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The Israeli Ministry of Defense (1955 – 1956) and the Role Played by Pinhas Lavon in it

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Preface

Studying the internal conditions of (Israel), especially the Ministry of Defense, is one of the significant topics in the modern history of (Israel). Besides, the role of Pinhas Lavon, who made great efforts in serving the Zionist movement, is of importance as well. Pinhas is considered one of the figures who played a major role in influencing all aspects of life. In (Israel), especially in the political field, in addition to his influence in forming the government and making strategic and crucial decisions at the internal and external levels, resulting partisan division and struggle for power and influence, which was clearly reflected in the Ministry of Defense. Therefore, Pinhas Lavon is deemed one of the most important defense ministers in (Israel).

Abstract

Pinhas Lavon was nominated for the (Israeli) Ministry of Defense by Moshe Sharett's government, to assume his ministerial duties despite the opposition of many figures within the government. Lavon had no relationship with Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff of the Mapai Party. Because they considered themselves Ben-Gurion's successors, and this led to creating a conflict over issues. Basic matters in the affairs of the Ministry of Defense. Lavon faced difficulty in controlling the military, and was manipulated and lied to by (Israeli) army officers. However, Lavon continued his work as Minister of Defense, and worked to repel the Arab attacks carried out by the Palestinians against (Israeli) military targets, at a time when his instructions were being violated by the army leaders, especially Moshe Dayan, who viewed him as having little military experience and that his position would make the military establishment appear weak before the Israelis and the Arab countries, especially after Lavon rejected the United States' position on suspending the economic aid provided to (Israel).

Keywords: Israel, Pinhas Lavon, Ben_Gurion, Defense, topics.

Introduction

The Mapai Party ⁽¹⁾ nominated Moshe Sharett ⁽²⁾ to form the new government from allies of the previous government itself ⁽³⁾, on the 7th of January 1954. The government gained the confidence of the Knesset. On the 26th of the same month, Sharett announced that his government would continue according to the government's plan. David Ben-Gurion ⁽⁴⁾ was the first to discuss issues of security, economics, and foreign policy, and appointed Pinhas Lavon ⁽⁵⁾ Minister of Defense. This is the first time that the Prime Minister is not Minister of Defense at the same time ⁽⁶⁾.

On January 29, 1954, Pinhas Lavon assumed his ministerial duties in the Ministry of Defense.

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Upon his arrival, he met with Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan ⁽⁷⁾, his colleague in the Mapai Party. Relations with the latter were not normal for some time, due to competition within the Mapai Party. Both Lavon and Dayan were members of the second generation of the "State of Israel" from the Mapai party. They both considered themselves successors to Ben-Gurion. The truth is that Ben-Gurion had appointed Moshe Dayan as Chief of Staff in the "Israeli" Army to ensure loyalty to him within the army even after his retirement. This exacerbated the hostility between the two, and created a conflict over basic issues in the ministry's affairs from the first moment. For example, Chief of Staff, Dayan, on February 18, 1954, demanded the purchase of French tanks, and Laffont refused to buy them, explaining that this matter is still premature, but Dayan and Shimon Peres ⁽⁸⁾, Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, saw that it was of utmost importance to establish an alliance with the French government headed by Joseph Lanel, and support its colonial policy in Algeria. Dayan even encouraged Minister of Defense, and Laffont, called for French military cooperation in Algeria, but Laffont's opinion was different from both of them. He realized that the French colonial era had ended, and that the right thing was to strengthen relations with the United States under the administration of President Dwight David Eisenhower ⁽⁹⁾ at that time ⁽¹⁰⁾.

The military establishment's point of view was that establishing military alliances with Western countries would strengthen Israel's security position in light of the threats from the Arab countries and the American reservation to support Israel militarily for fear of the Soviet Union supporting the Arab countries with weapons. Therefore, the military leaders in the "Israeli" army made it clear that establishing a military alliance with France will serve Israeli security interests in the region.

The appointment of Lavon as Minister of Defense raised questions among the military leaders in Israel about the powers enjoyed by the Minister of Defense. The portfolio of the Ministry of Defense, before he assumed his duties, was occupied by Ben Gurion, the dominant Prime Minister, and no one dared to object to him occupying the position of Minister of "Defense". However, when Laffont took office, questions and doubts began to arise about his lack of knowledge of previous military experiences ⁽¹¹⁾.

It is significant to disclose that Pinhas Lavon's thoughts changed when he assumed the duties of the "Israeli" Ministry of Defense, especially since the security reports presented to him by military intelligence showed the interest of the Arab countries, especially the State of Egypt, in concluding deals to purchase weapons, whether officially or unofficially. The Egyptian Republic was negotiating with the American administration to conclude a deal. Purchasing weapons from the United States of America, which raised fears within the Ministry of Defense about Egypt's success in concluding that deal. Also, there was also an equally important reason, which is what Pinhas Lavon found that the senior officers that fought in the Palestine War in 1948, who only believed with the shedding of Arab blood and no hope of changing their ideas. Therefore, he had to follow in the light of their ideas, otherwise he would leave the ministry irrevocably, especially since David Ben-Gurion's disciples were holding high positions in the army leadership, such as Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff of the Defense Forces of "Israel" and Shimon Peres, Director General of the Ministry of Defense, who were calling for a more stringent and aggressive military and political approach. Although Lavon's ideas before assuming the duties of the ministry were focused on state builders - population and demographic stability, international recognition, the economy and negotiation with the Arabs as a means of addressing "Israel's" foreign and military problems, he came to agree with the leaders of army in the aggressive approach or he decided to not

contravene the army's orientations to agree to carry out retaliatory operations against Arab guerrillas ⁽¹²⁾.

So far, it is clear that the presence of Pinhas Lavon in the Ministry of Defense was not welcomed by the military leaders in the Israeli army due to the importance of the position of Minister of Defense. The military leaders considered that the appointment of Lavon was a big mistake, due to his lack of knowledge of military matters related to the "Israeli" army and that the presence of a civilian figure at the head of the Ministry of Defense is one of the things that would expose the security of "Israel" to danger. In addition, they think that the presence of a former leading figure in the Ministry of Defense such as Ben-Gurion, which will make things difficult for Lavon. This fact led to the lack of cooperation with him from senior military leaders such as Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres.

Lavon's views were thwarted from the first day he had assumed the Ministry of Defense due to the military leaders' firm belief in militarism and the use of force by the Israeli army, despite Sharett's efforts during his tenure (1953-1955) as Prime Minister to bring about change. Sharett suffered much from the criticism of Ben-Gurion and his supporters in the government of his policy, especially security and economic. Sharett resisted this, and proposed reductions in military spending for the budget of the Ministry of Defense, which immediately caused Moshe Dayan's anger, and he announced his disobedience to that decision. Lavon tried to win the position of the military leaders by objecting to the proposal presented by Sharett to the "Israeli" government to limit exaggerated military spending ⁽¹³⁾.

It was the infiltration operations carried out by Palestinian guerrillas against "Israeli" military targets that worried Lavon. The main tool for "Israel" to confront the infiltration challenge was the policy of military revenge, and this policy developed in stages until the raid on the village of Qibya ⁽¹⁴⁾, in which revenge was used primarily against civilian targets. The Sharett government was under pressure from the "Israeli" public to respond forcefully to the Arab attacks. This step was an order to implement "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" principle in light of the biblical command, and thus the political climate was generally lenient with regard to the use of force ⁽¹⁵⁾. Military revenge was the central issue in the debate between the military and moderate politicians. The "Israeli" military believed that the Arabs did not care about peace, but rather their goal was only to destroy "Israel." They only understand the language of force, and that "Israel" cannot rely on guarantees from the United Nations or Western powers to protect its security. Therefore, they believe that in order to survive, "Israel" had to make repeated demonstrations of its military power ⁽¹⁶⁾.

As for the moderate politicians, they were more sensitive to Arab feelings and world public opinion. They wanted to create a climate conducive to exploring the possibilities of peaceful coexistence in the Middle East. They also feared that the repeated and excessive use of force would inflame Arab hatred for "Israel" and cause a setback in the prospects for peace. Actually, Lavon, as Minister of Defense, had difficulty controlling the military, especially Moshe Dayan, his Chief of Staff, whom he viewed as a threat to the security of "Israel" ⁽¹⁷⁾.

When the government decided not to take revenge for the guerillas on the Egyptian border with occupied Palestine launching armed attacks against the "Israeli" army during the beginning of March 1954, and causing casualties among the army forces. The army ignored it, and Defense Minister, Pinhas Lavon, found that on many occasions he was manipulated or lied to by Israeli army officers. He was certain that Major in the "Israeli" Army, Ariel Sharon, and

other officers from the infantry units in the "Israeli" Army (101) had ignored the orders of the Minister of Defense not to carry out any operations except with direct permission from the Ministry of Defense. In one of his meetings with the generals, Lafon commented, saying: "We must begin to force the army to respect the state and implement the orders of the Minister of Defense, although it is appreciated that military commanders have the right to make decisions in the war field without referring to the ministry, but the army has not committed to that, especially since we are not now in a situation of war" (18). Lafon found himself in a critical situation, especially since the Palestinian guerrillas ambushed, on March 16, 1954, a "civilian" bus that was on its way from the port of Eilat to Tel Aviv. The gunmen opened fire on the bus, then boarded it to kill those who survived the first attack. In the incident, (11) "Israelis" were killed and (3) of those on the bus survived. After another attack, on March 22 of, the same year near Jerusalem, one "Israeli" woman was injured, so Pinhas Lavon decided to issue orders to the "Israeli" army command to launch a retaliatory operation against the Palestinians and the countries that help them, especially Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon (19).

"Israel" focused on expanding in the Jordan River area in the Hula Valley (20), near the Banat Ya'akov Bridge in the demilitarized zone along the armistice line between "Israel" and Syria. On April 12, 1954, Syria submitted a complaint to the UN Security Council, which ordered the suspension of military actions. As for "Israel", it refused to comply with, and the United States of America announced in the same month, in an unprecedented step, that it would suspend all economic aid to "Israel" (21). This was a surprising step for the Israelis. At a meeting of the Ministerial Defense Committee headed by Israeli Defense Minister, Pinhas Lavon, Lavon strongly refused to submit to American dictates. He asked Israeli Foreign Ministry officials to meet with friends of Israel and members of the Zionist lobby in America, to pressure the American Administration to retract its position. In the end, the Prime Minister, Sharett, surrendered to American dictates, and Israeli forces were withdrawn from that area (22).

On June 30, 1954, Palestinian fighters opened fire on Israeli soldiers in the city of Jerusalem. The result of the operation was (20) people killed or wounded. Many army commanders called for collective military retaliatory action against the Palestinians. *Moshe Sharett* and *Pinhas Lavon* feared the reaction of the United States of America if a massacre was committed against civilians. Lavon's decision was to target military sites of Arab countries away from civilian cities, but the "Israeli" army was using the excuse that Arab military installations were located near civilian homes, and that any targeting would be civilian casualties (23).

The "Israeli" army leaders viewed Lavon as having little military experience and that his position would make the military institution appear weak before the "Israelis" and before the Arab countries, especially since he issued his orders (24) to the army leaders not to cross the borders of Arab lands preemptively and without permission. On the political level, since Dayan had a different military policy than Lavon, he sent him partial or false reports in many cases, as happened when Lavon was informed on July 7, 1954, that shots had been fired at an Israeli Air Force plane. It was flying over the area of Al-Qalaa village, which is close to the city of Jerusalem, and which is under "Israeli" control. Lavon allowed Dayan to inspect the village to determine the location of the shooting, during which the army resorted to violence with the people of the village. It became clear to the Minister of Defense through military intelligence reports that "the plane had crossed The Jordanian border, and that the shooting took place from the area of the city of Hebron, a fact that was known to Dayan and the military leadership." When Lavon demanded an investigation into the matter, Shimon

Peres' response to the Ministry of Defense: "The reports received by Moshe Dayan are correct and that the army leadership confirmed that the issuance of the fire was from the village of Al-Qalaa" ⁽²⁵⁾.

Another example of violating the instructions of Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon is the hijacking of the Syrian plane, on December 12, 1954. Israel was looking for a bargaining chip to release Israeli soldiers detained by Syria, and Lavon allowed Dayan to hijack a Syrian military aircraft if this aircraft crossed the borders of the Arab territories occupied by "Israel" from Palestine or flew near them. However, Dayan ordered the hijacking of a Syrian civilian plane, under the false pretext that it had "crossed the border." Lavon and Sharett ordered Dayan to release the plane and its passengers, and Dayan obeyed the order ⁽²⁶⁾.

The above showed that the leaders of the "Israeli" army tried not to inform the Minister of Defense, Pinhas Lavon, of many matters related to the army. They even deliberately gave him false information or reports that were not clear in the required and sufficient manner in some of the reports on the situation on the border, especially with regard to relations with Arab countries. Despite Lavon's attempts to impose his personality and style on the Ministry of Defense, the conspiracies carried out by Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres constituted an obstacle for Defense Minister, Pinhas Lavon, in his management of the Ministry.

The differences in opinion between Lavon and Peres focused mainly on the issue of the army's control over the "Israeli" economy. Peres claimed that the "Israeli" army and its institutions are the most efficient bodies in the country, especially in controlling the printing industries, the rubber, plastic, and fiberglass industries, and the electronic and electrical industries. However, Lavon had a different point of view than Peres. He believed that civilian companies could operate much more efficiently than army institutions, and that the army's primary mission was to protect the security of "Israel" ⁽²⁷⁾. Despite this, Lavon could not, in his short period of time as being Minister of Defense, implementing his ideas to neutralize the army institutions from controlling the "Israeli" economy ⁽²⁸⁾. Despite the difficult circumstances in which Lavon found himself in his position as Minister of Defense, he was able to record a number of achievements in his favor, including equipping the army with modern combat equipment ⁽²⁹⁾, increasing combat brigades in the army, and merging military units with each other, just as Unit (101) was merged with the Paratroopers Brigade ⁽³⁰⁾.

On the other hand, Lavon failed to issue an order to recruit members of the religious establishment into the army. It was such as a result of the refusal of the religious parties to participate in the government coalition, as well as pressure from Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, who feared a crisis in his coalition government. Lavon was forced to retract this order. He contented himself with establishing separate military units for religious soldiers ⁽³¹⁾. Pinhas Lavon was unlike Ben-Gurion, who visited the Ministry of Defense only once a week, while Lavon was a full-time minister of the Ministry of Defense and his attempt to interfere in the work of "Israeli" military plans, such as the defense system ⁽³²⁾, and Lavon insisted on his right as Minister of Defense to continue meetings with one of the senior Israeli army officials, Colonel Benjamin Ghibli ⁽³³⁾, head of the Israeli Military Intelligence Division, apart from Dayan and Peres. This was also the case when Defense Minister, Lavon, held several meetings with the Air Force Commander, Major General Dan Tolkowski at the end of December 1954, when Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan learned of this, he immediately submitted his resignation, but Ben Gurion, who was far from the government, convinced him to withdraw the resignation. This development did not prevent Lavon from continuing to hold additional

meetings with senior IDF officials ⁽³⁴⁾.

Moshe Sharett preferred to resort to diplomatic action and exclude military action. Therefore, he sent a letter to Gamal Abdel Nasser ⁽³⁵⁾ in October 1954, through the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he announced “Israel’s” readiness for negotiations in order to bring peace to the region, but Pinhas Lavon opposed the idea and was not enthusiastic about it. Because there was a decision rejecting that from the leadership of the “Israeli” army for those negotiations, even though Sharett was the highest authority in the country, but Ben-Gurion’s disciples in the “Israeli” army had actual control over the “Israeli” decision with regard to war or peace, which led to the postponement of any discussions with the Egyptians. The Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser ignored that message, especially after the reports submitted to him by the security services about the responsibility of agents from the “Israeli” Mossad in sabotage operations in Egypt ⁽³⁶⁾. The Charette and Laffont government tried to delude everyone, especially international public opinion, that it seeks appeasement and peace with the Arab countries. It is opposite to the previous governments, but the reality is that it did not differ in its crimes against innocent people from the previous government through killing and displacement.

Conclusions

1. Pinhas Lavon assumed the (Israeli) Ministry of Defense despite opposition from many figures within the government, which did not affect Moshe Sharett’s decision to choose Lavon to take over the ministry.
2. Pinhas Lavon was striving hard to achieve his goals and ambitions, despite the difficulties and challenges he faced from the internal opposition in assuming the Ministry of Defense portfolio.
3. Many of Ben Gurion’s followers, including Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres, made efforts to overthrow Lavon and end the term of his ministry, by violating Lavon’s authority as Minister of Defense, not following his orders, and manipulating and lying to him.
4. It is noticeable that despite the army’s control over the economy, Lavon believed that the army’s main concern is to provide security (for Israel), and at the time he assumed the Ministry of Defense portfolio, he worked to neutralize the ministry’s interference in the economic field.
5. Pinhas Lavon, as Minister of Defense, had an interest in the army through modern combat equipment, increasing the brigades, and merging the military units with each other, so that such an interest would reflect the image of the (Israel) security force.

Footnotes

- 1) Mapai Party: an abbreviation of the full name of the Eretz Yisrael Workers' Party in Hebrew, a socialist Zionist political party, founded in 1930; As a result of the union of the Ahdut HaAvoda and Hapoel Hatzair parties, upon its founding it called for the necessity of achieving socialist Zionism through socialist settlement, encouraging young immigration, and defending workers’ rights within the framework of the Histadrut union. The party succeeded from its founding until the day the “establishment of Israel” was announced. In expanding its influence in the Zionist settlements, the Mapai then became the ruling party in “Israel” after the establishment of the Zionist entity in 1948. For more see: Ibrahim Al-Abed, *Mapai, the ruling party in Israel*, 1st edition, Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, Beirut, 1966.
- 2) Moshe Sharett: He was born in 1894 AD in Ukraine, and moved with his family to

Palestine in 1906. He joined the ranks of the Ottoman Army with the rank of officer during World War I, after which he joined the international Zionist movement and joined the (Workers of Zion) Party, then joined the (Party Mapai) upon its founding in 1930, where he was a founding member of the party. In 1931, he assumed the presidency of the political wing of the Jewish Agency. After the announcement of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, he assumed a number of ministerial positions, including the Prime Minister in 1954, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He died on July 7, 1965 in Jerusalem. See: Moshe Sharett, *Personal Diary*, Translated by: Ahmed Khalifa, Beirut, 1996.

- 3) Moshe Sharett, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Levi Eshkol, Finance Minister, Pinhas Lavon, Defense Minister, Golda Meir, Labor Minister, and Israeli Rocak, Interior Minister. For more, see: Nisreen Saleh, *Internal Political Developments in Israel 1948_1967*, unpublished master's thesis, approved at the College of Arts, University of Basra, 2019, p. 57.
- 4) David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973): He is Chaim Avgdor Green. He was born in the town of Polensk in Poland, which was part of the Russian Empire. He began as a Zionist-socialist activist in his youth, in the "Workers of Zion" party, and immigrated to Palestine in In 1906, he headed the Jewish Agency from 1935-1948, and after the establishment of the Zionist entity in 1948, he became the first Prime Minister and Minister (Defence). For more, see: Ali Adnan Ali, *Ben Gurion and the Zionist Project*, unpublished master's thesis, Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Jordan, 2004.
- 5) Pinhas Lavon: He is one of the leaders of the labor movement and an Israeli politician. He was born in Galicia in 1904. He founded the Gordonia movement in 1924. He immigrated to Palestine in 1929. He became one of the people who rebuilt "Hulada" which was destroyed by the Arabs in 1929. Position as General Secretary of the Trade Union between 1956-1961. In 1961, he was forced to resign from his position due to a security case called (the Lavon Affair), which occurred in 1954 and sparked severe internal disputes and disputes, causing a division within the Mapai Party. He died in 1976. See: Ephraim and Menachem Talmi, *Dictionary of Zionist Terms*. Translated by: Ahmed Barakat Al-Ajrani, Dar Al-Jalil for Palestinian Publishing, Studies and Research, Amman, 1988, p. 241.
- 6) Netanel Iorch, *Major Knesset Debates 1948-1981*, Library of Congress, USA, 1993, p. 701.
- 7) Moshe Dayan (1915-1981): He was born in a settlement in Tiberias (Palestine) in 1915. In his youth, he joined a unit (the Palmach is an organization that split from the Haganah in 1941). He first entered the Knesset from the Mapai party, and Ben-Gurion assigned him the Ministry of Agriculture in 1941. 1959, and he was one of the founders of the party (Rafi: David Ben-Gurion split with prominent members of the Mapai party, such as Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres, as a result of party differences). Together with Ben-Gurion in 1965, he took over the Ministry of Defense in the national unity government formed by Levi Eshkol on the eve of the 1960 war. 1967. He was retired after the 1973 war, and entered the Knesset in its ninth session in 1977 on the Labor Party's list. However, he surprised the "Israelis" when he withdrew from his party and established an independent party in 1980. For more see: Moshe Dayan, *The Story of My Life*, prepared by Shawqi Ibrahim, Cairo, 1977.
- 8) Shimon Peres: An Israeli politician who was born in the city of Bishnava in Balussia in 1923. He immigrated to Palestine in 1934 and joined the Zionist organization "Haganah", and after the announcement of the establishment of "Israel" he assumed the position of Director General in the Ministry of Defense. Between the years 1953-1959, and as Deputy Minister (of Defense) between the years 1959-1965 and he played a major role in the Israeli-Arab wars, he became Chairman of the Labor Party for the period between 1977-1992, and Prime Minister between the years 1984-1986. He also held a number of ministerial positions. He became Chairman of the Labor Party. Again, for the period

- between 1995-1997, and Minister of Regional Cooperation for the period between 1999-2011, he died on the 28th of September 2016. For more see: David Landar, *The Battle for Peace: The Diaries of Shimon Peres*, translated and printed by Al-Ahliyya Publishing, Distribution and Printing, Lebanon, 1995.
- 9) Dawit Eisenhower: He was born in Texas in the United States of America in 1890. He was raised in a large family by his religious parents. He graduated from West Point in 1915. After World War II 1939-1945, he served as Chief of Staff of the Army under the leadership of Harry Truman and then served as Chief of Staff of the Army under the leadership of Harry Truman. President at Columbia University. He then entered the presidency in 1952 for the Republican Party. He served as the thirty-fourth president of the United States from 1953-1961. He died in 1969. For more, see: Ohood Abbas Ahmed, *The Eisenhower Doctrine and American Policy Towards the Arab World 1957-1958*, Master's Thesis. Unpublished, approved by the College of Arts, University of Basra, 1997.
 - 10) Zach Levey, *Anglo-Israeli Strategic Relations, 1952-56*, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 31, No. 4, Washington, (Oct., 1995), p.772.
 - 11) Randall S. Geller, *Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon and the Arab Draft That Never Was*, Israel Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 2014), p. 12.
 - 12) Jonathan B. Isacoff, *Between Militarism and Moderation in Israel: constructing security in historical perspective*, Manchester University Press Series, Number 5, Manchester 2002, p.46.
 - 13) Avi Shlaim, *Israel between East and West, 1948-1956*, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 36:4, Beirut, November 2004, p. 657.
 - 14) Qibya village: It is located to the west of the city of Ramallah, and in the past it was affiliated with the Lod district, and it is 11 km away from Lod to the northeast of it, and it is located to the northeast of the city of Jerusalem and is 32 km away from it. See: Ghazi Al-Saadi, *Massacres and Practices 1936_1983, Zionist Terrorism Files in Palestine*, 1st edition, Galilee Publishing House, 2016, p. 135.
 - 15) Hilary Brash, *the middle east: conflict, crisis and change, 1917–2012*, Pearson Education Limited, London, 2017, p. 41.
 - 16) Benny Morris, *The Israeli Press and the Qibya Operation, 1953*, Taylor Francis, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 Beirut (Summer, 1996), p.42.
 - 17) Ohad Leslau, *Love/Hate Story: Moshe Sharett and AMAN (Military Intelligence), 1954–1956*, Israel Studies Vol. 20, No. 3 (Fall 2015), p. 81.
 - 18) Zaki Shalom, "Sin and Its Punishment," Pinhas Lavon, Negan Publishing Corporation, Jerusalem, 2019, p. 45. 2019, "ההטא ועונשו", פנחס לבון, תאגיד הוצאת נגן, ירושלים, 2019, p. 45.
 - 19) Shay Hazkani, *Conformity and Dissent in Israeli Soldiers' Letters from The Suez CrIsis, 1953–1957*, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University, U.S.A, 2010, p.54.
 - 20) In this regard, see in detail in: Abdul Amir Al-Hayali, *The Development of Israeli Water Policy towards Arab Waters*, Diyala Magazine, No. 41, 2009, pp. 1_35.
 - 21) Meron Medzini, *Golda Meir A Political Biography*, Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aḥaronot, 2008, p.229.
 - 22) Meron Medzini, p.229.
 - 23) Shay Hazkani, Op.cit, p.68
 - 24) Shay Hazkani, Op.cit, p.69.
 - 25) Billy Aharon, *Terrorism Against Civilians 1948-1967*, Ben Shushan Foundation, Tel Aviv, 1997, p. 35.
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 - 27) Billy Aharon, *ibid*, p. 37.

- 28) Esther Rocca, *ibid*, p. 9.
- 29) Zeev Droni, *Army Activities in Civilian Areas in the Early Years of the State: Settlement, Immigrant Absorption, Education, Construction*, Ben Shushan Press, Tel Aviv, 1997, p. 22.
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- 30) Billy Aharon, *ibid*, p. 40.
- 31) Esther Rocca, *ibid*, p. 9.
- 32) Zeev Droni, *ibid*, p. 24.
- 33) Benjamin Ghibli: Born in Palestine in 1919, he worked in the Combat Intelligence and Information Evaluation Service in 1948. He served as head of military intelligence in the period between 1950-1955, and worked on developing the device and forming a military intelligence force known by the code name (131) His mission was to carry out retaliatory operations in Arab lands, and he established for the first time the intelligence service in the Air Force, whose mission was to take pictures from the air. He died in Tel Aviv in 2008. See: Abdul Hamid Al-Baba, *Israeli Personalities*, Dar Al-Bayariq, Ramallah, Palestine, 1992, p. 169.
- 34) Billy Aharon, *ibid*, p. 42.
- 35) Gamal Abdel Nasser: He was born in Alexandria Governorate in the Arab Republic of Egypt, in 1918, graduated from the Military College in 1938, participated in the Palestine War in 1948, and organized the Free Officers group who carried out the July 23 Revolution in 1952. In June 1953, he assumed the position of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, and in February 1954 he was appointed Prime Minister. He was chosen as President of the Republic on the 25th of Jaziran in 1956 after the issuance of the new constitution. He died on September 30, 1970. For more, see: Buthaina Abdel Rahman Al-Tikriti, *Gamal Abdel Nasser, a historical study on the emergence and development of Nasserist thought*, unpublished doctoral thesis, approved at the College of Arts, University of Baghdad, 1998.
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