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The Future of US- Saudi Relations in Light of The Growing Saudi- Iranian Relations Under the Auspices of China

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Abstract

The study aimed at identifying the future of the American- Saudi relations in light of the growing Saudi Iranian relations under the auspices of China. The study dealt with the path of Saudi cooperation towards reconciliation with Iran under the auspices of China. The Arab Gulf and an explanation of what reconciliation might achieve in terms of political stability in the Middle East region and what both parties benefit from. The study relied on employing the historical approach to trace the course of historical competitive relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and dealing with historical sources and information that highlight the size of competition between the two parties throughout history as well as the analytical descriptive approach, which is a tool and method for analyzing the growth of Saudi- Iranian relations under the auspices of China. The study deduced a group of results and recommendations, as the study confirmed that the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement contributes to achieving security stability in the Middle East region and reduces confrontations and competitions between the two parties.

Keywords: *International Relations, the Middle East, Regional Competition.*

Introduction

It seems that the new trends in the growing Saudi- Iranian relations under the auspices of China may enhance the opportunities for regional cooperation between the two sides, and may witness the reduction of the

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Western influence represented by the United States' sponsorship of the complex files in the Middle East, which may witness a state of de'tente after China's intervention within the framework of the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation as the most prominent competitors in the Middle East region. The region may witness a kind of cooperation in discussing many outstanding issues in the security, economic and political fields.

On the other hand, there is a desire of both sides the Saudi and the Iranian in achieving reconciliation on the auspices of China to achieve understanding on bilateral interests in the Middle East and to move to a new stage based on cooperation and integration the contributes to opening the way towards settlements of intractable files in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq, to get out of the illusion of the sectarian conflict between the two sides.

The path of reconciliation is an indication of the eastern camp through the tripartite summit that brought together China and Iran on March 10, 2023 in Beijing at the level of foreign ministers, where the meeting agreed to resume diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran, and work to open their embassies in near future, and the two sides discussed the resumption of the signed agreements. Previously in the areas of economic, commercial, cultural sports and youth cooperation that were signed in 1998. The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement under Chinese auspices may lead to some shifts in the structure of the international system within the framework of what the Sino-American relations are witnessing, and the preoccupation of the international poles with the repercussions of the Russian- Ukrainian war on the international system. China's role has emerged clearly in the Middle East, which is represented in more cooperation. The economic is with Saudi Arabia and Iran in light of the relative decline of the American presence in the Middle East region, and the divergence of views with Saudi Arabia on arrange of issues related to human a rights issues, and with regard to issues related to reducing Saudi Oil production.

Problem of Study:The problematic of the study in examining the issue of the future of US-Saudi relations in light of the growing Saudi- Iranian relations under the auspices of China, given that the growth of Chinese relations in the Middle East may open the doors of China to make the Middle East a market for the consumption of Chinese industries this from the economic side, while the political side may constitute the Saudi rapprochement the Iranian side is a kind of achieving political stability in the Middle East after what witnessed the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011. As for the security aspect, the rapprochement may constitute defusing the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially the

Iranian support for the Houthis. This convergence may contribute to the decline of Iranian- Saudi relations with the United States. America, which witnessed a state of conflict between the two parties.

Significance of Study

The Scientific Significance

The scientific significance of study rises for what the study forms it of benefit for national libraries, specialists, and the Jordanian and Arabic libraries about the future of the American Saudi relations in the shadow of growing of the Saudi-Iranian relations under auspices of China, and asserting the new role of China in the Middle East in the specialty of enhancing relations between both traditional competitors: Saudi and Iran.

The Practical Significance

The practical significance emerges in explaining the significance of the future of US-Saudi relations in light of the growing Saudi-Iranian relations under auspices of China by studying China's new directions towards the Middle East within the framework of achieving stability that contributes to making the Middle East a consumption market for the Chinese industry.

Study Objectives

The study searched for achieving the following objectives:

1. Showing the future of the Saudi-American relations.
2. Growing of the Saudi- Iranian relations under the auspices of China.
3. Challenges that face reconciliation between Iran and the Saudi Arabia Kingdom.

The Study Questions

The study searched to answer the following questions:

1. What is the future of the Saudi – American relations?
2. The how of growing the Iranian – Saudi relations under the auspices of China?
3. What are the challenges that face the reconciliation between Iraq and the Saudi Arabia Kingdom?

Methodology of Study

The study employed the historical method and it was employed to track the course of historical competitive relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and to address historical sources and information the two parties throughout history, and also the aSaudi Iraniancriptive method, which is considered a tool and way to analyze the growing of the Saudi-Iranian relations under auspices of China and analyzing the retreat of American sovereignty in the Middle East.

Terms of Study

The Middle East: a geopolitical term its regions cover the great majority of regions covered by the definition of West Asia, and most of states of the Middle East are part of the Arab World, in addition to Iran and Turkey, and its interior covers ethnic groups the most prominent of them, the Kurds, Turks, Turk man, Persians, Azeri's Copts, Jews, Assyrians, and Greek Copts (Al-Afifi, 2012: 33).

The regional competition: is a state of interaction among international units, and a state of competition emerges as a result of states' search towards achieving their interests and targets due to available possibilities, and competition may turn into conflict (Al-Jbouri, 2019: 750).

The First Demand: Future of the Saudi American Relations and Their Regional Repercussions

The United States connects with historical relations with Saudi Arabia lean on the mutual interests at the political, economic and security level, and both countries differ on a group of private files in the Middle East region, but the language of cooperation is the most prominent, for the there are economic and security agreements shared in the consolidation of cooperation between the two sides, but what the world witnesses of diversion from the track of the international relations, because of war prevailing between Russia and Ukraine had made Saudi Arabia in a state of détente towards China. And the Chinese reconciliation had enhanced relations between Saudi Arabia and China (Al-Jbouri, 2022: 11).

The First Branch: the Saudi- Iranian Competition

Both competing states (Saudi Arabia and Iran) connect by relations with the United States lean on interests, but competition between both states had shared in a state of tension in the Middle East region,

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especially from Iran's side in what is called the Iranian expansion its outputs created a state of instability in the Arab region, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen (Al-Smadi, 2023: 3).

Saudi Arabia and Iran look to the American domination in the Middle East as had shared in raising the level of competition, conflict and divergence between the two parties, where the elements of competition represented in the ethnic and religious differences, and the emergence of political and economic loyalties and affiliations, and the regional competition between the two countries over the leadership of the Islamic World, which increased the state of divergence and disharmony at the political and security level (Abdo, 2016: 6).

At the level of Islamic religious competition, Iraq considers itself the protector of Shiite Islam, where the seminaries, especially the Qom Seminary, are among the most prominent religious universities Shiite Sect, in addition to the Holy Najaf Seminary, which formed scientific centers for many Shiite students as a safe haven for adherents of Shiite Islam in the World (Saad, 2023: 2).

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia considers itself the incubator of the Sunni Islamic world due to the existence of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, in which the honorable Kaaba is located, the home of pilgrims of the Islamic World, and the Prophet's Mosque, which the world visits from all sides, out of envy for the hadith of the Messenger to AbiHuraire, may God be pleased with him, that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said: "Do not tighten Traveling only to three mosques: the Grand Mosque, this mosque of mine, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Asilan, 2023: 2).

But differences rises in the nature of the political regime structure, where the political regime in Iran is a constitutional regime before the revolution. In the 1979 the Iranian constitution was issued, that divides the structure of the regime into three authorities; the legislative authority, the Executive authority, and the Judicial authority. But the Saudi Arab Kingdom: The Saudi Arab Kingdom, its political regime is an absolute royal, the three legislative associations are: the Executive, and the Judicial and all the strategic decisions in the Saudi Arab Kingdom are taken by the King. The Executive authority is headed by the King. And the Parliament is more consultive than legislative in nature, and the Judiciary is directly under the supervision of the King (Farah Al-Zaman, 2014: 2).

Also the economic competition in the Middle East, especially in oil, where both states produce oil and gas, they both are poles of energy resources and formed the essence of the geo-economic competition

in the Islamic World. In the same time, the political competition through what the Saudi Arab Kingdom considers a strategic threat of Iran's nuclear project (Naji, 2023: 3).

The start of the Saudi- Iranian relationship was after the outbreak of the Iranian revolution in 1979, where these relations underwent a comprehensive restructuring. These were among the most affected relationships by the changes in the region, based on three main factors; include disparity in Political Models where the roots of tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran lie in the disparity in political and religious models. Saudi Arabia adopts a monarchical system and follows the Sunni trend, while Iran adopts an Islamic republican system and follows the Shia trend. Competition for Regional Influence, where the countries compete for influence and impact in the Middle East region, which increases tensions and conflicts between them on the regional stage. Also factors include regional conflicts that concentrate on interventions in various regional conflicts contribute to increased tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran, such as wars in Yemen and Syria, as well as tensions in Bahrain and Lebanon (Abu- El-Qasem, 2023).

The Second Branch: The Saudi and the United States Relations

In what concerns the Saudi American relations since more than seven decades the United States and the Saudi Arab Kingdom laid a close alliance, inspite of differences about human rights and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in accordance with the alliance document the United States gave security guarantees for the Saudi rulers in the track of its benefiting from the Kingdom's vast oil reserves. This arrangement stood fast in facing periodical conflicts all along years. But, recently, however, the United States dependence on Saudi Oil has weakened, also the Saudis are less confident in the American protection. As a result, conflicts that may have been covered by the Americans appear to be in potential rupture (Lain, 2023: 9).

The first official meeting was in 1945, when the American President Franklin Rose felt concluded a historical meeting with King Abdel Aziz Bin Saud, and they both differed about one point, it is the United States support of Israel's rise, as the King opposed that, but they laid the basis of arranging security in return for oil. And in 1973 the Saudi Arab Kingdom led the Arab Oil-boycott against the United States and other States, because of the American support to Israel in the Arab- Israeli war at that year, also Riyadh and Washington relations developed and became more warm after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 that dethroned the Iranian President, supported by the United States. And in 1990

the American forces came for rescue when Iraq invaded Kuwait and that had formed a threat to the Saudi Arab Kingdom as considered the geographic neighbor of Iraq (Muamer, 2022:3).

In the year 2001, relations between the two sides became strained again when the United States announced that the September 11 attacks were a planned operation by Saudi Citizens, most notably Osama Bin Laden. And in another challenge Saudi Arabia launched a blockade on Qatar in 2017, although it is home to the largest American military base in the region, it did pay any attention to this, and the bombing campaign in Yemen since 2015 has claimed the lives of thousands of civilians (Al-Minshawi, 2023: 2).

The United States has imposed JASTA law approved by the US Congress, which allows the families of the victims to file lawsuits against the Saudi government to compensate the victims of the events of September 11, 2001, which constituted a setback in Saudi relations with the United States of America, and this development made king Salman in 2016 call for a session of the Council of Ministers during which he discussed developments in the law and sent letters to the American administration calling to maintain relations and not to prejudice the sovereignty of states.

Likewise, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 and the accusation of Saudi agents of carrying out the assassination was the biggest opponent of the policy of the Saudi Crown Prince in Istanbul. Bin Salman. However, with the rise in Oil prices as a result of the Russian War in Ukraine in July 2022. Biden swallowed his pride and travelled to Saudi Arabia with fists. The Prince in Public (Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, 2: 2023).

A conviction was born among the Saudis that the United States, despite the deep relations and alliance, could not be relied upon for protection, defense, and security, and the decline in the American role emerged after its withdrawal from Afghanistan in the year 2021, which hastened the fall of its government, and within the framework of friendship, the United States abandoned its ally, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in the protests that led to his downfall, and this is an indicator confirmed by the Saudis in stating the extent of the American retreat in the Middle East (Catherine, 3: 2021).

After Biden assumed the US Presidency in 2023, US lawmakers called for the revival of a bill called the "Oil production and Export Prohibition Acts" Known as NOPEC. That would authorize the US Department of Justice to file an antitrust lawsuit against OPEC, although it is unclear how. An American court may implement a decision against the cartel members. On the other hand, other law makers

suggested reducing arms shipments to the Saudis. These two options contributed to the escalation of tensions between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America (Al-Bayari, 11: 2022).

The positive development of relations is fraught with a lot of anxiety and mistrust on the part of the Saudi side, which sees a complete American bias towards its internal interests at the expense of the stability of the countries of the region and their aspirations for development and security.

The stand of the United States from the agreement of reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, so at the political level, the United States of America announced its welcome with the project of reconciliation being shares in achieving political stability in the region, especially in Yemen. And calming tensions in the Eastern region, as US President Joe Biden's visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in July 2022 was shaped by the call for achieving stability and strengthening normalization relations between the countries of the region and Israel within the framework of the peace process in the Middle East (Hatoum, 2: 2023).

This is what is announced from the United States of America about the agreement of reconciliation, but the real thing differs completely, where the United States looks at the reconciliation as a dissolution of the partnership of Saudi Arabia and the United States, but it is getting out of the Saudi Arabia from the American cloak after the tension of relations between both sides, because of differences about human rights and oil production, in addition to anxiety caused by the growing of the Chinese Power in the Middle East and fearing of the United States from the Chinese existence that bothers in preventing arrival of Gulf oil provisions to it in case of conflict breaking and did not cover any sensitive security agreements (Patrisho, 2021: 2).

From other side Anna Jacobs, the greatest analyst in the international crises group, the Iranian- Saudi rapprochement with China does not form a threat to the interests of the United States, because it is with an economic nature, but the agreement may stir a case of tension if the matter concerned affecting the sensitive security issues, especially Saudi Arabia and the United States connect with relations concern nuclear energy and arms sales (Arab Journal, 2023: 3).

The Second Demand: Growing of Iranian-Saudi Relations Under the Auspices of China

In a statement issued on March 10 of 2023 after seven years of severing the Saudi diplomatic relations with Iran, both regional powers agreed on a deal to restore relations. And negotiations concerning this

deal witnessed ups and downs in the past two years, where the Iraqi, and Omani governments and recently the Chinese government mediated in it. And finally talks continued and ended successfully, the matter that shed light on the mutual political will to resort to diplomatic means to address grievances (Jibril, 2: 2023). The role of China in the Middle East and North Africa has grown through diplomatic efforts, including its role in facilitating the resumption of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These efforts gained significance following the failure of American efforts to end conflicts and wars in the Middle East (Malcolm H. Kerr- Carnegie Center; 2023)

The process of reconciliation appears to be a tactical reduction of escalation to serve the common interests of the parties and signatories to the agreement in the direction of achieving political, economic and security stability in the Middle East region, which contributes to the development of Saudi-Iranian relations in a way that transcends the elements of permanence and continuity. Mutual trust and paving the way for steps that support regional integration, and the Arab Gulf region may witness a state of transformation towards a peaceful and cooperative security system. It is a gradual process in which the Saudi Iranian reconciliation is one of its inevitable stages (Abdul Basir, 6: 2023).

And it will always be present for the Saudis to achieve a balance through smart programs to produce weapons that are conduit for Iranian missile superiority and its progress in producing marches that have proven their existence and were used extensively by the Russians in their attacks against Ukraine in the war going on there.

The First Section: The Strategic Perspective of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in The Context of Reconciliation

From the strategic perspective of the Saudi Arab Kingdom, the reconciliation may make a state of transformation within the framework of economic competition away from political and security competition because political and security competition is costly for both sides (Kenneth 3: 2022).

Therefore, Saudi Arabia's orientations within the frameworks of reconciliation stand out in a set of motives, which are explained as follows: First: The decline in the role of the United States in the Middle East may change Saudi Arabia's security calculations, especially after the relative decline of the American role in the Middle East, and it began to move its military and diplomatic resources to serve its competition with China, Better President Obama's nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015 and his declared policy that Iran and Saudi

Arabia “need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and establish a kind of cold peace”; and the US’ non-interference against the Houthi drone attack on Aramco oil facilities. Giantism has convinced the Saudi that Saudi Arabia can no longer rely on the United States to protect its security.

Therefore, Saudi Arabia considered its strategic options to calm hostilities with Iran or complete the current security guarantees that it possesses from the United States by using the competition of great powers in its favor and diversifying its security investigation (Nawar, 2: 2023).

Therefore, Saudi Arabia began to reduce the escalation with Iran and move towards diplomatic interaction with Iran to complete deference with diplomacy. To take advantage of the opportunities of multilateral diplomacy to bring a new political guarantee that enjoys greater interference over Tehran. It is China and it is an attempt to replace it with the United States, or it was not effective (Moses, 11: 2022).

Secondly: De-Escalation: Saudi Arabia Has No Interest in Any War in The Gulf Region. The failure of the US policy of pressure on Iran, Iran’s policy of increasing uranium enrichment, and Israel’s threats to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities have led to an unstable situation in the region, even on the brink of war. Therefore, Saudi Arabia does not want to be a party to this escalation that undermines its security and delays its social transformation. And the economist. On the other hand, the openness with Iran sends a clear message to the United States of America and Israel that the Kingdom is not ready to risk a direct war with its neighbor (Abdul Basir, 3 2023).

Thirdly: Security Priorities and Achieving Stability in The Region: Saudi Arabia believes that Iranian support for the Houthi group in Yemen, Iranian interference in Iraq, and support for Hezbollah in Lebanon should not be among Iran’s first security measures, because this behavior has led to a high level of escalation and a threat to security and stability in the region. Rather, the security priority is the existence of an alternative path that may contribute to the stability of the region in all Arab countries, especially Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon (Jabali, 11: 2023).

Fourthly: Vision 2030 and the Social and Economic Transformation Program: The priority of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Social and Economic transformation program is highlighted in Vision 2030. Where the Kingdom sees that the opportunity of transformation to carry out the vision 2030 conditioned with stability in the region that demands performing natural relations with Iran.

Therefore, the Saudi Arab Kingdom believes that any case of tension in the Gulf region and the Middle East, that will form an obstacle to social transformation, and in order to achieve a state of stability, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has chosen a policy of strategic ambiguity towards Ukraine, which helped it protect its interests from the negative results of Russian- Western tensions (Vision 2030, 2023 website).

Fifthly: Preserving The Interests: Saudi Arabia has economic and strategic security interests with China, therefore the agreement with Iran under the auspices of China consolidates relations between both countries. And the most important of that, because China enjoys a political and economic sovereignty with Iran, therefore it makes Iran more inclined to fulfill its obligations in the agreement, in order not to negatively affect its ally's image, so the Saudi Arab Kingdom hopes the Chinese auspices of reconciliation to be more permanent (Al-A'grabawi, 2023: 3).

Sixthly: Achievement of stability in the Gulf and the Middle East: Saudi Arabia believes that stability in the region has become an urgent case, on the contrary, competition and a high level of escalation will be an economic cost and a costly loss between the two parties. Great economy for the Kingdom, for example, but not limited to benefitting from the large Iranian market within the framework of improving relations between the two countries (AbulBasir, 2: 2030).

The vision of the Saudi Crown Prince 20-30 and the repercussions of the Yemen war and the failure to achieve it militarily, its high financial cost made the thinking mind in Saudi Arabia want to zero problems and strive towards cooperation and economic development, as economic growth in Saudi Arabia reached 8.7%, and this is a great indication of interest in economic aspects and spending billions in capital projects to attract investment, and improve its legal environment.

The Second Section: The Strategic Perspective of Iran in The Framework of Reconciliation

On the other side, the Iranian motive for the deal was included within the framework of a broader strategy to separate from the West through two main foreign policy strategies, namely "looking to the east" and "neighborhood policy." "The first side calls for establishing stronger relations with China and Russia, while the second option gives priority to the fifteen neighboring countries of Iran as major economic and political partners (Ahmadian, 6: 2021). Therefore, the actual motives that led to the Islamic Republic's decision to agree to the deal appear to be more complex for the following motives:

First: Internal turmoil in Iran: The Islamic Republic is facing unprecedented anti-government protests after the killing of the 22-year-old girl, MahaAmini, in police custody. The death of the girl formed public pressure in Iran, and the security establishment in Iran faced criticism from public opinion, and the main state-owned radio and television channels in Iraq lost their positions among the population. Rather, these dynamics and the balance between Riyadh and Tehran. Tehran was previously confident that its position was better because of its influence in Yemen, the dynamic protests after September 2022 revealed its vulnerability to the tools of Saudi influence. The new Saudi influence provided the Kingdom with a powerful bargaining tool for negotiating with Iran, so that if Iran reduces its support for the Houthis, Saudi Arabia will reduce its support for anti-Iranian propaganda (Al-Faqih, 2022: 3).

Secondly: The nuclear issue and reduction of tensions: Tehran considers that the agreement with Kingdom, of Saudi Arabia may help Iran to pursue its nuclear policy with more freedom after reducing the level of tension with Saudi Arabia, and this becomes a strategic principle of behavior in the Iranian security policy crises at the same time, so that there is no single reason for tension regarding the nuclear file. There is no sign indicating a change in Tehran's nuclear policy. Therefore, Iran believes that through its agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia it is to avoid facing a regional crisis in the Middle East within the framework of the Iranian tension of relations with the United States and Israel regarding the nuclear issue. Reconciliation may help Iran to take advantage of its rapprochement in the region to push for a better nuclear agreement with the United States, and may request Saudi Arabia's help in stooping its nuclear reactor (3: 2023, Ahmed).

Thirdly: The value of strategic reconciliation for Iran: Reconciliation for Tehran has a strategic value in deterring the Saudi-Israeli Security cooperation in the future, inspite of the dimension of the Saudi-Israeli normalization, the possibility of security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel may form a kind of threat in the Iranian perspective, and Iran believes that reconciliation and resorting relations with Saudi Arabia does not guarantee the prevention of Saudi- Israeli normalization due to the changing dynamics of regional relations. Therefore, Iran may use the principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty with Saudi Arabia as a pretext to prevent the emergence of an anti-Iranian security alliance at the regional level, and Iran believes that it can add another layer of complexity to the situation. Israeli military plans successfully through reconciliation with Saudi Arabia (Abdul Basir, 4: 2023).

Fourthly: The détente in Saudi Syrian Relations: détente in Saudi- Syrian relations helps the Islamic

Republic of Iran stabilize its gains across Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. In these hotspots where Iran has the upper hand, easing the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran can help pressure the status quo. The visit of the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad to the Arab Emirates in March 2023, and his attendance at the Jeddah conference on May 19, 2023 constituted a conference for the restoration of Syria in its relationship with the Arab countries, and it will also open the door for Saudi Arabia to exercise its influence in the region, and Iran believes that this new dynamic will help stabilize its main regional partner on in addition, as was proven in the case of Iraq, where despite the American presence, Tehran has maintained its influence, the Iranians seen confident that Saudi Arabia's entry into Syria will not endanger their interests in a strategic way (Al-MayadeenNewspaper, Net 2023: 5).

Fifthly: Growing of the Chinese existence in the region: Iran believes that the Chinese intervention in the security issues of the Gulf as a stage of disarming America from the regional system. And believes that increasing the number of forms, parties and diplomatic initiative in the shadow of the United States absence will share finally in weakening the security structure led by the United States in the region. And believes that the Chinese existence in the region limits the intervention of the United States in the region (Gahwaji, 2023: 2).

Sixthly: War Techniques: Iran believes that its superiority in drones and high-tech missiles did not last forever. In light of the great development of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in its possession of missiles and drones with Chinese help, it is in the interest of Iran to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia now before its comparative advantage ends. Cheap drones and low-cost missiles (Nadim, 4: 2022).

The policy of exporting the revolution brought troubles to Iran and losing the West's confidence in it and accusing it of destroying the Arab countries in which it has influence through sectarian racism, and this is what made the bloc of Iran's enemies grow little by little to the point of trying to explode the Iranian internal situation because of its preoccupation with outside. And ending the exclusivity of the United States by high lighting the role of China in the region.

The third demand: Challenges facing reconciliation between Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Relations between Riyadh and Tehran in the past decades witnessed many political disputes, and religious classical ones. The securitization and militarization of relations has become the prevailing trend in this period (Al-Smadi, 2019: 4). The Saudi side Saudi Arabia will continue to improve its missile defense and anti-drone capabilities by working with China, the United States and other partners. It will also seek to

acquire nuclear technical knowledges albeit for civilian use, and will do what it needs to strengthen its domestic military industries, which Iran may consider a threat to its security (Youssef, 203: 4).

Secondly: The Saudi Openness with The Arab Countries Constitutes A Threat to The Influence Of Iran: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will open up politically and economically to countries such as Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq because it believes that stability and security in the region can be strengthened through economic prosperity. Strong Saudi Arabia is with the United States for historical and security reasons (the United States remains the main military resource for Saudi Arabia), and Iran may remain suspicious of the consequences of this (Anadolu Agency, 2023).

Thirdly: Iranian Nuclear Reactor: Given that Iran is a nuclear threshold state that is close to developing nuclear weapons if it wished that, and this is not of the interest of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but its interest is in practicing some pressure on Iran to retreat from the nuclear agreement. And Iran may believe that this pressure contradicts with the spirit of the agreement. And this means that the Kingdom's fear from Iran's attaining nuclear weapons may force the Saudi Arab Kingdom on building its nuclear ability, and then any change in Iran's nuclear policy will contribute to its accounts, thus, the complex puzzle of the nuclear puzzle between the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel will remain in place (Ross, 3: 2022).

Fourthly: Iranian intervention in Yemen: Despite the reconciliation between the two parties, Iran believes that its support will continue in Yemen, given that there are external threats represented by Israel and the United States in the region, so Iran will remain supportive of the Houthis with new and advanced offensive weapons systems, and it is unlikely that the Policy of supporting the Iranian-backed axis of resistance will change as a pillar to deter the country in the region as long as its army has conventional alternatives limited in the shadows of the American – Israeli threat that has not changed. This means that Tehran will continue the policy of qualitative improvement of the axis of the operational capacity of the resistance, including through horizontal operational links between the Shite groups and raising their iterability capabilities (Al-Deeb, 3: 2023).

Therefore, the complications in Yemen will continue. Because Iran views Yemen as a strategic corridor that guarantees operational access to Saudi Arabia during a hypothetical conflict. Iranian influence in Yemen is seen as a decisive asset in imposing a logistical burden on the Saudis and maintaining

deterrence against the Kingdom. Iran has worked to strengthen its bases Military near the Gulf Coasts to increase its ability to confront the coastal Arab States.

It is difficult to imagine changing such long-term military planning if reconciliation remains limited to restoring diplomatic relations only. Thus, it is likely that Saudi arms purchases will continue to thwart the perceived Iranian threat (Al-Smadi, 2022: 3).

Fifthly: effects of internal public opinion on reconciliation: domestic reactions are shaping up in Iran. The hard-liners in both countries have contributed to some degree of demonizing the other side. While on the Saudi side, Skeptical voices in Iran can still influence policies and raise doubts about the usefulness of reconciliation, and it is not unlikely that they will make competition in the elections. The upcoming presidency in Iran, the escalation of tensions with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is beneficial to some opposition factions (The Eight Day Foundation for Media and Studies, 11: 2023).

Sixthly: effects of external public opinion on reconciliation : the influence of external public opinion emerges from Israel's concern and the emergence of sharp criticism within the Israeli government. Opposition leader YanirLapid, who described the reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, expressed that it "constitutes a threat to the directions of Israeli foreign policy" in the Middle East because it constitutes a blow to Israeli relations with Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. At the same time, Israel is looking for ways to disrupt the Arab-Iranian reconciliation to avoid further regional pressure. Israel believes that it moves towards the elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard in Syria may lead to an escalation of tensions and endanger reconciliation of Iran decides to respond (Saleh, 3: 2023).

Seventhly: Security problems between the two parties: Reconciliation sponsored by China cannot be achieved unless the two sides reach of solution to the closed security problems between them. Therefore, the two countries need to negotiate and resolve their differences over Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. The first step to making reconciliation permanent is for policy makers on both sides to acknowledge the challenges and spoilers that could threaten to undermine the benefits of the reconciliation agreement. And work to expand the different levels of communication at the ministerial, parliamentary, governmental and non-governmental organizations and interpersonal levels that would help in overcoming these challenges (Al-Shami, 2023: 6).

Eighthly: Military and security concerns: Military and security concerns will remain the most serious concerns for both sides, and the two sides should continue and prioritize intensive security talks. Thus, the two sides need to match the dialogue on their basic threat perceptions and help each other better understand each side's security grievances. On the one hand, the US sanctions against Iran will prevent economic integration between the two rival countries. And Saudi Arabia and Iran can work together in aspects that are less subject to sanctions than economic cooperation, and in areas such as maritime security, climate change, and renewable energy, and coordinate better regarding their political energy (Abdul Basir, 23: 2023).

Conclusion, Results, and Recommendations

Firstly: Conclusion

The conclusion of the study formed the outcome of the results that represent the answer to the questions of the study in addition to presenting a set of recommendations. The study dealt with the future of US-Saudi relations in light of the growing Saudi-Iranian relations under the auspices of China, and it may enhance the opportunities for regional cooperation between the two sides and may lead to reducing the Western influence represented by the US sponsorship of complex files. In the Middle East, a state of détente is witnessing after China's intervention within the framework of the Saudi- Iranian reconciliation, as the most prominent contenders in the Middle East region, and the region may witness a kind of cooperation in discussing many outstanding files in the security, economic and political fields.

They study showed the desire of the Saudi and Iranian sides to achieve understanding on bilateral interests in the Middle East and to move to a new journey based on cooperation and integration that contributes to opening the way towards settlements of intractable files in each of Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq to get out of the illusion of the sectarian conflict between the two sides.

The study indicated that the path of reconciliation may give an indication of the presence of the eastern camp led by China through the tripartite summit that brought together China and Iran on March 10, 2023 in Beijing at the level of foreign ministers, where the meeting agreed to resume diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran, and work to open their embassies in the future. The two sides discussed

the resumption of previously signed agreements in the fields of economic, commercial, cultural, sports and youth cooperation, which were signed in 1998.

The study confirms that the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement may lead to the creation of new trends towards China that contribute to international shifts towards a new world order that is anti-Western in light of what China is witnessing from the growth in its economy, especially towards the Middle East region, which may contribute to a new regional arrangement based on cooperation and integration and gives an indication of the decline of the influence of the United States with Saudi Arabia. Because of the lack of agreement on a set of files related to human rights issues in Saudi Arabia, and related to issues related to reducing Saudi Oil production.

Results of Study: the study deduced the following results through the conclusion:

1. The study confirmed that the Saudi-Iranian agreement may lead to the creation of new directions towards China that contribute to international transformations towards a new world order that is anti-Western in light of what China is witnessing from the growth in its economy, especially towards the Middle East region, which enhances the elements of cooperation and integration between the two parties.
2. The study proved that reconciliation succeeds in the presence of a desire between the two parties to achieve understanding on bilateral interests in the Middle East and move to a new stage based on cooperation and integration that contributes to opening the way towards settlements of intractable files in each of Syria, Lebanon and Iraq to get out of the illusion of the sectarian conflict between the two sides.
3. The study showed that reconciliation will contribute to the growth of Saudi-Iranian relations under the auspices of China, and may enhance opportunities for regional cooperation between the two sides, and may lead to reducing the Western influence represented by the United States sponsoring complex files in the Middle East, witnessing a stated relief after China's intervention in the framework of the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation.

The study confirmed that reconciliation will restore the reopening of frozen cooperation files between the two factions and the resumption of previously signed agreements in the fields of economic, commercial, cultural, sports and youth cooperation, which were signed in 1988.

Recommendations: The Study Had Recommended the Following Through Its Results

1. The study recommended that cooperation between the parties; the Saudi and the Iranian will share in enhancing the political and economic stability in the Middle East region, and reduce the sharpness of escalation and regional tension, and restore the state of relative calmness in the Arab countries that witnessed revolutions of the Arab Spring.
2. The study recommended that Saudia has to enhance the elements of calmness and stability among the rival factions in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon, and work to push towards enhancing elements of development and investment in the framework of Saudi Arabia's orientations towards vision of 2030, which is represented in the social and economic squint program, in condition that this program covers the states of the region adjacent to Saudi Arabia.
3. It is necessary for Iran to reduce the state of supporting fractions loyal to it in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon to ensure the success of reconciliation, enhance economic and investment development opportunities, and achieve stability in the Middle East.
4. Saudi Arabia and Iran have to comprehend that the agreement of reconciliation under auspices of China will increase opportunities of investment, trade exchange, and economic development between the two parties and other parties in the Middle East region.
5. Saudi Arabia and Iran must realize that competition and escalation will increase the state of tension and freeze all cooperation agreements, which will lead to a decline in the economies of the two countries, as well as distributing ambitions and economic transformation, which is a pillar in the development of countries.

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