The Universality of Humanity and Citizenship in Marxist, Liberal, and Islamic Thought: A Foundational Study

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Abstract

The human's universality stems from their inherent self, representing their truth in every human existence. This universality is intrinsic and not a product of making or consideration. Human universality is inseparable from their being and exists with them constantly. On the other hand, considerate universality is based on external making and consideration, and can be separated from something if the consideration changes or the need for it disappears. Human universality is self-based and not based on consideration. The concept of citizenship as a political consideration is outside the reality of human selfhood. Human universality has not been taken into account in the concept of citizenship, not even in Marxist political thought, which made the universal standard for humans through the working class (proletariat). This is also just a concept outside of human selfhood, even if it is a universal consideration for a class of people. Liberal political thought made citizenship based on the national state system the basis for determining human rights. It made the political and civil rights stipulated in international declarations and treaties a standard for determining the civility of the state. These political and civil rights, even if some are inherent to humans, do not need significant consideration by making them universal through international treaties. Meanwhile, Islamic thought considers humanity as a supreme value on which the global system is based. The universality of Islam is nominated to the universality of the system formed according to Islamic law, which is a universal system. Therefore, Islam, as a religion of human nature in its political dimension, considers humans as universal through the Islamization and humanization of the global system.

Introduction

The human being is inherently a political creature, interacting with the environment based on this nature. The study of politics requires deep contemplation and has evolved alongside human development and the complexities in individual and social life. The evolution of politics is closely tied to the development and conflicts among states, leading to the creation of solutions for these conflicts and their subsequent organization within the branches of political science. Both individuals and political science mutually influence each other.

The human being, through their mind, thoughts, and self-development, creates, develops, changes, modifies, innovates, and discusses all these subjects, either confirming or refuting them. The intellectual and cognitive production in various scientific fields, centered around the human mind, has been instrumental in humanity reaching its current state. Additionally, humans are both influential and influenced in the world through the practice of practical

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politics. This encompasses all events affected by the decisions made by governments internally, whether legal, administrative, regulatory, or other types of decisions issued by state institutions and structures. Furthermore, it includes treaties and decisions made by one state towards another in times of war and peace.

Research Questions

1. The problem of the study arises from the following questions:
2. Is there a universality to humanity?
3. What is the nature and reality of this universality for humanity?
4. Does the universality of humanity influence modern political thought? What is the impact of citizenship on the universality of humanity?

Research Hypothesis

This foundational study assumes two types of universality: inherent universality, which arises from the essence of a thing and is inseparable from it, and consideration-based universality, which originates from specific considerations outside the essence of a thing. Human universality belongs to the first type, inherent universality, and not consideration-based universality. This universality is influenced by and influences modern political thought. The study also assumes that citizenship limits human universality based on the conditions it imposes, thereby narrowing this universality. To study human universality and the perspective of citizenship, this research will be divided into two sections and a conclusion: the first is to establish the concept of human universality, and the second is to explore human and citizenship.

Human Universality

The term universality" is derived from the word "universe," which refers to the entire creation or everything within the universe. It encompasses all types of creation, such as the animal world, plant world, and inanimate objects, as well as the entire existence associated with planet Earth. It also refers to the entire world. That is, the existence associated with the planet Earth, as it refers to the worlds devoid of matter, such as the world of spirits, the world of angels, and the world of the unseen (Al-Ansari, 2005; Gomez–Marin & Sheldrake, 2023).

Universality signifies anything that is not limited to specific boundaries or a particular region, and it includes everything known to a group of people around the world. For example, global universality is evident in the widespread use of traffic signals to regulate traffic flow and in the global observance of certain events, such as Mother's Day, which transcends national boundaries and includes people of all nationalities, religions, and cultures. Another example is the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which is not specific to any country or people and addresses the condemnation of violence universally. Similarly, the International Anti-Corruption Day recognizes that corruption in its various forms represents a deviant practice from professional and ethical standards worldwide. These examples demonstrate that there are issues, phenomena, practices, and behaviors that are universal to all humans, regardless of their location. Therefore, these issues, phenomena, practices, and behaviors are referred to as "universal".

Universality is not only related to topics, phenomena, practices and behaviours, but extends beyond that to rights. The universality of human rights means the applicability of these principles, or rather, the necessity of applying them in all human societies, regardless of their location and whatever the social, economic, political and cultural differences that distinguish each society from the other (Hadi, 2000).

The period of universality in human rights standards and principles was preceded by another stage that was characterized by specificity, which is the one in which national human rights declarations were issued, such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, and the American Charter of Human Rights, and then after the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. There was an international conviction that there are rights that a human being must enjoy because he is a human being, regardless of gender, religion, language, race, or color, and that international human rights standards are one of the fundamental and necessary political elements inherent in their correct theoretical concept, so that the absence of universality leads to the transformation of these Rights from being human rights to becoming rights for distinct human groups, and these rights are distinguished by the differentiation and diversity of these societies (Farhat, 2000).

Proving the universal rights of the human being is that he is a human being with a common entity in all human beings, regardless of all other affiliations that distinguish one human being from another in terms of language, race, color, religion, culture, etc. However, the human self is one among all people - this proof - opens the door wide for research into the universality of man himself.

If the universality of human rights in principle may be something that cannot be discussed if we want international cooperation to ensure respect for human rights, then what should be discussed are the terms of these rights that are intended to be universal (Atiya, 1996).

In our pursuit to establish the concept of universality in this study, it's essential to make a clear distinction between relational universality and inherent universality from various perspectives:

To begin with, relational universality which involves assigning universality to a subject, event, behavior, or similar, indicating that this universal characteristic was not originally inherent but was externally bestowed upon the subject, event, or behavior. On the other hand, inherent universality entails deriving universality from the essence of something because it is an intrinsic part of its truth and existence. It is not a matter of consideration, creation, or external bestowal upon the essence and existence of the universal entity

The second aspect is that relational universality is not permanent and can be lost when the reasons for considering the subject, event, behavior, or similar as universal cease to exist. It can also be lost when the entity that considered it universal and made it a characteristic of the subject, event, behavior, or similar ceases to exist. In clearer terms, the continuity of relational universality and the attribution of universality depend on the continuation of the reasons for consideration and attribution, as well as the persistence of the entity that considered it universal and made it a characteristic of the subject, event, behavior, or similar, or both together.

The third aspect is that relational universality relies on the acceptance and approval of societies and peoples for its consideration and attribution. Without this acceptance and approval, the attribute of universality cannot be granted to the subject, event, behavior, or similar. In contrast, inherent universality is independent of anyone's acceptance or approval for conferring the attribute of universality upon something. Its existence is constant and real, and even if it is

rejected in consideration and attribution, it is because it was extracted from the truth and essence of the thing.

When we make this distinction between relational universality and inherent universality, a clear contrast emerges in the examples we've discussed. International Mother's Day, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence, the International Anti-Corruption Day, and even traffic signs represent "relational universality." They acquired universality through attribution and consideration, and this universal attribute was not originally inherent to their essence and existence. It can be revoked when the reasons for this attribution cease to exist, or when an alternative attribution or consideration replaces it, or even completely eliminated. In contrast, the universality of human rights is inherent and not the result of consideration or attribution by an external entity. Human rights are an intrinsic part of human essence and existence, extracted from their truth. The "Declaration" of human rights simply reveals this truth, nothing more.

Man and Citizenship

The concepts of citizenship and homeland are inherently linked, as mentioning one naturally evokes thoughts of the other. When homeland is brought up, it directs attention to citizenship and the citizens. Conversely, when citizenship is discussed, it immediately brings the focus back to the homeland. This connection stems from the fact that citizenship is derived from the homeland, and the existence of a homeland lacks meaning without citizenship or individuals being citizens in that homeland. Thus, the homeland forms the fundamental basis of citizenship. Al-Firuzabadi defined it in his dictionary as "the place of residence and the stable place for cattle and sheep." He also used the term "homeland" to refer to residing, taking it as a homeland, and citizens of Mecca as its residents (Al-Firuzabadi, 2005). Al-Firuzabadi used the analogy of cattle and sheep being tied to their stable due to the strong bond that keeps them in place, just as humans are drawn to their homeland.

Some people make a distinction between the native land and the place of residence, with the native land being an individual's birthplace and hometown. The place of residence, also known as the residence homeland, is where a person lives for a certain period, becoming their homeland where they and their family settle (Al-Jurjani, 1983). In political terms, citizenship denotes the rights and responsibilities of an individual towards their homeland. It represents the status of a citizen who enjoys rights and is bound by the duties imposed on them by their allegiance to the homeland (Al-Kayali, 1996). As per the British Britannica Encyclopedia, citizenship refers to the relationship between an individual and the state, as defined by the laws of that state. It encompasses the rights and duties outlined in the laws, balancing freedom with responsibility. Citizenship grants political rights to individuals within the state, including the right to vote and hold public office (Britannica, 2008).

The concept of citizenship has been closely associated with the concept of equality more than any other, and it continues to represent this relationship when introduced in various countries. This association does not represent a new political concept or principle; rather, its emergence was evident in the city-state of ancient Greece. Despite the exclusivity represented by citizenship in those Greek societies, it aligns with the intended meaning of the concept in modern political terminology (Al-Kawari & Bashir, 2001).

The political differences regarding the concept of citizenship are not unique to modern political thought but have existed since the inception of this concept. Aristotle explicitly addressed this

issue, stating: "Who is called a citizen and what does this name mean? This is a matter on which there is often disagreement, and hardly anyone is likely to give a unanimous answer. A man who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy (Aristotle, 2009).

Aristotle (2009) presented a complex notion of citizenship, one that encompasses various levels and distinctions rather than a uniform concept that applies equally to all. According to him, children who had not reached the age at which their names could be recorded in the city's civil register were viewed as incomplete citizens. Additionally, he regarded elderly men whose names had been removed from the civil register (retired citizens) and those who obtained citizenship through an external decree as not being full citizens.

Engaging in civic participation and contributing to public life is essential for attaining citizenship, surpassing mere association based on residency, birth, or citizenship granted by decree. This engagement varies from one city to another, characterized by a system of graded values and differential treatment of individuals, where certain rights are granted to one group while denied to others. From the prevailing philosophical and ethical standpoint of that time, this is not viewed as a flaw in the system, as every individual act in pursuit of what they perceive as good. It is evident that all forms of participation aim for the greater good, and the most obligatory form of participation, encompassing all others in a particular manner, aims at the greater good of all. This is what is referred to as the city of political participation (Strauss, 1949).

Hence, participation is considered the virtue of citizenship and the criterion for classifying citizenship. It is not universally granted, leading to two fundamental implications as uncovered in this study:

The first implication: Citizenship, as a political concept, is tied to the ability to engage in civic activities. An individual unable to engage in civic activities has a questionable citizenship, indicating less consistency compared to those capable of such engagement.

The second implication: Citizenship is not inherent but rather contingent. The contextualization of the concepts of inherent and contingent in this study clarifies that contingent aspects can be altered or even eliminated if the consideration for them changes or if the concept evolves due to changing circumstances, as will become evident in the context of citizenship.

The introduction of the social contract concept (Rousseau, 1916) is regarded as a pivotal political development that revolutionized modern political thought. The social contract delineates the nature of the state and the political institutions that form the components of state power. It presents citizenship in two forms: first, the citizenship of subjects, based on a complete allegiance relationship with the ruler; and second, the citizenship of citizens, signifying a transition from individuality to citizenship, indicating that individuals become citizens after being individuals (Imam, 1985).

The social contract is based on the relinquishment of individual rights by individuals in exchange for the relinquishment of the rights of others in society in favor of the political entity, whether it is an individual or a group. Citizens each relinquish their right to self-governance on the condition that others do the same (Moreau, 1988). This formed the basis of the legitimacy of governance by the ruler in exercising power in the state. However, it also implicitly recognizes the rights of citizenship that individuals have relinquished on one hand, and the impossibility of relinquishing basic rights that keep a person human, without which there would

be nothing of humanity left, such as the right to self-defense. Since the right to defend one's life and preserve one's limbs cannot be relinquished because it is a fundamental right, and a person cannot exist without it. It is not subject to transfer or waiver. This means that the right to self-defense exists even against the orders of the ruling authority (Hobbes, 2010).

The social contract, as outlined by John Locke, replaces individual decision-making with collective decision-making. Once formed among a group of individuals (the citizens), the authority to act becomes the prerogative of the collective body, determined by the principle of majority rule or plurality. This is because the driving force behind the group is the consent of its members. It is essential for the group to move in a unified direction rather than dispersing its efforts in multiple directions, which would weaken and diminish its effectiveness. Consequently, the group's direction is guided by the prevailing force, which is the force of the majority (Locke, 2015).

In this context, citizenship under the social contract places an individual under the authority of the majority, which may not necessarily align with their thoughts, views, or beliefs. On one hand, the decision of the majority in citizenship signifies a shift from an individual attribute to a collective one. Therefore, the absence of a concurring majority of citizens results in its non-existence.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's concept of the social contract is grounded in two core principles. Firstly, it emphasizes the vital need for active participation by individuals in the governance and administration of the state. The lack of positive engagement by the people in state affairs, or their exclusion from participation in any form, hastens the decline and eventual demise of the state. The second principle pertains to the equality of all citizens before the law, without discrimination, recognizing them as a unified entity. Economic equality among citizens is deemed equally crucial alongside political and legal equality. Rousseau asserts that the absence of equality results in the erosion of natural human happiness, brings about misery for many, heightens discord among members of the same society, undermines its unity, and ultimately leads to its destruction (Rousseau, 1916).

The principles of participation and equality, from which Rousseau established the foundations of citizenship, are in fact inherent rights of individuals. Incorporating them as part of the social contract does not diminish their status as inherent rights; rather, it transforms them into contractual rights within the social contract. Based on this, proponents of social contract theories must explore the nature of contractual rights that individuals acquire when relinquishing certain inherent rights in the social contract for the benefit of the social body.

The concept of citizenship has evolved politically following the theories of the social contract, especially in liberal political thought. In this context, the concept refers to the relationship that binds the individual to the state in terms of the obligations and citizen rights that the state is responsible for realizing. Liberals have emphasized the principle of freedom as a fundamental aspect of citizenship and have classified freedom into three types: freedom of conscience, which encompasses belief, thought, emotion, and expression; freedom of choice, which includes freedom of action and personal conduct, and adaptation of individual life; and freedom of association, which includes political affiliation and joining groups (Mill, 1988).

Liberal thought considers citizenship as the space that allows the individual citizen to develop their personal capabilities through the freedoms provided by citizenship. The liberal society is based on the principle that individuals should be left with as much freedom as possible in all cases where they cannot harm others, because they are best able to judge their own self-interest.

Restrictions should only be imposed to prevent them from harming each other, as exercising rigor and severity against individuals in this case is security for all (Mill, 1998).

From our perspective, the political application of the principle of citizenship has redefined its role from merely safeguarding the civil, political, economic, and social rights of individuals. A key objective in this redefinition is fostering coexistence within a unified framework, especially in the absence of concepts or principles that ensure harmonious coexistence. Citizenship has been acclaimed as the most effective concept for the coexistence of naturally diverse and unequal human beings, founded on the respect for their dignity, which is a fundamental value in democratic society. In essence, citizenship is predicated on the belief that despite their differences and inequalities, all humans are equal in dignity and deserve fair treatment, devoid of discrimination based on historical backgrounds or diverse religious affiliations, even in the face of economic and social disparities (Schnapper & Bachelier, 2001).

Marxist political thought critiqued the liberal concept of citizenship, as outlined in the writings of Karl Marx. Marx highlighted that the distinction between human rights and citizenship rights is rooted in membership in the bourgeois class or bourgeois society. In his critique, Marx posed a series of questions about this differentiation: The distinction between human rights and citizenship rights has been established. Who is the individual distinct from the citizen? None other than a member of bourgeois society. Why does this member of bourgeois society become a mere individual, and why are these rights labeled as human rights? How do we interpret this reality? Through the political state's relationship with bourgeois society, through the essence of political emancipation. Above all, we establish that what is termed human rights, as opposed to citizenship rights, are essentially the rights of members of bourgeois society. This signifies the self-centered individual, separated from others and from the community (Marx, 2016). Additionally, Marx critiqued the central tenet of liberal citizenship, which is freedom. He viewed human freedom, considered the core of individuality, as a state of isolation and withdrawal. According to Marx, an individual's right to freedom does not depend on human relationships but on the individual's separation from others (Marx, 2016). The essence of citizenship for Marxists is embodied in the real transformation through the union between the working class and the citizens. Citizenship is not only about formal participation in elections and legitimizing the ruling bourgeois class, but also about changing the entire social structure of society through a true revolution against bourgeois social values.

Marxist criticism deeply examines how institutions are seen as tools to perpetuate bourgeois control over society, rather than promoting citizenship and equality. They argue that these institutions create real barriers that prevent the proletariat from accessing democratic systems such as parliament. According to Lenin, bourgeois democracy, while an improvement from the Middle Ages, is still seen as limited, insincere, and advantageous for the wealthy, while deceiving and trapping the poor. He contends that the fundamental laws, administration, and freedoms in contemporary states reveal the hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy, as they contain provisions that allow the bourgeoisie to use force against workers and make unfair judgments, even in the most advanced democratic states (Lenin, 1977).

The Islamic political thought did not have the same scientific value it has today, and political thought in general, regardless of the political doctrine it represents, did not have the same depth of thinking that exists now. Therefore, the concept of citizenship was not used in the same sense that we see today in political literature. However, when we look back at Islamic history, we find many practices that reveal the application of this political concept, I mean citizenship, on the basis of humanity. If we go back to the first city founded on an Islamic constitution,

which is the city of Medina, we find in the Charter of Medina, a social and political document established by the Prophet Muhammad, principles of citizenship present, especially the principles of justice and equality before the law (Al-Hindi, 1983)

The document or charter explicitly states: "This book shall not stand as a protection for the unjust or the criminal. Whoever goes out in peace from the city is safe, and whoever stays in it is also safe, except for those who have committed injustice or crime" (Ibn Hisham, n. d). This clearly emphasizes equality before the law. The provisions of the charter that emphasize social protection and tribal support for the people of this charter do not represent social or religious immunity for the perpetrator of injustice or crime.

This social-political document stressed the significance of the social contract, and highlighted that social stability is crucial for political stability in the city. It also mentioned that any disputes or conflicts arising from the document should be referred to God and Muhammad, the Messenger of God, for resolution, with the affirmation that God is a witness to and approves of the content of the document (Al-Ghurooi, 1420 AH).

The universality of Islam is considered the starting point for the process of doctrinal upbringing and the global Islamic typification of human beings (Islamization of humanity). We emphasize from the outset what we have previously proven, that this universality of Islam stems from four aspects: the self-universality of Islamic law, the objective universality of Islamic law, the universality of the human to whom Islamic law was sent, and the universality of the system of governance in Islamic law. From the third aspect of this universality, which is the universality of the human to whom Islamic law was sent, the process of doctrinal upbringing for human beings begins. Despite its self-universality and objective universality, Islamic law cannot carry out this doctrinal upbringing without taking into account the universality of the human being.

The process of man Islamization did not originate solely with the advent of the Noble Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), but rather commenced with the inception of humanity and the missions of the prophets, in accordance with a comprehensive divine plan for mankind by the Creator. This plan, as elucidated in Islamic beliefs, affirms that the Creator is the Perfect and Absolute Being, independent of all else. Islam, in its Muhammadan law and the overarching divine heavenly laws, represents the ultimate purpose of its creation. It is intrinsically linked to the universe itself, signifying the attainment of its potential perfection, the most optimal realistic state achievable by the universe in its progression towards improvement. This perspective underscores the fundamental role of Islam in the grand scheme of creation and the universe's pursuit of its highest actualization (Al-Sadr, 2007).

The Islamization of man within Islam, as opposed to other divine laws, is attributed to the universality that distinguishes Islamic law from others. Specifically, Judaism and Christianity lack the universal elements necessary to govern human life universally. In contrast, Islam's universality transcends time and place, being inherently linked to the existence of man himself. Islamic law accompanies man wherever he goes, a characteristic not found in other laws. The limitations of other laws are exemplified by the famous saying of Christ, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's," indicating that Christian law does not comprehensively address all aspects of society (Al-Sadr, 2007). Furthermore, historical missionary and Christianization efforts did not promote the same universal concept as Islam, focusing primarily on converting individuals to Christianity without a broader program for human integration and the betterment of humanity.

Conclusion

The universality of man in political thought arises from within himself, not from any external source, and it represents the essence of man wherever he may be. Regardless of the time and place, man remains unchanged in his fundamental nature, unaffected by the language he speaks, the culture he embodies, or the geographical location in which he resides. This universality is inherent and does not stem from an external source. It is not a product of deliberate consideration, the work of a creator, or the establishment of a regulator, as is the case with legal universality. Based on this, we can draw the following conclusions from this study.

The first case: modern political philosophy was based on its intellectual foundations and scientific theories through investigating the phenomenon of power and governance. This philosophy regarded man as one of the aspects of that political phenomenon. The second case is that the universality of man did not exist according to modern political philosophy, which still believes in the subject of political science in terms of political authority, not man. According to this philosophy, despite its different views, ideologies, goals, and objectives, there are no human rights except through the legal terms in political philosophy, such as citizenship. Man, in his intrinsic reality, was not taken into consideration as being outside the political consideration of citizens and subjects, even though the basis for creating political philosophy is man himself. Without man, there would be no homeland and citizenship terms in political consideration.

1. Modern political thought established its intellectual and scientific principles by examining the phenomenon of power and governance, considering the human being as one of the components of that political phenomenon.
2. Modern political thought did not recognize the universality of man, as it viewed the subject of political science from the perspective of political authority, rather than focusing on man. According to this perspective, human rights were only recognized through the two legal titles in political thought, such as citizenship. The intrinsic reality of the human being was not considered outside the political framework of citizens and subjects, despite the fact that the basis for the development of political thought is the human being himself. Without the human being, there would be no homeland and citizenship in political thought.
3. Citizenship was associated with the emergence of the state, even in its simplest forms, such as the Greek city-state or the Islamic city-state. Although the term "citizenship" was not used in the latter, the concept was practically similar.
4. The concept of citizenship was linked in its intellectual development to three political concepts: citizenship and the social contract, citizenship and the nation-state, and citizenship and democracy. The perception of man differed based on each of these connections.
5. The concept of citizenship in relation to man has undergone significant fluctuations. With the social contract, individual human rights were weakened in favor of the social body. This trend continued in the nation-state, where nationalism was strengthened at the expense of humanism. However, in democracy, the emphasis on individual characteristics and human rights was reinstated.
6. Citizenship is a legal-political concept to which the phenomenon of globalization can be applied. The globalization of citizenship is part of the political globalization project. Based on the differences in the first chapter of this study, citizenship is not one of the intrinsic qualities of a person.

7. The association of the concept of citizenship with political globalization has made the political use of citizenship rights a pressing political tool in international disputes, as countries vie for global hegemony.

8. The contrast between human rights and citizenship rights is based on the meaning of citizenship in the nation-state or in liberal democracy. At times, human rights align closely with citizenship rights, while at other times they diverge, especially with the tendency to politicize citizenship rights under the banner of human rights.

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