oppression of reactionary monarchies and the Church's dominance over all aspects of life and thought in Europe—a situation that profoundly harmed the European populace economically, socially, and spiritually.
Their influx into the Regency of Algiers began in the 16th century, especially from Mediterranean cities like Genoa, Naples, and Venice, as well as Spain, Portugal, northern lands, Germanic cities, and the Netherlands[7]. However, each *'Alj* in Algeria represented a unique case, with individual motives for embracing Islam.
The Ottomans of Algiers viewed these new converts (*al-muhtadin al-judad*) as an opportunity to strengthen their presence in Algeria, as their numbers were relatively small compared to the local Algerian population. This strategy represented an attempt to create a form of balance between a local majority and an ethnic minority foreign in geography, ethnicity, and language. It also aimed to bolster a human force capable of deterring rebellion and secession, challenges the Ottomans frequently faced in this territory, especially since multiple fronts were opened against them at the outset of their presence.
The first rebellion the Ottomans encountered came from political and economic stakeholders who felt deprived of their former influence and privileges. Contrary to common belief, scholars, religious figures, and the general populace did not reject Ottoman rule; on the contrary, they allied with the Ottomans, which harmed the interests of certain factions and led some to revolt. The movement led by Salim al-Toumi[8i]was the first attempt to break away from Ottoman allegiance. After quelling his rebellion, Aruj (representing Ottoman authority in Algeria) faced another uprising by the city's bourgeoisie, particularly the merchant clans of Mitidja. These merchants perceived the Turks as a foreign, incoherent group loitering in their streets, posing threats to their women and their goods[9].
In the autumn of 1517, they orchestrated a plot whereby armed tribal men entered Algiers under the guise of trade. Some burned Turkish ships docked at Bab El Oued while others attacked Aruj's men within the city. However, Aruj thwarted the conspiracy by locking the plotters—composed of notable figures and nobles—inside the mosque during Friday prayers[10]. This was just one of many conspiracies aimed at destabilizing and undermining Ottoman rule from within by local leaders, not to mention the constant external threats from the Iberian Peninsula. In this context, the *A'laj* represented an irreplaceable opportunity.

Celebration of the *A'laj*'s Conversion to Islam:
Upon the conversion of an individual *'Alj*, special celebrations were held following the customs and traditions for new Muslims. The conversion took place in front of the governor and the members of the *Divan* (council), followed by festivities. If multiple converts were involved, they would be paraded through the streets on decorated, saddled horses, accompanied by military music and soldiers. Money was collected as a symbol of the public's joy at their conversion. Most of these *A'laj* would enlist in the military, receive fixed salaries, and have their names registered in the army's rolls. They also participated in the spoils of naval campaigns. This applied to those who converted willingly; forced converts were not celebrated but still received the rights accorded to soldiers[11].
The Ottoman Turks integrated the *A'laj* into influential positions, and they gradually gained status within the power structure, eventually serving as advisors, ministers, and military trainers. Despite their elevated roles, they posed no threat to the authorities. Instead, they assimilated, intermarried, and merged with the ruling elite. The real danger—the proverbial "time bomb" threatening the Ottoman presence—came from the local populace, who expressed dissatisfaction with the nature of Ottoman rule and the marginalization policies they endured.
As for the number of *A'laj* in Algeria, historical sources vary widely. Most of the records come from consuls and captives, whose presence and activities were concentrated in Algiers more than elsewhere. Consequently, their estimates often fail to account for the entirety of the *Regency*, including its eastern and western territories.
Haïdou estimates their number at twenty thousand (20,000)[12], while *Grammaye*, who came later, estimates them at twelve thousand (12,000). This decline in their numbers is attributed to the historical period each writer experienced. Their differing assessments of the decrease in the number of new Muslims are due to the reduced activity of maritime jihad, particularly against France and England, as well as the integration of some of them into the ruling elite, where they came to be considered Ottomans. Consequently, their number dropped to about six hundred households of **A'laj** (Christian converts to Islam)[13].

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[6] Fray Diego de Haëdo, De la Captivité à Alger, translated by Moliner Violle, R. A., No. 06, O.D.P.U., Algiers, 1895, pp. 54–55.
[7] Hassani Mokhtar, History of the Zayyanid State – Social Conditions, Vol. 3, Civilisation Publications, Algiers, 2000, p. 26.
[8] Salem Et-Toumi, governor of the city of Algiers and a member of the Tha'aliba tribe, a branch of the Ma'aqil, seized control of the city of Djazaïr Beni Mezghenna when the Spanish occupied Bejaïa in 1510 AD. He settled there for several years. See: Al-Hassan ibn Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Fasi (Leo Africanus): Description of Africa, trans. Mohamed Hajji, Mohamed El Akhdar, (Vol. 2), (n.p.), Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, Beirut: 1983, p. 39.
[9] Corinne Chevalier: The First Thirty Years of the City-State of Algiers (1510–1541), (n.p.), University Publications Office, Algiers: n.d., p. 34.
[10] William Spencer: Algeria during the Era of the Corsair Rulers, trans. and ed. Abdelkader Zbadiya, (n.p.), National Publishing and Distribution Company, Algiers: 1980, p. 33.
[11] Abou El-Kacem Saadallah: Cultural History of Algeria (1500–1830), (Vol. 1), (1st ed.), Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, Beirut: 1998, p. 150.
[12] Fray Diego de Haëdo: Topographie et Histoire Générale d'Alger, op. cit., p. 50.
[13] Mahfoud Remmoum: op. cit., p. 54.

Regardless of the status of these new Muslims or converts of European origin in Algeria, their situation was preferable to apostasy. Renouncing Islam posed a serious threat to their existence, as any attempt to return to their previous faith risked certain death if they were captured by European ships and identified as **A'laj**. In the best-case scenario, they would be hanged without trial. This is because the term **A'laj** in foreign literature and European thought was synonymous with apostasy from Christianity and carried deep connotations of shame and dishonor in the European mindset[14].

The A'laj and Political Leadership:

A close observation of the rulers of Algeria during the Ottoman era reveals a striking phenomenon at the beginning of this period: the majority of Algeria's rulers were of European origin — from among the **A'laj**. This supports the idea that the Ottomans used them as a demographic tool to strengthen the population and that they developed a unique solidarity among themselves.

In the early period, particularly during the era of the *Beylerbeys*, they formed a significant political force, as evidenced by the number who assumed power. Between 1535 and 1580, sixteen Beylerbeys ruled, of whom seven were **A'laj**[15] who held the central authority, even surpassing the influence of the Turks. Among them were:

- Beylerbey Hassan Agha (1535–1544), of Italian origin, succeeded in recapturing the city of Mostaganem from the Spanish in 1539 and repelled Charles V's campaign in 1541. Domestically, he focused on urban fortifications in the Beylik of Titteri, establishing the *Borj al-Fanar* (Lighthouse Tower) in 1541 and the *Sultan Qalassi Fortress*[16].
- The A'laj Ali (1568–1571), originally from the Italian city of Capo d'Istria (*Capodistria*), participated in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. He revoked the French monopoly on coral trade in the El Kala center due to their delay in paying taxes. Shortly after, the city of Tunis was conquered and annexed to the Ottoman Empire in 1587[17].
- Ali Ramadan, of Sardinian origin, was captured by an Ottoman merchant and brought to Algiers. He later rose to the rank of *Pasha* in 1574.
- Hussein Veneziano, named after the city of Venice (Venise) in Italy, reigned during the time the Spaniard *Miguel de Cervantes* was taken prisoner. He was also the first to sign a commercial treaty with English merchants in 1579.
- Ja'far Pasha, of Hungarian origin, began his career in military positions and eventually assumed leadership in 1580. He introduced reforms and improvements, including the construction of the *Qal'at al-Kifan* (Fort of El-Kiffan) east of the capital in 1581.

The influx of converts continued through the 17th century. Notable among them were *Sulayman Qatania* (1617) from Sicily, *Sha'ban Agha* (1661), a Portuguese, and the Italian *Hajj Hassan Mezziomorto* (1683)[18].

However, their numbers began to decline due to peace treaties signed by European states, which reduced the rate of conversion to Islam. Additionally, the *Deys* saw these treaties as limiting financial revenues, prompting them to restrict conversions—sometimes even by force through individual actions.

The A'laj and Military Leadership

1. Their Role in Naval Fleet Construction

The Algerian naval fleet was supplied from multiple sources: some equipment came from the Ottoman Empire, some was locally produced, others were obtained through maritime jihad, and some were provided by foreign diplomats in the form of taxes, tributes, or mandatory gifts in exchange for peace agreements or their renewal — the latter being particularly relevant to our study.

European countries often offered valuable and diverse gifts, yet they deliberately avoided providing weapons or naval equipment, fearing that such items could eventually be used against them. Consequently, Algeria found an opportunity in treaties with smaller nations to include specific clauses requiring the delivery of clearly designated types of weapons and military equipment. Countries like the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden were among the most consistent suppliers to the Regency of Algiers, delivering over long periods essential items such as timber, sails, masts, gunpowder, cannonballs, ropes, iron cables, cannons, sulfur, tar, and saltpeter[19].

Over time, Algeria began specifying its requirements in detail. For example, under a treaty with Denmark in 1746, Denmark agreed to supply ninety 12-pound iron cannons, four mortars (referred to as *mortiers*), fifty masted ships, and one hundred thousand units of gunpowder. If the terms were not met precisely, the Dey would refuse to accept the delivery, as occurred in 1747[20]. However, the acquisition of this equipment should not be interpreted as a sign of deterioration in the quality of the Algerian navy. On the contrary, these items were brought in to improve operational efficiency and ensure the continued strength of the Ottoman-Algerian naval presence.

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[14] John P. Wolf: op. cit., p. 165.

[15] Aïcha Ghatass: Crafts and Artisans in the City of Algiers (1700–1830), (n.p.), National Communication Corporation, Rouiba: 2007, p. 27.

[16] Known today as Borj Moulay Lahcen. See: Abderrahmane Djilali: General History of Algeria, Vol. 3, Dar Al -Thaqafa, Beirut: 1980, p. 67.

[17] Julien Charles-André: History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco from the Islamic Conquest to 1830, trans. Mezali Bachir Ben Salama, Vol. 2, Tunisian Publishing House, Tunis: 1978, p. 349.

[18] Amoura Ammar: Algeria: The Gateway of History, Vol. 2, Dar Al-Ma'rifa, Algiers: 2006, p. 233.

[19] Abbad Salah: Algeria under Turkish Rule (1514–1830), Houma Publishing and Distribution House, Algiers: 2007, p. 322.

[20] Moulay Belhamissi: Marine et Marins d'Alger (1518–1830), Vol. 1, National Library of Algeria, Algiers: 1996, p. 51.

Additionally, the *Deys* employed foreign laborers — prisoners and Jews — in the shipbuilding arsenals for the construction of large vessels and their cannons. Skilled engineers among the A'laj were specifically selected for shipbuilding roles. English sailors such as "Ward," "Samson," and "Edward[21]" also worked as trainers for Algerian *Reis* (naval captains), especially in commanding long vessels.

In the early 18th century, the Algerian fleet witnessed qualitative development with the introduction of round-hull ships, thanks to the pirate *Simon Danser* and new methods implemented by the French engineer *Joffre* during the period of détente in 1798. The use of *proton*-type ships expanded, and Algerian sailors learned how to navigate them from European experts living in the region. These ships were the result of the Industrial Revolution in Europe[22]. As a result, the 18th and 19th centuries marked the golden age of Algeria's naval power, bolstered by European maritime technologies and practices.

2. The Role of the A'laj in Naval Command

The expansion of the Algerian navy's operations led to an influx of Christian captives, many of whom were assigned to prestigious roles after converting to Islam. Their attachment to Algeria, despite their diverse origins, opened pathways to high-ranking positions that were otherwise inaccessible to other segments of the population. In some cases, their conversion to Islam was motivated not by faith, but by ambition — a desire to escape bondage and benefit from the profits of maritime jihad.

Most of the naval captains — referred to in European literature as apostates from Christianity — were not initially organized in formal military units nor did they receive fixed salaries. Instead, they followed the *Reis* they sailed with and received only a share of the spoils acquired during raids. Over time, they came to represent approximately one-third of the leadership within the fleet. Among thirty-six *Reis* commanding ships with more than fifteen Christian rowers, twenty-two were of A'laj origin[23].

An A'laj could rise through the naval hierarchy, beginning as a servant to a ship captain, progressing to the rank of *nawti* (sailor), then to *zamil* (mate), followed by *Reis* (commander), and ultimately reaching the prestigious rank of *Qubudan Reis* (Captain-of-Captains), the highest rank in the naval officer corps[24].

Among the most famous A'laj naval commanders was A'laj Ali, previously mentioned. Before assuming the position of governor, he served as commander of the fleet. He was physically disabled, a condition that subjected him to mockery by his fellow Christian captives, who were often chained to the ships during raids or piracy missions. He endured numerous insults and was so ostracized that others avoided even eating near him. This mistreatment was likely a significant factor in his conversion to Islam, as it offered him a way to escape the abuse[25].

Another notable figure was Murad Reis, who served under *Reis Qara Ali* and was later promoted to command a naval unit under *A'laj Ali*. Through his successful missions, Murad Reis elevated the reputation of the navy—most notably when he captured a Sicilian ship carrying the Duke of Terranova, the military governor of the city, along with a large number of captives and a technologically advanced vessel[26].

As for ship ownership, many vessels were privately owned. This created opportunities for wealthy European individuals to engage in profitable ventures. Many seafarers, such as *Simon Danser* and *Suleiman Reis* (a Frenchman from La Rochelle), viewed their time in Algerian service as a temporary measure. After accumulating wealth, they often attempted to escape service and return to support their countries—whether France or the Knights of St. John[27].

These exceptional cases raise critical questions about the true motives behind their conversion to Islam. Was it genuine religious conviction, or rather a response to personal crises or social constraints? Despite these irregularities, many of them still entered naval service. Among these were *Ferrér Reis*, a Genoese; *Batrabillo*, a Spaniard; *Murad Reis the Younger*, a Greek; *Hasis Reis*, from Crete; *Omar Reis*, from Rhodes; and *Mami Reis*, a Sicilian[28].

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[21] They were affiliated with the Levant Company, as Queen Elizabeth of England granted in 1581 a group of merchants exclusive trading rights with the Ottoman Empire for seven years. This group formed what became known as the Levant Company. Upon the expiry of the company's charter, it was renewed by the Queen in 1592, and the company took its official name "Levant". This company played a major role in trade with the Levant region. See: Abdel Raouf Jabr Al-Qutaty: A Study on the Beginnings of Exploratory Occupation in the Levant, Palestine Dialogue Network, 20/10/2011, website: http://www.paldf.net, 19:36.

[22] Saidouni Nacer Eddine, Sheikh Mahdi Bouabdelli: Algeria in History: The Ottoman Era, Vol. 4, National Book Foundation, Algiers: 1984, p. 65.

[23] John P. Wolf: op. cit., p. 107.

[24] Bouaziz Yahia: A Concise History of Algeria, Vol. 2, University Publications Office, Algiers: 1999, p. 176.

[25] Western writings have often questioned his conversion to Islam, as noted by the testimony of his French ambassador friend, who claimed he practiced Christianity in secret. It was also said he treated captives with compassion, refusing to sell or force them into hard labor—perhaps naturally, given his own past experience. But how do we explain the generous offers he repeatedly rejected from Philip II, son of Charles V, who proposed high-ranking positions in Spain or Sicily in exchange for collaboration? See: Fares Mohamed Khair: Modern History of Algeria: From the Ottoman Conquest to the French Occupation, (2nd ed.), Dar Al-Sharq Library, Beirut: 1979, p. 51.

[26] John P. Wolf: op. cit., p. 260.

[27] An organization originally founded to assist sick pilgrims visiting Jerusalem in 1113 AD, later transformed into a military order during the Crusades (1137 AD). Its members fortified themselves in Cyprus and captured Rhodes in 1310, hence becoming known as the Knights of Rhodes. In 1530, they moved to Malta and became known as the Knights of Malta, and are attributed to Saint John who blessed the order. See: Al-Munjid fi al-A'lam, (16th ed.), Dar Al-Machreq, Beirut: 1988, p. 410.

[28] Yahia Bouaziz: op. cit., p. 177.

Furthermore, the diverse social origins of these European-born Muslims played an important role in shaping their behavior and interactions. Most of them came from social classes opposed to the feudal aristocracy that dominated economic, political, and cultural life in Europe in alliance with monarchies. This background influenced their activities as sailors and partially explains the hostile European reactions to their actions, as well as rising concerns that their naval endeavors might align with anti-feudal and anti-monarchical movements in Europe[29].

This human diversity is precisely what endowed the naval system with both comprehensiveness and specialization, enabling it to foster civilizational interaction through a variety of abilities, capacities, and talents, ultimately giving rise to new perspectives. It would be misleading to attribute the strength of the navy during the Ottoman era solely to European leadership—a view often used to discredit the foundations of the modern Algerian state. Rather, this strength should be attributed to the integration of European and local elements, united under an Ottoman spirit on Algerian soil.

3. The Role of the A'laj in the Janissary Corps

The Janissary Corps in Algeria was structurally similar to that of the broader Ottoman Empire, with one key difference in composition: the imperial corps was largely Turkish, while the Algerian one was composed mainly of Asian and European recruits[30]. The navy achieved considerable superiority despite the pressure exerted by the Janissary forces. In response, Khayr al-Din Barbarossa established a new military force consisting of five hundred A'laj, alongside other troops recruited from Albania, Greece, and local tribal groups, forming a total force of approximately 8,000 soldiers[31]. He entrusted their leadership to loyal and experienced captains from among his trusted associates.

Khayr al-Din's decision to create this parallel force stemmed from his urgent need to confront the challenging conditions surrounding him: the ongoing conflict with the Spanish across various coastal outposts, interference from the Hafsid dynasty aimed at weakening his control, internal resistance from entities such as the Kingdom of Kuku and the Tha'aliba tribe who opposed Ottoman presence, and the logistical difficulty of securing reinforcements from the Ottoman Empire, which was deeply engaged in its own wars and conquests in Europe.

Unsurprisingly, this initiative was met with opposition from the Janissaries, who viewed it as a direct threat to their power. The discontent extended to Istanbul, where it was seen as the early stages of a separatist movement. However, due to the naval weakness and the oversight exercised by the Janissaries, the policy was allowed to continue under Khayr al-Din's successors. As tensions escalated between the Reis corps (naval commanders) and the Janissaries, Muhammad ibn Salih Reis in 1568 resolved to open military and naval service to both factions. This decision effectively created a system of mutual exchange, and through this new opening, the A'laj gained access to military barracks that had previously been off-limits to them[32].

Although this policy was intended to reduce tensions by offering voluntary enlistment, it ultimately escalated the conflict. The Janissaries considered themselves more entitled to war spoils than naval forces, as they viewed themselves as the foundational nucleus of the Ottoman state and its provinces. In contrast, the navy, in their view, only began to prosper and develop under the leadership of the Barbarossa brothers.

Another segment of the military consisted of Spanish mercenaries who were captured during the failed Spanish Armada attempt to occupy Mostaganem and other coastal regions. These captives were offered freedom in exchange for renouncing their faith and fighting on behalf of the Pasha. However, despite such efforts, since the arrival of the Ottomans in Algeria, the state had never truly freed itself from its reliance on the Janissaries[33].

Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that the Ottoman presence in Algeria during the modern era, in conjunction with the **A'laj**, constituted a dynamic interaction across multiple domains—political, military, naval, as well as social and cultural. This interaction notably influenced the military core of the state, fostering a conducive environment for deeper and more complex developments.

It has also become evident that the relationship between the Ottomans and the **A'laj** was uniquely interactive, more so than with other societal groups. Despite the principle of social isolation that initially characterized their relationship with the local population, mutual influence between the Ottomans and the **A'laj** gradually emerged. This dynamic granted the **A'laj** a distinct social significance and a unique ethnical positioning within Algerian society during the Ottoman period. Even while maintaining their distinct identity, structure, and cohesion, they succeeded—over time—in integrating within the broader Algerian social framework without encountering significant obstacles.

Furthermore, the presence of the **A'laj** in various leadership spheres—ranging from political authority to the military in both its naval and Janissary branches—and the diversity of their roles therein, brought a new vitality and spirit to Algeria under Ottoman rule.

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[29] Mohamed Khair Fares: op. cit., p. 88

[30] Salah Abbad: op. cit., p. 313.

[31] Mohamed Khair Fares: op. cit., p. 87.

[32] Salah Abbad: op. cit., p. 313.

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