Representation of Kurd in ISIS media: A critical discourse analysis

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Abstract

ISIS is a terrorist organization that uses visual media to express and promote its ideals. Utilizing this medium in several languages is critical to the media's seriousness against ISIS. In one direction, actions are being taken to demonstrate the linguistic and ethnic diversity of ISIS members, while in the other, the owners of these languages are being targeted. Moreover, languages that are prevalent in ISIS-controlled regions are of utmost relevance. In this sense, it can be argued that Sorani and Kormanj, the two main dialects of the Kurdish language, are essential languages and ads for ISIS propaganda. However, this is less significant in quantity and quality compared to Arabic, English, and French. It continues to be average. The purpose of this study is to expose ISIS in the Kurdish-language media using Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) by examining the fundamental aspects (i.e., pictures, sounds, language, and sights) from data of three distinct sorts (audio, videos, and press-published content). The researchers "rediscovered" another aspect of the Kurdish language, including words such as Barzani, Ocalan, PKK, Talebani, and Peshmerga, and terms such as apostate, Molhed, Taghout, and Crusaders' servant. And, on the other side, by recalling a name such as Salah al-Din al-Ayubi, he, among the Kurds who attempt to make the groups appear illegitimate to them, makes himself a legitimate group and attracts followers.

Keywords: *ISSI Media, Kurdish Language, Kurds, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)*

1.   Introduction

ISIS is a terrorist organization that utilizes media to promote its ideas (Marone, 2019). Redistribution and Delegitimization of the Enemy is one of ISIS's most essential goals in its media coverage and broadcasts (Harmon & Bowdish, 2018). These opponents mentioned by ISIS in their media are listed in a specific sequence. The media introduce each with its literature and conversation (Alava, Frau-Meigs, & Hassan, 2017). Using a chain of equivalence (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), ISIS considers everybody besides itself to be "another" and "an adversary." From the viewpoint of ISIS, anybody who opposes this group opposes the law of God and is an atheist, as ISIS claims that it alone upholds the holy law. However, it differs neither from Islamic nor religious beliefs (Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani . 2015)

The ISIS media appear to be divided by ideological classes and categories, but the verdict is the same. ISIS regards Jews as its primary adversary, referring to them as "Ahfad al Qeradate wal Khanazir" (descendants of monkeys and pigs) at times (Al-Naba newspaper, the numbers. June 15, 2016). According to ISIS, all current conspiracies against Muslims range from the provocation

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of Christians to protecting the convergence and dominating the Arab rhythms of all Jewish plots; consequently, Jews are at the head of all seditions, in their view (Al-Khair wilayah., 2017)

In its rhetoric and images, ISIS attempts to emphasize the "other" issue. Former ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani typically distinguished Jews from other adversaries (Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani, .2014). ISIS views America as the leader of all Christians (Ninawa Wilayah, Armor Hunters., 2016). Meanwhile, it is occasionally referred to as the Zionchristans, which refers to a Christian and Jewish alliance (Aljazira Wilayah, siham allayl. 2016). Ravafedh (Shias) and Tawaghit (Tyranny) appear to be on par with the Christians, following the Christians. All Sunni and Shi'a Islamic global leaders, including those in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and North Africa (Al-Furat Wilayah, 2016), as well as Kurdish officials, including Barazani, will attend the next event. Al Barakah Wilayah. 2016) However, there are two floors or other tiers of the others, which may be designated as at least the final and another ISIS adversary. ISIS solicits Kurdish political organizations, non-believers, and the PKK in particular.

ISIS refers to the other class as "Sahawat al-Redda." This expression refers to the Sahwah battalions established in Iraq by American and Iraqi forces to confront an ISIS branch. This word also refers to organizations that were able to eliminate ISIS and offshoots of al-Qaeda. ISIS also recruits Tawaghit and non-believers from the majority of Sunni tribal and non-tribal organizations or parties with Ekhwani roots that are sponsored by regional or international powers. 2018 (Damascus Wilaya). ISIS' rivals, Al-Qaeda, and Al-Nusra Front are sometimes referred to as "Sahawat" "Yahod al-jihad" or "Defendants of Jihad" by ISIS. (Al-Battar Media Center, 2016).

According to the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of the media, press news reports and media are viewed as the rapid portrayal of an event. According to the reporter's preferences, the language used in news reports influences the societal belief system, perspective, and attitude toward a particular subject or incident. The media are crucial in determining social identities, connections, opinions, and ideals, according to Fairclough (1992).

Research Questions

1. How are languages prevalent in ISIS-dominated areas affecting Society remarkably?
2. What linguistic strategies are employed to portray Kurds in ISSI Media?
In this article, researchers analyze how ISIS redistribution Kurds in its Kurdish media. The 3-d model of critical discourse analysis is used to recognize ISSA's use of media devices and how the Kurdish language or Kurdish products are used to spread their agenda.

2.   Review of Literature

In the 1980s, critical discourse analysis gained popularity as a tool for investigating the social context of language (Fairclough, 1992). According to Halliday (1994), language is a "Social act," which indicates a close link between language and societal beliefs. However, (Van Dijk, 1985) there is a relationship between social discourse and power. Language and power interactions are intricately intertwined. Language contributes to the dissemination of ideologies and aids people in power. There is a reciprocal relationship between social structure and language discourse, as language influences social customs and social networks. CDA is a helpful approach for highlighting unequal power relationships in Society (Van Dijk, 1998). Wodak (1996) says that CDA is a tool for examining language that helps to determine its aims. Merrill et al. (1995) has emphasized several positive and negative characteristics of mass communicators. One of their positive characteristics is that "...they have a knack for words,

that they are often powerful, dynamic personalities, and that they demonstrate a certain social curiosity" (p.30). On the other side, among its negative characteristics are: "...they frequently appear to have some difficult-to-ignore prejudice." They frequently appear to have a hard-to-hide prejudice, to be ideologues or true believers, and to be self-possessed, exposing people to their information, thoughts, and viewpoints." (Also see p.30) More significant and pertinent to the study's concepts is that journalists (reporters) lack adequate knowledge of global politics and geography (Barjaba, 2021).

Propaganda is one of the media's primary functions. Journalists are propagandists in the sense that they "promote" or "spread" their prejudices and ideas to (consciously) affect the attitudes and behaviors of their readers. Many journalists, even so-called "straight news" reporters, engage in propaganda when they attempt to lead, influence, or control their audiences in predetermined ways." Journalists use the following propaganda techniques to achieve the objectives mentioned above: (the desired effect) The formation of prejudices

On the other hand, newspapers and magazines have a huge role to play and a great deal of responsibility to shoulder to achieve their desired effects: "Newspapers and magazines must capture our interest with superb writing and useful information, or we'll keep turning the pages." The journalist can only perform his duties effectively if he adheres to ethical norms. On the other hand, ethics is a broad term that encompasses applying moral principles to one's life and career. The word "ethical codes" refers to standards emphasizing truth, honesty, justice, and good taste (p.383). In a single phrase, journalists should be "...truthful, impartial, complete, and fair."

There are several theoretical studies on this topic. Media bias may be caused by owners' or journalists' interests (Anderson and Shattuck, 2012) or to appeal to the audience's preexisting conceptions (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006) to promote product differentiation and prevent price competition (Mullainathan, 2002). In these scenarios, prejudice may increase as competition decreases. According to empirical research, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) revealed a high association between the ideologies of US magazine readers and the publication's bias. After considering regional factors, two newspapers from the same chain are ideologically no more similar than two randomly selected newspapers. This shows that client demand, rather than the interests of newspaper owners, primarily dictates the slant of American periodicals.

Thanaphokhai (2015) utilized the CDA methodology to investigate linguistic patterns from various perspectives and their unique social functions. He examined how two media, the China Daily and the New York Times, portray the event " The Syrian Conflict" differently and how the two competing news organizations used linguistic aspects such as lexical structure, transformation, transitivity, and evaluation to convey contrasting societal images and ideologies. Chen (2016) analyzed ten news items regarding the Sino-Japanese Boat Collision from the China Daily and the New York Times. Using Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis method, he described how the two newspapers reflected distinct mindsets and ideologies. The China Daily promoted the Chinese agenda and adversely represented the Japanese. The New York Times, on the other hand, painted a balanced picture of the disagreement with language such as "territorial dispute/ Island conflict."

After thoroughly examining the literature, researchers require assistance locating studies examining the interpretation of Kurds portrayed by ISSI across three media genres. This study examines the portrayal of Kurds in ISSI Media (Zarate-Hoyos, 2022).

3.   Methodology

In the present study, the researcher used Fairclough's (Fairclough, 1992) three-dimensional framework of CDA to analyze three distinct forms of ISSI-published audio, video, and press content. This framework is composed of three interdependent dimensions. These dimensions are 1) textual analysis description, 2) interpretation, and 3) explanation. The diagram below briefly describes the three dimensions of Fairclough's three-dimensional framework for CDA.

Figure 1. Three Dimensional (3D)Fairclough's discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992)

Fairclough's 3D examination model is valuable in linguistics, yet likewise in different fields like semiotics, thus numerous other disciplines that we need to investigate any content, whether spoken or composed.

4.   Results and Discussion
Dimension 1: Description

The researcher examines both the grammatical and visual parts of a text Fairclough, 1992, number 2. Despite this, they employ a variety of narrators to ensure that the screenplay or visual arts convince the audience that this is a factual story.

Kurdish language in ISIS media

The ISIS media frequently discusses Kurds and Kurdish-related issues, potent Kurdish groups. We do not plan to bring anything that ISIS has said about the Kurds here, but it will be discussed in those ISIS media that are published primarily in Kurdish or at least partially in Kurdish.

Pivotal media in Kurdish; few but high quality

ISIS has created its own media organization, which reaches diverse audiences through various media formats. In a video titled "Sarhe al-Khalaphe" released by Al-Furqan Center (Al-Furqan Media Center, 2015), ISIS specified the structure of the "Divan al-elam al-markazi" as well as 13 other divisions of the ISIS caliphate government. The following is the graphic design of the

periodic Centers of the Divan al-Elam al-markazi:

In recent years, Al-Hayat Center has been the most critical ISIS media organization, and it has been able to support other institutions, including Al-Furqan Center, more effectively. Initially, al-Furqan was considered the most prominent ISIS organization, and most of the videos and statements were distributed through the center. Recently, this responsibility has been delegated to another center named Al-Hayat. Of course, this does not signify the end of the Al-Furqan Center; some ISIS videos (Al-Furqan Media Center, 2015), as well as statements by ISIS leaders, in particular Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, killed ISIS spokesman. After al-death Adnaani's audio statements by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu al-Hassan al-Mohajer, as the primary focus of ISIS propaganda, al-Hayat is responsible for producing high-quality, significant documentaries in non-Arabic languages. This center initially published the "Dabiq" English-language magazine, but after a while, publishing ceased, and the "Romyeh" Multilingual Magazine took its place. Kurdish is one of the languages published by ISIS in the magazine Romyeh. During the height of ISIS, the al-Hayat Center also released a film titled "A Massage to the People of Kurdistan." In addition to producing the video, this center also produces foreign and non-Arabic music in a variety of languages, like the Kurdish song "Navakani Khilafat" (Al Hayat Media Center, 2015).

The other media center featured in the graphic design of Sahrh al-Khalafa is the Ajnad, which produces ISIS Arabic hymns professionally. In contrast, as previously stated, al-Center Hayat's typically produces ISIS's international anthems. Nonetheless, several illegitimate institutes also produce hymns.

Another entity is the ISIS radio station Ezae al-Bayan. This radio is accessible online and via radio broadcasts in ISIS-controlled regions. This radio station plays ISIS music, religious instruction, and religious answers. During peak ISIS activity, Al-Bayan established a local television network alongside the radio, which also broadcasts ISIS pictures.

Maktabe Al-hemma is another propaganda organization that publishes ISIS's literary discourses. It operates in more than three categories, including books, posters, and banners, but has yet to publish Kurdish-language works.

ISIS also publishes the Arabic weekly Al-Naba, which includes news of ISIS actions and some ideological writings.

According to the graphic design, ISIS published four additional magazines: Daiq in English, Dar al-Islam in French, Manba in Russian, and Constantinople in Turkish. These magazines were published separately. After the Free Syrian Army seized former forces, publication of these periodicals ceased, and the Romyeh Multilingual Magazine was produced. One of the languages that Romyeh continues to print is Kurdish.

In conjunction with the establishment of the al-alam court, two other institutions have been established. One is Al-Monaseroon, which handles informal media, and the other is Al-Loghat wa al-Tarjood, which translates and distributes ISIS media in various languages. The al-forat Official Agency, which publishes primarily in languages other than Arabic, is likely to join the institution. We will go to this section in the following section. Nevertheless, the provincial centers are the most influential elements of ISIS's media, considering the significance of their diverse media productions.

Dimension 2: Interpretation

According to Fairclough (1992), the description in the first move requires more explanation in the second move. In this step, research is centered on developing advertisements for another CDA concern.

Kurdish language in the production of provincial centers; the language of the victim or murderer?

Provincial Media Centers cover the geographic areas of the Islamic State Caliphate wilayats following the power allocation of ISIS over the years. ISIS wilayas peaked at 35 wilayas (Al-Furqan Media Center, 2015). Still, after ISIS's decline, the number decreased to the two main wilayas of Sham and Iraq and wilayas outside of Sham and Iraq. (Ghazvini, 2018)

Due to ISIS's territorial dispersal, the organization has been striving to disseminate its media products, in addition to the primary languages it targets, in the dominant languages of the areas it controls. Kurdish is one of the languages that ISIS has, albeit only briefly. Hence Kurdish content has always been a focus of ISIS's beliefs.

This sector and regional centers where some people speak Kurdish account for the large majority of media productions, especially Kurdish-language productions. The wilayas of Rigaq, Ninawa (Mosul), Al-Barkah (Haska), Al-Jazeera (Tal'afar), Al-Khair (Deir al-Sur), and Kirkuk have all created Kurdish-language videos.

It should be mentioned that ISIS's Amagh News Agency has produced numerous footage from Kurdish regions, particularly the Kurdish regions of Syria. In this instance, most Syrian hostages announcing themselves in the news media are Kurdish and speak Arabic. Because the Kurdish captives under the hands of the Syrian regime speak Arabic more than their language, these individuals speak Arabic in the videos. While the Kurdish detainees speak Kurdish infrequently, they did so at the beginning of the ISIS height in the movies "Resale beldam ela zoama al-half alamriki-alkurdi" from "Ninawa wilayeh" in 1435 AH and "Wa yashefa sodor ghomen momenin" from Kirkuk Wilaya in Jommadi al-Awwal 1436 Several Peshmarga hostages pleaded for the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from the conflict in the first video. In the footage, in which a Peshmerga is also slain, the individual who speaks to the executioner in Arabic is cut short. Still, those arrested appear to speak to some of them in Kurdish in the

subsequent film (Ninawa Wilayah, A message of blood to the leaders of the American Kurdish alliance., 2015). In the second film, a large number of Peshmerga are interviewed by a Kurdish ISIS, and their footage is placed in iron cages. Peshmarga's end in the cage is compared to the flaming scenes of a Jordanian pilot in a cage so that his fate is identical to that of the Jordanian pilot. Although there are no depictions of the execution of these Peshmargas in the film, the scene depicts severed Coptic skulls in Libya. In another film, one of the Kurdish captives is executed (Kirkuk Wilayah, 2015). This motif, which is unique to this film, is also repeated. ISIS hostages speaking Kurdish are only featured in these two films. In a different film, a detainee claiming to be a member of the Kurdish Democratic Party spoke Arabic instead of Kurdish.

In contrast, he spoke Arabic and Turkish in the same Turkish prison film (Aljazira Wilayah, rade aljunat 2, .2016). If accurate, this issue will give the impression that ISIS media channels are quickly determining that the victims do not speak Kurdish and that Kurdish ISIS fighters should speak Kurdish. Despite the evidence, this issue cannot be readily accepted and is considered deliberate.

Dimension 3: Explanation

In the third dimension, the explanation researcher investigates the discourse about the historical, economic, and social dimensions of the culture it produced.

Kurdish language in the ISIS unofficial Centers: from subtitles to dubbing

Separate from the formal institutions, numerous unofficial institutions help the caliphate administration with unofficial productions. Institutions, such as the Tarjoman al-Asawerty Center, Abwah Laseghah, Al-Battar Center, Sarriyah to-Malhama, Al-jihato al-Elamiyah lenosratol al-dolatol Islamiyah, Al-khaelapha Center, Sanaetol al-Rijal, and other media institutions, are particularly active in the ISIS area. ISIS appears to have identified officials as a more critical task (Al Hayat Media Center, 2018). These institutions are distinguished because, except for a few, such as "Tarjoman al-Asawerty" and a few other Centers, most appear in distinct parts and follow unique productions. However, there is no longer any evidence of them. And additional Centers with various names produce content for ISIS.

Centers and Centres of Managers or ISIS sympathizers have also worked in producing Kurdish content. In the interim, several ISIS sympathizers' Centers convert ISIS materials into a specific language. The "Neda'i Haq" Center, for instance, is a friendly organization that translates official and unofficial ISIS movies into Urdu following ISIS's peak. The center also occasionally makes clips in Urdu, occasionally generates hymns from various ISIS factions, and occasionally plays ISIS movies with Urdu subtitles. The translation of the film Flame of War II was one of the center's most significant accomplishments. The "Nahawand" Center also provided Persian subtitles for multiple ISIS videos and periodic Persian translations of the ISIS journal. Nahawand made independent videos in Persian and other ISIS languages on occasion. In the field of Neda'i Haq, the Arabic-language publication also provides an Urdu translation of al-Naba.

In addition, there are informal institutions that attempt to interact with their audience in a variety of ways. Some institutions, like their counterparts in Persian or Urdu, specialize in Kurdish or have several runaways who speak the language. According to our findings, the "Ashhad" Center, which creates its significant works in Arabic, included portions of one of its products in the Kurdish-language video "Resale ela ahlana fi Kurdistan" produced by the Al-Hayat Center (Ash had Media Center, 2018).

However, there are other Kurdish institutions with a particular focus. These institutions include "Ahfad" or "Ahfad Salah al-Din." In our searches, we discovered that the center, on the one hand, translated the works of ISIS into Kurdish; for instance, "To the Enemies of Allah" is the English title of the Kurdish poem published by the German poetry of the Al-Hayat Center. This may be attributed to Germany's huge number of Kurdish immigrants. On the other side, the center also produces Kurdish items with no Arabic subtitles and only the intended audience in mind. In addition to Arabic subtitling, ISIS videos, which the official Centers typically produce for the audience, are also subtitled in Arabic. Regardless of language, all of ISIS's official media works typically have Arabic subtitles. The works of the Ahfad Center, which categorizes Kurdish opponents of ISIS as Madakhele, Sufis, Islamic parties, and Kurdish parties, are created only in Kurdish (Ahfad Center, 2015).

In this regard, however, other institutions' scholars have witnessed the establishment of the "Caravani Jihad." This institution's actions, which are more than those of other institutions, adhere to rationally intelligible terms. Particularly the "Tarjoman al-Asawerty" Center, most of the center has produced ISIS monastic institutions. In the meanwhile, a film from the Summud Center was also viewed. The center submitted most of the ISIS informal institution photographs regarding the battle with other Salafist jihadi groups, notably Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham. The "Caravani Jihad" also publishes with subtitles certain ISIS hymns. "Ajnad" Center is responsible for the poetry "Dolaty Baqiyah." It should be noted that "Caravani Jihad" occasionally removes the "Tarjoman al-Asawerty" emblem from the center's products and publishes its logo and Kurdish subtitles, omitting any reference to the main center in the Kurdish edition.

Razda Ray is another Kurdish organization that produces media in the Kurdish language for ISIS. This center is referred to as "Lematha noghatel" in the instructions of one of ISIS's religious leaders, Abu Ali Al-Anbari.

ISIS Kurdish video content

After becoming familiar with the official and informal institutions of ISIS and institutions that have generated media content in the Kurdish language, we are attempting to determine the substance of official and informal institutions' Kurdish-language media works. Kurdish ISIS products have been produced in the region where the film was created in the two dialects of Surani and Kormanj. To address the substance of ISIS's Kurdish movies, analysts observed that historical topics may have been more noteworthy.

Kurdistan history from ISIS perspective

The beginning of Kurdistan's history

Two ISIS videos in Kurdish feature two major dialects of the Kurdish language, namely Surani and Kormanj, as well as a relatively extensive history of Kurdistan. "ya qawmana ajibu dai Allah" is the title of a film from Kirkuk wilaya, which is the Surani dialect, and has dealt in great length with Kurdish history. The video begins with the history of Kurdistan during the Rashidun Caliphate when Islam came to Kurdistan. The film's narrator asserts that the Kurds voluntarily embraced Islam. As a macro narrative of Kurdistan's history, the film chronicles the history of Islam (Kirkuk Wilayah, 2017). Another film that deals significantly with the history of Kurdistan is "Al-akrad... beyne al-Tawhid wa al-Elhad," which was produced in the Kormanj dialect by al-Raqa.

In contrast to the Kirkuk provincial video, this film discusses the religion of Kurdistan's people

before the entrance of Islam. It considers Kurds to be adherents of Zoroastrianism and other religions, including Izadi (Al-Raqqa Wilaya, 2016). Despite the proximity between these two films, there are substantial distinctions in how discourse is conveyed. Perhaps this difference is because the film of al-Raqa wilaya at the height of ISIS dominance approximately two months before the Mosul recapture began on October 17, 2016, and 16 Moharram in 1438 AH was filmed from above, while the Mosul recapture began on October 17, 2016. The film in Kirkuk wilaya was produced less than a month after the commencement of the Mosul liberation operation when ISIS had a sympathetic and laudable perspective as opposed to a top-down perspective. Possibly in the Kirkuk provincial film, which was created at the beginning of the days of the fall of ISIS, ISIS media, along with the use of a never-ending discourse of blaming, is attempting to find a language that is more laudable than it was a few months ago, and more sympathetic towards the Kurds. Like the hypothetical pattern outlined previously, ISIS, except for a limited amount of visual content at the inception of the caliphate, has always made Kurdish, the language of the truth, the false language.

Salah al-Din al-Ayubi

Indeed, ISIS has a favorable opinion of Salah al-Din al-Ayubi. Salah al-Din al-Ayoubi is one of the media's most frequently mentioned jihadist group names. This is because Salah al-Din is a Kurdish commander (Bengio, 2014) and is frequently used by jihadist groups in Kurdish. ISIS is also knowledgeable. As previously indicated, one of the ISIS Kurdish media is titled "Ahfad Salah al-Din," as are the children of Kurdish ISIS militants who were taken out for play and leisure in Ninawa Wilayah (Ninawa Wilayah, nuzhat ahfad salah aldiyn. 2015).

In the videos in which ISIS discusses the history of Kurdistan, Salah al-Din al-name Ayubi's persona is among the most prominent characters. In these movies, after he discussed the entrance of Islam in the Kurdish region, Salah al-Din al-Ayubi is depicted as a guy who rendered several services to Islam, liberated Jerusalem from the Crusaders, and overturned the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt (Ninawa Wilayah, nuzhat ahfad salah aldiyn.2015).

Contemporary history of Kurdistan and the dream of an independent country

ISIS also examines contemporary history; for instance, in the film Raqa wilaya, the Safavid administration and the Islamic Republic of Iran are depicted as causing the most harm to the Kurds in the guise of a Sunni-Shia dualism (Al-Raqqa Wilaya, 2016).

ISIS, which does not believe in the uprising, believes in Kurdish movements and uprisings in modern times and views these movements, particularly in the years 1339-1344, as aided by the Crusader infidels and France, Britain, and Russia (Al-Raqqa Wilaya, 2016). ISIS videos identify Mullah Mostafa Barzani as a Jew educated in Russia. ISIS Kurdish films emphasize modern history in southern Kurdistan or Iraqi Kurdistan, reducing all Kurdish history to that of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Parti and Yeketi politico parties, and their acts (Al Hayat Media Center, 2017).

In the meantime, the Kurdish nationalist struggles in contemporary history are regarded as inaccurate and deal with the conflicts of the two longtime rivals, the Parti and Yeketi, two rivals who, to defeat each other, become "other" and, in contemporary history, World War II has killed a large number of people for their nationalistic blasphemous goals (Kirkuk Wilayah, 2017).

In the opinion of ISIS, the desire for an independent state indicated the parties' inability to learn from the past (the Ghazi Mohammed and Sheikh Sa'ad Piran uprisings). ISIS, which

considers all these movements false, deems the earliest combatants of modern history to have pursued a fictitious and doomed vision of an independent state (Al-Raqqa, 2016). Meanwhile, ISIS highlights the role of Kurdish factions in the hands of crusaders and global forces. Crusades and great nations have demanded more than anything else, as is seen in 'Afrin and Kirkuk today (Kirkuk Wilayah, hisad althul. 2018).

ISIS appears to have employed two praiseworthy and blameless discourses regarding Kurds in their history after this part. It may be said that ISIS's media, when uttered by Kurds in the guise of their Sunni identity, praised it more than Shiites and occasionally Crusaders. Whenever they saw them in their ethnic shape, Ethnicity sought to establish a nation, convicting and excommunicating them.

Barzani, from the ISIS perspective

If not the most frequent, then one of the most frequent names repeated in ISIS Kurdish films is Massoud Barzani, which will be discussed in further detail in the following section.

Barzani's image position

Massoud Barzani is one of the central figures in the ISIS Kurdish video and is mentioned in most Kurdish and even non-Kurdish movies. In the interim, it is possible to mention the image of a location where Barzani's name is frequently spoken, particularly in Kurdish films. The name Barzani has appeared in three violent videos, archival pictures, and speeches. In the sequences of executions that are sometimes incorporated in the most horrific form in Kurdish films, they typically mention Barzani's name and threaten to execute the perpetrator during the most brutal moments. Even in certain Arab films, Barzani is threatened with death, with "Eram Fadak 2" including the most prominent of these scenes. The sniper-themed film focuses on ISIS sniper operations against Peshmerga soldiers around the borders of Ninawa wilaya. After the film, in a scenario reminiscent of one of the "Call of Duty" computer game scenes, ISIS uses a bayonet to stab Barzani's image on the table. Simultaneously, he collects photographs of victims of ISIS nightmares (Ninawa Wilayah, Erme Fadak 2. 2016). The framework of the execution and overthrow of Peshawar is one of the repeating motifs of Kurdish ISIS films, in which most of the murderers are Kurds. However, in other video formats, he attempts to portray Barzani as a traitor and despot (Al Hayat Media Center, 2017).

Barzani as a taghot

Barzani is referred to by numerous titles in ISIS media, including al-Qa'zam, Crusader's servant, al-Ka'b, Stupid, and primarily Taghot. Obviously, in none of the Kurdish ISIS movies does this title refer solely to Massoud Barzani but to the authorities as a whole. However, Barzani receives more attention than all other political leaders and elites.

Barzani and the Christians and Jews

We have already determined that, according to ISIS's rhetoric, they are the greatest adversaries of Jews and Christians. Barzani attempts to be a Jewish and Christian servant and a Taghot in ISIS media. This message is reminded to the audience in various scenes of the films, such as during the seizure of ammunition and weapons from Crusaders (Ninawa Wilayah, A message of blood to the leaders of the American Kurdish alliance.2015) and as a servant of the Crusaders and their hands (Ninawa Wilayah, rada al'ubat ealaa qasf altughat. 2015). Peshmerga in captivity sometimes repeat the same message against Barzani and Talebani (Kirkuk Wilayah, 2015), and sometimes Barzani praises and thanks the United States for helping the Peshmerga

defeat ISIS (Kirkuk Wilayah, Qa're l, ed. 2018), and so on with his companion, according to the Americans. Barzani is sometimes presented to the Kurds as a Jew who opened the door to Kurdistan and made concessions to them (Kirkuk Wilayah, 2017; Al-Raqqa Wilaya, 2016).

Barzani and Iran, Iraq, and Turkey

Previously, it was stated that the Tawaghit and Shias were the successive adversaries of ISIS. ISIS media stresses Barzani's relationship with Jews and Crusaders, as well as his relationship with Shias and Tavaghit, or, in their view, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. Barzani and Talebani were entangled in their political struggle with Iran, Saddam, and the United States in ISIS media (Kirkuk, 2017). In these films, the anti-ISIS efforts of Barzani and Turkey, which is considered a Kurdish foe, are also stressed (Ninawa Wilayah, 2014). Barzani is also attempting to recognize in his wording that he agreed with the United States and Turkey to send soldiers to Kobani (Irtiqa Center, 2017). According to Kirkuk Wilayah, Qa're l, ed., 2018, about the Shias, after the collapse of Kirkuk, the only way to stop cooperation with the Shias is to revert to Barzani.

Barzani and Peshmerga

The ISIS media publish two forms of communication between Massoud Barzani and the Peshmerga: the first accuses Barzani of being indifferent to the destiny of the Peshmerga and of sacrificing them for his desires. Masters of the Crusaders, ISIS is executing them for teaching Massoud Barzani a lesson (Ninawa Wilayah, 2014). This is the pattern that the ISIS media have followed with other leaders in the Arab world, such as Egyptian President El-Sisi, claiming that El-Sisi does not value his military personnel and considers his life to be worth less than a military vehicle, the soldiers of the army being the finest of military vehicles (Sina Wilayah, 2018). This pattern was used by him even when ISIS was at its weakest. When ISIS was at war with the Kurdish troops, "ghowwat soriyeh Al-dimghratiyeh," many soldiers in different areas, such as Baghoz and surrounding Shafa, associated Kurdish forces with ISIS. The conflict was not fundamentally Kurdish. However, tribal Arabs align themselves with the Kurds, but there is no Kurdish front. This is the recommendation of Arab tribes that do not provide their youngsters to Kurdish soldiers (Kirkuk, 2015).

The second communication consists of instructions conveyed by ISIS detainees to Kurdish leaders, particularly Massoud Barzani, reminding them that it would be a grave error to align with the Jews and crusaders against the caliphate authority (Kirkuk, 2015).

Barzani and Kurdish people

In ISIS's Kurdish-language media, the organization accuses the political establishment and Kurdish leaders of murdering common citizens to protect the populace. In reality, Kurdish officials are accused in these films of building a nation-state, which ISIS regards as a prophet and propagandist, moving away from God and Islam (Kirkuk, 2017). The struggle between Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talebani has resulted in tens of thousands of innocent deaths. They are currently promoting dishonesty and anti-Islamic propaganda and attempting to indoctrinate an entire Divine generation against Islam (Al-Raqqa Wilaya, 2016).

Ocalan and PKK in Kurdish ISIS media

Among Kurdish intellectuals and leaders, ISIS's media outlets are incomparable to Barzani's. However, other Kurdish leaders and elites are not as Barzani and are of lesser importance. The connection between Ocalan and Talebani is also notable. In ISIS videos, Abdullah Ocalan is depicted as a Christian, non-religionist, apostate, and non-believer in God and the Prophet's

message (Kirkuk, 2017). From this perspective, he has consistently pursued lunacy and the spirit of nationalism, a blend of atheism and secularism, with the party he created (Al Hayat Media Center, 2017). ISIS regrets that it has paid a significant deal of heed to Ocalan's opinions on the Kurds. "Unfortunately, the Kurds are also swayed by these advertisements and support Ocalan and his party, from Ocalan, who tears in God's annual or daily messages, especially in the field of women's rights, which, according to Ocalan, has not been able to guarantee their rights" (Al Hayat Media Center, 2017). Likewise, his party was able to protect women's rights fully. ISIS frequently refers to these forces as "Malaheda" or "Mortadon,", particularly in fights with Syrian PKK affiliates. In the Kurdish section of al-Hayat, the following is true: "All of these parties are opposed to Islam and are allied with socialist and apostate thought, fighting the Islamic State and the men of God, plundering the property of Muslims, and in all cases opposing God; for instance, when we say Allah is the greatest, they say Ocalan is the greatest. These YPG and YPJ units are active in Syria, although they are identical to the PKK ".

ISIS, in another film, contrasts the Kormanj Kurd to the PKK, stating: "The PKK is one of ISIS's enemies. We have no further issues with the Kormanj Kurds." (Aljazira Wilayah, rade aljunat 2. 2016) ISIS views the PKK as the Crusaders' Barzani hands. The PKK and its other branches in Syria are in the hands of the Crusaders and the United States to further their goals, as stated in an ISIS propaganda video. (Kirkuk Wilayah, hisad althul. 2018)

ISIS also discussed the United States usage of Kurdish forces in its movies, claiming that the United States used them when the Kurds came to work and abandoned them when they no longer saw a benefit (Kirkuk Wilayah, 2017). In the meantime, Talebani appears significantly less frequently in ISIS Kurdish movies than Barzani, Ocalan, and PKK. In any event, Talebani is regarded as one of the primary characteristics of the Kurdistan Taghot (Kirkuk Wilayah, hisad althul. 2018) (Al-Raqqa Wilaya, 2016) who, for the sake of power, sold all of Kurdistan's wealth, allied with Kurdish minstrels, and promotes unreliability in Kurdistan (Kirkuk, 2017). ISIS also mentioned the internal conflicts of the two largest Kurdish parties and said that Yekta and Party had begun battles in which thousands of innocent people have been slain, injured, and displaced (Kirkuk, 2017).

Colorful show of childhood passion for dealing with opposition media

Among the Kurdish-language ISIS, videos is a clip describing the social assistance offered to the children of Kurdish mujahideen by the group. "Siran wa Khoshikani Salahuddin" is the name of the video broadcast by the media of Ninawa wilaya. The clip depicts Kurdish children who have joined ISIS as they play in the city. The film depicts scenes of youngsters engaged in play and eating, as well as scenes filled with vibrant colors. The film consists of interviews with a few children, highlighting comfort and happiness under the caliphate administration. In an interview with a government official, he also claims that the media is spreading false information about ISIS and that life under the caliphate rule is uncomfortable. This movie, which features the smiling faces of Kurdish girls and boys who are ISIS members, exposes anti-ISIS propaganda that portrays the caliphate government as a brutal, bloody regime. ISIS has created videos in several languages, primarily Arabic, with only one targeted at Kurdish children. In an interview, the group leader states, "Thanks to God, after a hundred years of waiting, the Islamic State was finally formed, and the atheists and traitors, especially those in Kurdistan, do not see this Divine blessing on the Islamic State's soil. As a result, contrary to the Islamic state, they negatively impact the public, which is not the case at all" (Ninawa Wilayah, nuzhat ahfad salah aldiyn. 2015).

5.   Conclusion

The present study investigated that Kurdish is one of the languages in which ISIS media typically publishes its works, along with two dialects of Surani and Kormanj. As we have seen, both official and unofficial ISIS entities generate Kurdish-language media. However, they differ in terms of quality or quantity in Arabic, English, and French. They indeed do not, however. Quantitatively and qualitatively, Persian, Pashto, and Urdu-language films are comparable to Turkish-language films. The content of the ISIS media in Kurdish can be split into three categories: content that refers to Kurds and Kurdish groups as "other,"; content that refers to Kurds and Kurdish groups as "other,"; and content that does not mention Kurds. This content is vastly better than all other Kurdish-language content. This article discusses Barzani, Ocalan, the PKK, the Taleban, and the Peshmerga through works such as the apostate, the atheist, the dictatorship, and the servant of the Crusades and Jews. This content may contain some of the most brutal scenes offered by ISIS propaganda. The second information refers to Kurds as jihad pioneers and ISIS members. In this setting, Salah ad-Din Ayubi's name is continually repeated. In this scenario, Kurdish mujahedin act against the Islamic State and legitimate innocent anti-ISIS personalities. Nonetheless, other content that can only be claimed to be limited to a movie, along with other films such as those created in other languages, attempt to face the state of a caliphate not as a black and gory enemy media but as a funny, limitless, and colorful face.

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