

A Critique On The Efforts Of Philosophy Of Language In Settling The Issues Related To The Nature Of 'Meaning'

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Abstract

Philosophy of Language is as old as Philosophy itself. However, it took its prominence in the modern era, during the 20th Century when 'Language' became central to all domains. With the 'Linguistic Turn' by Frege and Russell (1905), the Logico-Semantic approach was founded in the domain of Philosophy and it gave rise to 'Analytical Philosophy'. After the occurrence of the 'Linguistic Turn', language was studied for the sake of itself rather than for anything else, i.e., knowledge, representation of thought, and an instrument to express mental entity. Thus Frege's 'Linguistic Turn' changed the flow of philosophical concern towards matters related to the meaning of language, i.e. reference, sense, truth-value, logic, sentential meaning, intention, and use of language. However, the present paper ends by valuing Chomsky's mentalist stance to account for language. The present paper aims to provide an appraisal by reviewing the efforts of the philosophy of language in the settlement of issues related to the nature of meaning.

INTRODUCTION

Language has persisted as one of the main efforts of philosophy, through the evolution of philosophy. Although philosophy's significance concerning language has been underlined by many scholars, yet, the concentration of philosophy on Language has been fluctuating in comparison with its other concerns, i.e. existence, knowledge, values, logic, and mind. As per Blackburn (2017), philosophy investigates Language descriptively, analytically, and scientifically while taking into account the relationship with its users and the world in which it is being used. Baykent (2016) has defined it as "the philosophy of Language is the field in which philosophical questions about Language are discussed and where the concepts of Language, language ability and the language we speak are viewed philosophically" (p. 13). According to Morris (2007), philosophy of Language investigates about Language, "the words to have meanings and meaning of words" (p. 1). Peregrin (2012) has called it a disproportionate association between philosophy and linguistics analogous to the relationship between an "old fashioned mother and her emancipated daughter" (p. 1). Thus, another fundamental attribute is that the philosophical study of language is different from the scientific study of language (Linguistics).

Philosophy of language takes a universal perspective of natural language, to study language analytically, empirically, and socially. Yet linguistics investigates language based on multidimensional concepts related to different fields of the language, i.e. morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics, etc. (Baykent, 2016). However, one may find it equivalent from the developmental perspective of the investigational focus of Linguistics in comparison with the theoretical focus of philosophy of language. For example, 'semantics' as one of the fields of Linguistics is also a main concern of philosophy of Language.

The twentieth century is patent for the advancement of modern philosophy and analytical philosophy, with the main center of study as the relevance of meaning with its representation. 'Mind' and 'language' are the two components that have remained involved in the philosophical investigation of language (Inan, 2013). 'Mind' is a mental activity, not a mental entity as used to be perceived in historical philosophy, and 'Language' a representation of mental activity (Fennell, 2019). Through the interaction of these two components, Frege and Russell instituted the 'Linguistic Turn' which is one of the prime accomplishments of modern analytical philosophy during the twentieth century. After the occurrence of the 'Linguistic turn,' all philosophers have bowed in the direction of the logical investigation of Language and its different facets, i.e. Syntax, Semantic, or Pragmatic (Baykent, 2016). However, 'Linguistic turn' as a fundamental consideration of the discussion requires a background to substantiate its evolution. Furthermore, 'Language' as a major focus has been approached by many different perspectives, which have been developed as different 'theories of meaning'.

The present paper aims to carry out a thorough appraisal of the 'approaches to meaning'. The paper reviews the philosophers' approaches to the meaning of language from the philosophical perspective.

LOCKEAN 'WORDS'

John Locke, an English philosopher and one of the potential representatives of early-modern empiricism and proprietor of 'Ideational Approach' (1975) claimed that "words are marks of the ideas within the speaker's mind and communication is achieved when the words excite the same ideas in the hearer as they stand for the speaker" (Holm & Karlgren, 1995,

p.3). Locke as an empiricist rejected 'a-priori' fact of ideas and believed that the function of Language had been instrumental, to be used to express ideas of mind, without any cognitive activity. Furthermore, Locke, like other empiricists, agreed on the supremacy of ideas to construct meaning independent of Language practice and considered these meanings to be secretive and idiosyncratic. In such conditions, how these secretive and idiosyncratic meanings of an individual can be understood by someone else who has his own secretive and idiosyncratic meaning in his mind, thus comprehensive communicative activity cannot be experienced (Fennell, 2019). Moreover, a very important yet implausible claim was made by Locke that, "all expressions semantically function in the way as names do" (Fennell, 2019, p. 19). This claim is implausible as names refer to a particular entity to which it stands, yet in language and even across languages, there are tons of common expressions which do not refer to a particular entity or sometimes they do not denote at all, i.e. predicates, common nouns or general terms, sentence connectives, and sentences. These blemishes in Locke on 'words' were identified by Frege and Russell and dealt with by the escalation of 'Linguistic Turn' based on the logico-semantic approach to meaning.

FREGEAN 'LINGUISTIC TURN'

Frege (1989) a German logician and mathematician, in response to the empiricist interpretation of meaning, pioneered 'Analytical Philosophy' and put forth the 'Linguistic Turn'. Perrin (2012) has highlighted that while realizing the rank of 'Language' during Modernism, all modes of knowledge revolved towards Language and it became essential motivation. This methodological approach has claimed that language is the reflection of meaning, thereby, meanings are no more secretive and idiosyncratic; rather they are communal and impartial. As Fennell (2019) explains meaningful communication is likely a shared meaning, which can be reflected through language so that everyone perceives it alike. The fundamental mechanism of this line is that 'Sentence' is considered as a prime component of meaning which can express a complete thought as a 'proposition' and its reference can govern its 'Truth-value', through logical scrutiny of its components and predicate functions (Blackburn, 2017). Thus, the meaning of a sentence is deduced through logical examination in terms of the truth conditions of that sentence, yet, the meaning of words, i.e. names, is determined by its reference.

However, Frege's analogical stance puzzled him in identifying two kinds of identity statements, which seem to be alike but are different semantically, i.e. tautological statements (e.g. The morning star is the morning star) and informative statements (e.g. The morning star is the evening star). Frege ontological stance led him to explore much more than just meaning, which was 'Reference'.

FREGEAN REFERENCE

Frege's (1960) distinction between two dimensions of meaning, i.e. reference and sense, resolved many semantic issues in the philosophy of Language. The achievement owes to his analytical approach to disambiguating the vagueness of surface structure meaning of Natural Language. Therefore, through a logical approach, the actual meaning of the sentence is to be deduced. However, the meaning of a sentence depends on its 'Truth-value', which is determined by its reference. Daly (2013) has supported the argument by stating that "Frege seeks to solve the puzzle of informative identity sentences by distinguishing between what he calls an expression's 'Sense' (*Sinn*) and what he calls its 'Reference' (*Bedeutung*)" (p. 19).

Predicate Frege's distinction between 'Reference and Sense' was based upon referential and existentialist explanations of meaning. The notion of 'Reference and Sense' functions at three linguistic levels of meaning; singular terms as an argument, predicates as a function, and sentence (1960). Blackburn (2017) has explained that according to the Logico-Semantic tactic by Frege, arguments and sentences are complete or un-gappy units, while predicates are incomplete or gappy units. Predicate implements function on arguments to fill the gaps. These gaps can be filled by options of arguments (words), in substitution to one another. For example,

Sentence: Argument	Argument
Sentence: Ali	Philosophy

The logical analysis, based on references of arguments, yields the 'Truth-value' of the sentence. Furthermore, Frege considers sentence connectives as predicates. In this context, Holm and Karlgren (1995) enlighten that all elements in language do not always refer to some object, yet they yield the 'Truth-value' i.e. preposition, and conjunction. Such expressions deduce their 'Truth-value' from non-extensional context, i.e. belief context. Still, the problems remained persistent as explained by Speaks (2019) "a 'Location' in the sentence which is such that substitution of terms which share a reference in that location can change truth-value" (p. 5). Hence, in the belief context, the reference of the non-referring definite terms is taken from the sense of its part, nevertheless, in this way, the reference is not extensional but rather intentional (Fennell, 2019).

However, Frege's linguistic level, a sentence, helps to resolve the problem of non-referring singular definite terms with the notion of 'proposition'. The proposition of a sentence, obtained through the compositionality principle, can provide a thought based on the sense of non-referring terms, which determine the internal reference of a sentence. As stated by Speaks (2019) two propositions with the same sense would have the same reference but the sentences with the same reference can differ in sense. Hence reference is dependent on the sense to provide meaning for a proposition or sentence.

However, Russell and Quine (1953) highlighted the epistemological problem which is the use of the metaphysical entity, i.e. belief, to provide its sense as a reference of the sentence, which cannot be analyzed logically. Thus, the objection applied ontologically to Frege's distinction of 'Reference and Sense'. According to Speaks (2019), such belief expressions have been propositional ascriptions based on 'Attitude' rather than on knowledge.

With the reference to 'Frege's third realm' as thought, Frege himself was unable to explain the abstract processes involved in linking between 'Sense' and 'Words' (Constant, 2003). Frege's abstract concepts of thought and senses are closely related to the Platonic Forms. Concerning the concept of the 'Third World' as a metaphysical entity, Frege failed to explain the process involved in approaching meaning while using language (Blackburn, 2017).

RUSSELLEAN DENOTATION

Bertrand Russell, an English philosopher recognized the epistemological and ontological imperfections in Frege's notion of 'Reference and Sense'. Russell in 'On Denoting' (1905) challenged Frege's psychological and extensionalist views on the concept of objective meaning, though Frege and Russell are considered the founders of 'Analytical Philosophy' and the pioneers of 'Linguistic Turn'.

Frege, as a mathematician and logician, was inclined to generate such a scheme that could have manifold generality overall natural languages. Through "Begriffsschrift" he successfully achieved the aim but with some limitations in its practical execution.

One of these as identified by Russell was 'non-referential definite terms', which according to Frege are proper names, but how could Frege prove the reference or the meaningfulness of the definite article 'the'? This was the main concern of Russell (Blackburn, 2017). For Frege, proper names are significant for assigning the reference, so the 'Truth-value' and meaning of the sentence depends on the reference of its nominal phrases. However, Russell views definite descriptions and nouns as separate linguistic entities for meaningfulness. Russell claims that proper names are concealed quantificational expressions and they are 'demonstrative pronouns' in actual, rather than definite description. According to Peregrin (2012), "From the logical viewpoint, definite descriptions not only fail to qualify as names but are not even self-contained phrases" (p. 9). With the distinction between definite descriptions and a noun phrase, Russell brought a new wave of the 'Theory of Descriptions'. Fennell (2019) not only describes the range of Russell's concept of descriptions but also illuminates the stratagems Russell implemented to deal with the 'Denoting Phrases'. For Russell, definite descriptions are not singular referring terms, they are rather 'general' denoting phrases and include proper names, definite descriptions, indefinite descriptions, genitive phrases, and certain subordinate clauses. Russell believed that in the Logico-Semantic approach, denoting phrases do not reach out to attribute to a single description as its reference, rather they refer to the whole domain of descriptions. For example 'apple' is a denoting phrase, which can have multiple descriptions, i.e. it is red, it is juicy, it grows on trees, etc. Hence, the singular definite term 'apple' becomes meaningful and true when the description in the domain gets satisfied in attributing the object 'apple'. Fennell (2019) explains the scheme used by Russell to analyze the structure of denoting phrases, apparently definite descriptions, which are called 'disguised quantifiers at the logical level of meaning. Definite descriptions are not simple structures as Frege thought, they are according to Russell complex structures consisting of three logical constructs: 'quantifiers, variables and predicates' (Fennell, 2019, p. 94). For example, 'the book of philosophy is on the table'; at the surface level it is a nominal phrase, yet, at the logical level it is a quantifier, as it expresses the existence of quantification of 'single' variables; variables as 'book', 'philosophy' and 'table' and predicate which attaches some kind of attribute to something as function, 'is', 'of' and 'on'. Through this general apparatus, Russell successfully rejected the definiteness of definite descriptions and maintained his stance while establishing meaning as extensionalist and referentialist rather than mentalist. Russell's logical analysis has well been supported by the argument put forward by Speaks (2019) as "Russellianism is a general view about what sorts of things the constituents of propositions are, and does not carry a commitment to any views about the contents of particular types of expressions" (p. 12).

As per Fennell (2019), there are mainly four influences of Russell's 'Theory of Descriptions' on the philosophy of language (pp. 93-94):

- (i) It maintained one of the main characteristics of the 'Linguistic Turn' to establish meaning based on sentence, which Frege failed to do. Russell accomplished it while deducing meaning inside the sentence, from its linguistic context.
- (ii) Russell claimed the independence of meaning of denoting a phrase from its reference. Hence, the sentence is primary in terms of determining the meaning of definite as well as indefinite phrases.
- (iii) As 'Truth-value' has been significant for sentence meaning, which is to be determined through the reference to the real world. Russell's inclination to refer to the whole domain rather than a single object made it plausible. In this way, Russell preserved another motive of the 'Linguistic Turn', the extensionist and referentialist account of meaning.
- (iv) The logical relationship of the hypothetical structure of complex sentences is determined through multiple predicates as variables.

However, Russellean denotational theory of description also confronted glitches. One of these has been referred to by Speaks (2019) which is the plausibility of 'Empty Names', non-referring nouns. Moreover, Strawson found Russell's account of the meaning of sentences to contain 'Truth-value', based on the reference of names or definite descriptions, to be false (as cited by Fennell, 2019). Fennell (2019) interprets that according to Strawson, certain semantic terms could not be applied to sentences, phrases, or expressions but only to their use, i.e. the use of 'I' has different references, depending

on who is using this expression. The person who uses this expression is the reference to this expression (Daly, 2013). However, Russell's response to Strawson's objection exhibited Strawson's stream of thoughts which was that Strawson's perspective of Ordinary language use was based on "Pre-theoretical intuitions" (Fennell, 2019, p. 108).

Donellan's critical reviews in comparison of Frege, Russell, and Strawson asserted that Strawson and Frege were close to having a referring view of descriptions, while Russell's focus was more an attribution rather than on reference to determine 'Truth-value' as well as 'Meaning' (Daly, 2013; Fennell, 2019).

CLUSTER DESCRIPTION MODEL

To address the problems of Russellian descriptive theory, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle contributed to what has come to be called 'the Cluster Description Theory' with less rigid principles to determine the reference of description (Fennell, 2019, p. 118). As defined by Morris (2006), a reference of a word is determined when a community associates a single term with multiple descriptions and an appropriate description is selected to know the meaning of the certain word. Such as, if two persons understand the meaning of 'Frege', they both will select a suitable description as a reference of 'Frege' from the set of descriptions associated with the term 'Frege'. However, even if both participants do not associate their understanding to the same references for the word 'Frege', they will still be able to associate their meaning with it to some extent. According to Fennell (2019), the cluster theory has tried to solve three problems of Russell's theory of reference:

- (i) Russell's rigidity on the uniqueness claim has been resolved while having a cluster, to get the true description to be associated with the term satisfies the linguistic idealism.
- (ii) Communication becomes easier while having a cluster rather than a unique definite expression. People can interact meaningfully while having a shared cluster to refer to their expressions.
- (iii) In Russell's theory, the predicate has been responsible for deducing the meaning out of logical analysis, in which the law of bivalence is preserved. The denial of that predicate leads to self-contradiction, which is said to be trivial in identity. Thus, in cluster theory, the reference may preserve the denial as well as construct informativeness.

Fennell (2019) expounds that according to Kripke, Cluster Description Theory possessed the same problems as Russell's theory unveiled. The descriptions in the cluster need to be clarified to assign the reference to the word. However, communication can suffer in this way too, as it can create ambiguity between what the speaker refers to from the cluster and what the listener refers to from the same cluster. In such cases, no standard cluster can be determined and, hence, cannot be analyzed. Moreover, the clusters cannot determine on necessary truth, rather would be contingent.

KRIPKEAN'S CAUSATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Saul Kripke brought another revolution in the field of Philosophy of Language (1972). Initially, Kripke has remained inclined to Frege's and Russell's description of referring terms to establish a mediating connection to the actual world. Blackburn (2017) states, "Kripke used a large battery of arguments to suggest that Russell's account of logically proper names should be extended to cover ordinary names, with the direct linkage in their case consisting of the causal chain between the name and the thing referred to" (p. 24). Later based on myriad complications, Kripke rejected the theory of definite descriptions and developed his theory known as the 'Causal-Historical Theory' of reference (Brown, 2017).

While discarding the 'Definite description theory' and the 'Cluster description theory', Kripke claims that reference to an object or the relationship between them is neither a stipulation (to have a unique description) nor it involves content ample conditions (to be allied with descriptions). Reference may still be established independent of such surroundings. According to Kripke the certain expressions, i.e. names, are caused by their existence in the World. Name is related to the object as it is, neither as it is known to us nor how we define it. "According to this view, the references of these terms are not derivatives to, rather constitutive of their content" (Peregrin, 2012, p. 99).

Fennell (2019) explains that the Causal Model has two behaviors to launch reference: 'grounding and borrowing'. Grounding reference is established through a kind of naming ceremonial i.e. baptism. Through the cognitive causal chain, one establishes the reference (name) about the object (baby). When participants of the experience as 'witnesses' subsequently use the reference while using the name, they establish the reference through another causal chain while recalling the event. Borrowing of reference takes place when the witnesses of the event pass the reference to others who were not there while establishing an anaphoric causal chain, using their cognitive and sensory processes. Such names, according to Kripke, are 'Rigid-Designators' that establish the distinctiveness 'in all possible worlds' (Brown, 2017, p. 123). Regarding other definite descriptions, Kripke calls them 'non-rigid designators' as they may vary in different situations as well as in different languages.

Kripke's Causal Model also met much opposition; two of them are highlighted in the present paper. First, for the survival of the names, it requires new links of causal chain to be added up which sounds intentional or artificial rather than a natural process. The second issue with the causal model is the 'qua problem'. While interacting with so many factors, i.e. space and time, it becomes complicated to keep track of appropriate reference established with the object at the time of its origin (Speaks, 2019).

LOGICAL POSITIVIST VERIFICATIONISM

The philosophical wave of logical positivism brought back the empiricist account of knowledge with their updated version during the 1920s and 1930s. All knowledge has to be based on sensory experience which would be considered 'meaningful' if and only if it is consequential (Fennell, 2019). Moreover, logical positivists devised 'the Verification Principle' to test the meaningfulness of the experiences of knowledge. Fennell (2019) has comprehensively described the versions of the 'Verification Principle' from experience to experienceable and from experienceable to practical, with the efforts by Ayre (1936). However, Ayre has been trying to keep metaphysics aside while maintaining the a-priori assets of mathematics and logic, for the sake of protecting scientific laws. Thus, the meaning of descriptions was established based on a logical analysis of the experience process (Blackburn, 2017). The theory has faced many problems, especially regarding the inapplicability of the verification principle, from the perception of an experience as a convention to the confirmation of that experience as its verification. However, Rudolf Carnap's concept of the 'Linguistic framework' (1950) made the meaning-making process more comprehensive than Ayer's, though Ayer's empiricist sense proved to be more rigid. However, differently, Carnap's model held on to the conventionalism as well as the verification principle. Carnap's 'Linguistics Framework' confirmed the meaningfulness of 'a-priori, analyticity and necessity' on the condition of their relativity with that framework. Carnap proposed the concept of multiple 'Linguistic frameworks' for the validity which could be deduced by the relative analyticity of different truths within their relative framework. These frameworks have been based on norms set by the community, i.e. L-rules, which ultimately verify their meaning in relation to their relative framework. Thus, for positivists, all a-priori truths are conventional; therefore, they are analytical, necessary, and meaningful.

DAVIDSONIAN EXTENSIONALISM

Donald Davidson was one of the followers of Frege, but it has been observed that he became more inclined to Alfred Tarski's Truth-Conditional theory of meaning (1944). Despite possessing a structuralist account of meaning, Davidson's account of meaning for their dependency on 'intension', was neither like Russellian denotations nor like Fregean distinction to sense and reference. However, Davidson found that the truth-conditional approach to meaning was much more constructivist in deducing meaning (Speaks, 2019). Yet one may wonder how a 'Truth-value' of a sentence can determine its meaning. Davidson with a few variations to Tarski's theory developed his Own Programme. Daly (2013) explains that according to Davidson, the understanding of natural language sentences has been fundamental which has been developed on the knowledge provided by language on the basis of the knowledge construct beliefs and are justified in relation to the world by using our sense, i.e. in reading, listening, watching, etc.

However, Tarski's knowledge of 'Truth-value' about sentences got 'extensional contexts' to be applied to 'names' (extends as its reference), 'predicate' (extends on the set of description on which predicate functions) and 'sentences' (extends to determine whether it is true or false) (Daly, 2013, p. 229). For instance: The Great Wall of China. 'The great wall' extends as the great wall, the predicate 'of China' extends as the set of 'wall of China' and the sentence "The great wall of China" extends as true, i.e. The great wall of China is T (if The great wall of China is true). Thus Davidson called it a systematic study of natural languages. Although, Davidson encountered many objections to this new perspective of using the 'Truth-value' to determine language, yet, with confusion about whether language has been saved in one's mind as 'T-sentences' or one justifies the 'T-sentences' in the process of their functioning. However, Davidson's contribution is significant as it leads the philosophical trends to take the 'Truth-value' of linguistic facts meaningful with the support of empirical generalizations.

WITTGENSTEINEAN COMMUNITARIANISM

A different kind of approach to the meaning of language was adopted by Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a focus on 'Language Use' by communities rather than on language itself. In this context, Fennell (2019) has explained that Kripke inferred that Wittgenstein established a philosophical perspective to see language as a mutual understanding of a community on language use. Thus, the fundamental contribution made by Wittgenstein was 'Usage Holism': the 'holistic' approach to the meaning of language (Holm & Karlgren, 1995). Peregrine (2012) explains that according to Wittgenstein language is a set of myriad systems; that consists of innumerable linguistic forms (i.e. words, sentences, symbols), perform multiple functions (i.e. questions, requests, commands, etc) and these systems are not static because they are ever-changing with each language like 'Language-games', wherein, new elements come into being and others get forgotten. Thus, Wittgenstein focused on learning 'Language Use', rather than 'Language Forms'. However, to play 'Language-game', one needs to learn its 'rules' to know how to use the linguistic elements appropriately according to community norms.

Fennell (2019) has described that Wittgenstein has differentiated between 'Normative Standards' and 'Bedrock Propositions', as the former are considered as 'illusions' based on behavioral facts blindly followed by the communities for correctness or incorrectness. However, the latter is the primary level where one uses language without justifying it to be correct or incorrect. This primary level is established by a community over time in collaboration with other factors, i.e. 'instruction', 'evaluation', and 'correction'. Yet the system is context-dependent, which changes as context changes. So, consistent scaffolding is required for communal normative standards (Fennell, 2019, p. 12).

However, Wittgenstein's approach to 'Usage Holistic' has developed a new foundational theory the 'Use Theory of Meaning' for 'Speech Act Theory' and for behaviorism (Holm & Karlgren, 1995).

SPEECH ACT THEORIES

The efforts to develop a 'societal' perspective of 'Language Use' in the world of the philosophy of language evolved in the form of 'Speech Act Theories' proposed by J.L. Austin and later developed by John Searle. According to this theory, sentences are considered not only as linguistic units but they are identified by the function they perform. For example, while using a simple statement, 'it is getting hot in the room'; the speaker is performing multiple acts, i.e. request to open the door or to turn the fan on or it can just be a suggestive act to move outside the room etc. However, the suggestive system by Austin did not count on the 'Truth-value' of these sentences, because to do so one has to isolate these sentences from their context. According to Morris (2007), Austin's theory would shift the focus from the logical assertions of the meaning of language to everyday ordinary language use based on societal norms. However, Austin's theory consisted of three main categories of acts:

- (i) 'Locutionary act'- the act of delivery of literal meaning of the utterance.
- (ii) 'Illocutionary act'- when an utterance delivers an extra meaning by using the literal meaning of the utterance.
- (iii) 'Perlocutionary act'- the impact of the utterance on the interlocutor in a specific context. For example:
 - The utterance "I am sweating"
 - Locutionary act 'It is hot in the room'
 - Illocutionary act a request 'to turn the fan on'
 - Perlocutionary act the acceptance or refusal to request

However, Searle observed that the 'Illocutionary act' category can contain 'Locutionaryacts' in it, as the 'Illocutionary'inference is determined by the meanings of 'Locutionaryacts' (Green, 2020). The theory further explains 'Illocutionary acts' mainly, because they involve the speaker's intention as well as the real or the literal meaning to be conveyed.

GRICEAN MEANING

Paul Grice (1975) approached the meaning of language in a very different but practical way. Peregrine (2012) has mentioned that Grice has explained 'Cooperative Principles and its maxims' as rules of communication, "these rules facilitate that saying something can effect conveying something else" (p. 13). It has been explained by Blackburn (2017) that on the basis of tacit agreement between interlocutors, in collaboration with certain "Cooperative Principles," the communicative acts take place in varying contexts. For example, if someone asks, "Where can I get aspirin?" and gets the answer, "There is a canteen around the corner". So, the assumption can be made that the canteen keeps medicines too. According to Grice, such a response is because of participants' use of conversation implicative, implying non-literal meaning. According to Speaks (2019), Grice has focused on two kinds of facts; first, the relationship between the literal meaning of the speaker's linguistic expressions and the meaning the speaker wants to convey by using those expressions: second, the speaker's intentions behind this conversational act. However, 'Speaker's Intentions' remained a focal point to Grice.

The general observation of everyday conversations is that the speakers' intentional meanings depend upon the linguistic meanings, which are understood with contextual clues as well as with the help of speakers' prior knowledge that is shared with the interlocutors. Grice's theory has been 'Speaker's Intention' centered, but one can think 'what makes the audience believe that whatever is being conveyed is true through linguistic expressions. For example, the linguistic expression 'you left your purse out there', is spoken by a shopkeeper, while a customer is leaving the shop. Through this linguistic expression, the shopkeeper intends his interlocutor to believe him and do as he expects, but what if the customer refuses to recognize it as her possession? On the basis of such complications, the theory is questionable because it fails to explain the relationship between the Speaker's linguistic meaning and the Speaker's intended meaning is established?

CHOMSKYAN MENTALISM

So far, different approaches to meaning conceived by various philosophers have been observed from individual, referential, and social perspectives, to investigate ambiguities of language. However, once again the great revolution occurred in the fields of Philosophy and Linguistics. Noam Chomsky, an American Linguist, 1957, presented a new concept for the nature of language as a 'supporting linguistics by mathematics' (Peregrin, 2012). Though, the notion sounds like other modernist philosophers, i.e. Frege, Russell, Mill, Kant, etc, yet, it is nothing like that. Chomsky's (1968) account of language depends upon the mechanism of 'grammar' which must be dependable on as minimal rules as possible but with the capacity to generate as many sentences as possible with universal generalization.

However, such 'essentialism' regarding language processing, is achieved through the Chomskian 'Innateness Hypothesis' and 'Language Acquisition Model'. Chomsky (1986) has successfully proven through empirical studies that language structures are 'pre-wired up' in infants' brains, which helps them to acquire language rapidly without making any effort. Later, Chomsky named the part of the brain responsible for language processing as the 'Language Faculty' (Radford, 2004). It is further divided into two parts: computational component and lexicon (Carnie, 2012). During language processing, computational components apply transformational generative grammar rules and constraints on the lexicon. The lexicon is responsible for determining the meaning, syntactic relation, and phonological and morphological features (Carnie, 2012). Thus, Chomsky's mentalist stance to approach language covers all the essential aspects of universal language as well as particular languages.

INCLUSIVE REVIEW

Language has proven itself as a main concern to philosophy in two ways; First, as an 'object' to relate meaning with: Second, while using it as one approach to truth-value and meanings of things. Philosophy of Language contains multiple perspectives on meaning, starting from Locke who interpreted the meaning of words from the minds/individuals as a subjective entity, Frege's and Russell's analytical approach to objective meanings of sentences as sense and reference, Kripke's causal relations established meaning as the reference to their names. Ayer's instrument of verification principle and Carnap's linguistic frameworks became flexible to accommodate all kinds of knowledge into the scope of logical positivism. Davidson theorized the relevance of truth conditions with meaning without the interference of intentions or real-world context. Wittgenstein turned the flow of focus from the individual to communal and from the meaning of language to the meaning of language use. Austin and Searle constructed further to flourish the focus of meaning to language use but with a turn from structuralism to mentalism to approach the meaning of language in use. Grice put forth the meaning of language depending on linguistic as well as intentional expressions of individuals. Finally, Chomskian mentalist explanations proved to be significant in the field of language and its meaning. However, the list does not end here; it is evolving as the language itself is. Hence, Philosophy and Linguistics go parallel in cooperation with each other. Though it is challenging for the philosophers to manage the impact of each in its domain and the influence exerted upon the other domain, yet, theories are also building an appropriate bridge to facilitate each other; independently or when required. Hence, an integrated philosophical theory of language is required which can possess all the significant properties to determine the correct meaning of natural language.

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