

DOI: 10.53555/ks.v12i2.4016

# Pakistan And United Nations Role For Resolving Kashmir Issue: A Critical Analysis

**Dr. Ghulam Murtiza<sup>1</sup>, Dr. Muhammad Nawaz Shahzad<sup>2</sup>, Dr. Muhammad Imran<sup>3</sup>, Muhammad Sulyman Akbar<sup>4</sup>, Khalid Mahmood<sup>5</sup>, Dr Mehnaz Begham<sup>6</sup>, Iqra Kanwal<sup>7</sup>, Usman Ali<sup>8</sup>, Muhammad Faisal Mansoor<sup>9</sup>, Muhammad Asif<sup>10</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>\*Associate Professor / Chairperson, College of Law, Government College University Faisalabad – Pakistan, ghulammurtiza@gcuf.edu.pk

<sup>2</sup>Lecturer, Pakistan Studies, NUML Faisalabad Campus, Pakistan. nawaz.shazad@numl.edu.pk

<sup>3</sup>Assistant Professor, College of Law, Government College University Faisalabad – Pakistan, adv.drmimran@gcuf.edu.pk

<sup>4</sup>Lecturer, College of Law, Government College University Faisalabad – Pakistan, msulymanakbar@gcuf.edu.pk

<sup>5</sup> PHD Scholar, Times University Multan. Khalidmahmood6721@gmail.com.

<sup>6</sup>Lecturer, Sharia and Law Department, Islamic College University Peshawar. mehnaz@icp.edu.pk

<sup>7</sup> Lecturer, Pakistan Studies, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan. Iqrakanwal902@gmail.com

<sup>8</sup> PhD Scholar, History, Government College University Faisalabad – Pakistan. Aliusman2400@outlook.com

<sup>9</sup> PhD Scholar, History, Government College University Faisalabad – Pakistan. Ch.faisal.mansoor38@gmail.com

<sup>10</sup> PhD Scholar, History, Government College University Faisalabad – Pakistan. muhammadasif33370@gmail.com

## ABSTRACT

As defined by Pakistani authorities, the “basic issue” is Kashmir, but a more fundamental fear of India and Pakistan's national identities drives their strategy. Pakistan has been addressing the Kashmir conflict in a piecemeal fashion, without a coherent strategy or end aim. Since Pakistan's partition, majority of Pakistanis have claimed that the Boundary Commission misled them. Pakistan's measures in response to this perceived wrong, from protests at the United Nations (UN) to military adventurism, are generally ad hoc and used for temporary ends. The rise of Hindutva, the supremacy of the Pakistani military and the spread of Islamic extremism all have contributed to the impasse. Since the first Kashmir war, Pakistan's policy is not altered. Its bilateral and international diplomatic efforts have been limited to maligning India and portraying the bilateral strategy as failing. Also, it looks unwilling to fix the issue with India. It has not abandoned a military solution. Pakistan pushes for the UN Resolution (UNR), but its efforts to execute Clause II are insincere. India's aggressive attitude to Kashmir demonstrates that it does not want to follow UNRs. It adopted its political agenda rather expressing Kashmiris' wishes. Whenever bilateralism fails to settle the Kashmir issue, it might be viewed as not solving it on Pakistan's terms. Diplomatic stalemates came from Pakistan's nationalistic goal inside bilateralism. According to an analysis, The Kashmir position of Pakistan includes both military and diplomatic methods. When Pakistan felt its military might could capture Kashmir from India, it used force. Pakistan refuses to consider additional bilateral problems to indicate that bilateral conversations are fruitless. This halted bilateral talks. Pakistan is unrelenting in pursuing its “central issue” and only mentions plebiscites and UNRs. Since India opposes this concept, Pakistan argues that bilateralism will not solve the problem.

**Keywords:** India, Kashmir issue, Pakistan, Policies, United Nation Resolutions

## 1. INTRODUCTION (INDIA AND PAKISTAN FORMATIVE PHASE)



Source: Abby Pokraka, 2019 History of Conflict in India and Pakistan. *Centre for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation*.

<https://armscontrolcenter.org/history-of-conflict-in-india-and-pakistan/>

### 1.1 The Birth of the Kashmir Conflict: 1947-1949

In 1947, Pakistan and India were amidst violence, turmoil, and catastrophe. Maharaja Hari Singh remained hesitant on accession, pondered ideas of independence, and even courted Pakistan, which promised to continue his regal privileges. In the meantime, a revolution broke out in Poonch, a state's western district, and by October 1947, with Pakistan's support, the rebels declared "Azad Kashmir".

A scholar claims that the historical issue is "the outstanding business of division... the Kashmir conflict." Using the two-nation principle and physical proximity, some Pakistani analysts assert that Kashmir is a part of Pakistan. These viewpoints inspire statements such as, "Kashmir's admission Pakistan wasn't there, only desired but crucial for our unique existence." Numerous Pakistanis believe that Kashmiris would support the union in a referendum. Because of this, they feel India broke its promise to hold a vote. Pakistan's Kashmir policy is dictated by its military. Some Pakistani soldiers participated in the tribal offensive of 1947. In 1948, when Pakistan accepted a cease-fire, the army's Major Akbar Khan and other leaders tried to topple the government. This view supports Pakistan's Kashmir policy essentially (Thaakar, 2021).

### 1.2 Combat between Pakistan and India due to held Kashmir

As fighting persisted in 1948, India petitioned the United Nations (UN) to intercede, hoping to draw incursion into Kashmir. It passed a resolution in August 1948 demanding that India and Pakistan pull their troops out of Kashmir and agree on a ceasefire to hold a referendum. As of January 1, 1949, when the truce expired, there was no opportunity for a vote. Pakistan claims that India has betrayed the Kashmiris by not conducting the referendum. As a result, India has responded by accusing Pakistan of failing to withdraw its soldiers from the area as ordered by the UN.

### 1.3 1949: Indo-Pak Kashmir Dispute

They have battled three times (in 1965, 1971, and 1999). The front lines have not moved all that much due to these wars (LOC). India insists on using the LOC as a de facto boundary despite its claim to all of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan disagrees with this notion, stating that the princely state is founded on its Muslim majority and alleges India has broken its election promise. There has been no change in speech or position from either country in decades.

### 1.4 Why do India and Pakistan continue to hold their Ideological Positions? Kashmir is what?

Both nations have disagreements over Kashmir Valley and its predominantly Muslim, Kashmiri-speaking population. Because of Pakistan's partition, Muslims throughout the subcontinent now have a haven, but the issue of Kashmir remains unresolved. Located on after adopting a constitution in 1950, India's secular credentials were established by including Muslim-majority Kashmir in the union. By adopting a more confrontational stance toward the Muslim majority, the insurgency, and Pakistan

### 1.5 Since 1989, the Insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir

The insurgency's origins may be traced back to a grassroots movement by locals protesting government brutality and a decline in their democracy. In recent years, it has become a haven for radical groups, including Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, as well as Pakistani and foreign combatants, further complicating an already dangerous and muddled situation.

### 1.6 Sheikh Abdullah's Reviews

He built roads and infrastructure and tried land reform in Kashmir to transfer land to the people. In the early 1950s, Abdullah's popularity waned in the Jammu area due to his insistence on maintaining Kashmir's unique position inside the Indian union, despite his continued popularity in his home base of the Kashmir Valley. A provision in the Indian constitution giving Kashmir individual autonomy inside the Indian union was the product of negotiations with Abdullah and other Kashmiri leaders. In addition, Abdullah delivered many lectures in the early 1950s arguing that the status quo of India and Pakistan's occupation of Jammu and Kashmir amounted to stealing and that the region should become an independent nation whose sovereignty would be guaranteed by both countries.

In 1953, the Indian government first intervened in the Jammu & Kashmir's political landscape by dismissing and imprisoning Abdullah. It was the first of many such interventions. Kashmiris, particularly those living in the Kashmir Valley, began to experience a sense of hopelessness beginning in the 1950s and continuing into the 1960s as they endured a string of corrupt and autocratic regional administrations and rigged and fraudulent elections. When the 1987 elections in India rolled around, there was a general feeling of unhappiness with the leadership. These elections were granted to the National Conference, which is sometimes viewed as a puppet of the federal government. The Muslim United Front Coalition, the National Conference's primary rival despite performing well in the polls, conceded defeat and had its leaders imprisoned. Two of these individuals—Mohammad Yasin Malik and Yusuf Shah (also known as Syed Salahuddin)—founded two of the most significant Kashmiri separatist organizations in the ensuing ten years (Piotr Balcerowicz, 2022).

### 1.7 Internal and External Variables Regarding the Policy

- **First**, there is little chance of a change in Pakistan's Kashmir policy any time soon because it is intertwined with Pakistan's struggle with its national identity, institutional deficiencies, and five decades of animosity with India, all of which have reinforced Pakistan's concerns about Indian goals in the South Asian region.
- **Second**, Pakistan has modified its tactics several times despite its broadly consistent stance. Pakistan has resorted to war, diplomacy, and proxies. Strategy in Pakistan is affected by both domestic and external factors. There is a substantial impact of

internal politics on overall strategy. During the 1980s, a coalition of military and Islamist organisations worked to cultivate a support base that benefited from proxy conflicts.

- **Thirdly**, Pakistan's Kashmir strategy depends heavily on external developments. Changes in Pakistan's external environment have driven strategy revisions.
- **Fourth**, U.S.-Pakistan relations affect Pakistan's Kashmir strategy. Significant deterioration in U.S.-Pakistan ties led Pakistan to intensify the Kashmir conflict through war or proxy war. During the U.S.-Pakistan collaboration, Pakistan relied on diplomacy to address the Kashmir issue (Alam, 2020).

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

A Turkish foundation SETA as a research and policy recommending institution, provides a forum for international dialog to bring different views together with international scholarly standards, and contributes to the formation of a common ground. Through research reports, publications, brain storming sessions, conferences and policy recommendations, SETA seeks to guide leaders in government, civil society and business and contributes to the informed decision making mechanisms in Turkey. SETA opines that Pakistani experts see political benefits for their country's participation in the conflict; even though many Pakistani analysts think their country's involvement has paid political dividends. Here, it is crucial to calculate how much money such a programme will drain from the home market. If it meant achieving its foreign policy aims in Kashmir, would Pakistan be willing to absorb such significant damage at home? If this is not the case, then what other choices are there? (SETA, 2022).

According to Ansari, the PSDM Model focuses on resolving conflicts by conducting thorough and comprehensive analyses of the issues involved, offering various options to address primary concerns. It embodies an integrated approach that combines problem-solving and decision-making within a unified framework. Furthermore, in the implementation phase, it emphasizes accountability, ensuring that parties are held responsible for their behavior rather than treating each other unfairly. Ansari opines that PSDM model can be helpful in resolving Kashmir conflict (Ansari et al., 2019).

According to Haq, the enduring legacies of violence, displacement, refugee crises, rape, and kidnapping from both sides have fostered narratives of rupture, which persist in ongoing border skirmishes and various forms of intra, inter, or sectarian conflicts, contributing to a new wave of violence in the subcontinent. The question arises regarding how the partition has left the state of Jammu and Kashmir in a precarious state, with its people trapped in a liminal existence for seventy years. Since 1947, Kashmir has endured repression and genocide from both sides. Following Partition, it became an integral part (Atoot-Ang) and the jugular vein (Shah-Rag) for another. Notably, Kashmir remains unresolved, continuing to suffer politically, economically, and religiously for both India and Pakistan. Haq in his paper aims to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the Kashmir conflict through the lens of partition, examining the enduring legacies of violence that originate from this historical event, which continue to impact the subcontinent significantly (Haq, 2020). According to Pattanaik, Anger was widespread because of Pakistan's inadequate defences and the widespread that Pakistan should have kept control of Kashmir after the Partition. The significance of Kashmir as a symbol to the new nation, the region's absence of a strong national identity, and Pakistan's institutional imbalance all played a role in Pakistan's decision to assist the Kashmiri movement and those forces within Pakistan that battled it (Pattanaik, 2012).

### United Nations Security Council Peacekeeping Resolutions regarding Kashmir Issue

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has addressed the Kashmir issue through several peacekeeping resolutions. These resolutions primarily aim to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir. However, despite these resolutions and subsequent efforts by the UN, the Kashmir issue remains unresolved. The UNSC has continued to emphasize the need for dialogue and diplomatic solutions to address the longstanding conflict and alleviate tensions in the region. Yet, achieving a lasting resolution remains a complex and challenging task due to the entrenched positions of both India and Pakistan regarding the status of Kashmir.

The important UNSCRs related to Jammu & Kashmir dispute is as follows:

**UNSCR 38 (1948):** The resolution requests that “the Security Council should be immediately informed of any material change in the situation in J&K.”

**UNSCR 39 (1948):** The resolution established “the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and share facts with the Security Council about the situation in J&K.”

**UNSCR 47 (1948):** The resolution rules that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India and Pakistan should be decided “through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite”.

**UNSCR 51 (1948):** By this resolution, “the Security Council emphasizes the need to resolve the dispute for maintaining international peace and security.”

**UNSCR 80 (1950):** The resolution reaffirms that “final disposition of J&K dispute will be in accordance with the will of the people, expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.”

**UNSCR 91 (1951):** This resolution is significant as it pronounces that “any determination of the final solution by the erstwhile Constituent Assembly in HIOJ&K would not constitute disposition of the State of J&K, in accordance with the principles mentioned in UNSCRs.”

**UNSCR 98 (1952):** Reaffirming that “the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the UN, the resolution laid down the maximum number of troops to be maintained by both India and Pakistan at the end of the period of demilitarization before the plebiscite.”

**UNSCR 122 (1957):** The resolution once again stipulates that any action that “Constituent Assembly in IIOJ&K may have taken or might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State of J&K and any part thereof, would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance of the above principle.”

**UNSCR 1172 (1998):** The resolution urges “India and Pakistan to resume dialogue on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove tensions, and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir.”

**UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Resolution (1948):** Under this resolution, both “India and Pakistan have reaffirmed their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.”

**UNCIP Resolution (1949):** The resolution states that “the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite” (Qadeer, 2017).

### 3. METHODOLOGY

This study is qualitative in nature, and the secondary data collection tools used to get the data from internet articles and journals. Some of the information for this research has been gathered from the publications of various researchers. The information that is obtained through the use of this technique is in the form of words and sentences. In general, this methodology is used for social sciences, and it offers specific information regarding the subject of the research.

### 4. KASHMIR CONFLICT

In 2009, it may enter a new and improved phase, as the most accessible. This government can break with the past and demonstrate that it is working for the people by bringing peace, restoring law and order, and constructing infrastructure, schools, and bridges without enriching itself. Two decades of civil conflict, assassinations, disappearances, and other crimes have worn Kashmiris down. They expect the regional administration to provide them with tranquility (Dawn, 2010).

#### 4.1 The Prospects for Kashmir

Pakistan is being drawn deeper into the Afghanistan conflict, which has split over its borders, and India and Pakistan's relationship, both of which are governed by the international situation. The Pakistani military is not just trying to defeat the Taliban but also stoking Islamic extremism in Kashmir to weaken India's sway in Afghanistan.

#### 4.2 Ideology of Kashmiri People

Political parties in India, Pakistan, and Kashmir all adhere to seemingly opposing ideologies regarding Kashmir: Kashmir is Pakistani, Kashmir is India, and Kashmir must be accessible. Therefore, any long-term resolution to the issue must involve the three key powers in the region. They must reconcile and acknowledge that the Kashmir dispute is a complex issue involving domestic, regional, and international issues that require simultaneous attention from all parties involved. It is not just a dispute between Pakistan and India over who should rule the region's Muslim majority (Ahmed & Chakma, 2012).

If talks were held with Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri political parties and Jammu and Kashmir's democratic system was kept, the chances of peace in the area would go up (Pattanaik, 2008).

#### 4.3 Why doesn't the civilian administration negotiate about Kashmir?

Manufactured public opinion may have the answers. David Easton's system theory can be used to analyse Pakistani citizens' views on Kashmir. This idea discusses government inputs and public opinion feedback that determine policy outputs. The government's comment is mainly based on inputs. Pakistanis rely on official information.

The significance Pakistan's Kashmir may be gauged by considering that the civilian administration emphasizes its accomplishments in Kashmir when giving its governance performance report. The government's strong attitude is hailed as a positive accomplishment. It undermines any understanding reached by India and Pakistan to address the problem. An uncompromising stance is perceived as protecting Pakistan's “national interest” by withstanding pressure from multiple sources (Piotr Balcerowicz, 2022).

### 5. LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT

When it comes to low-intensity conflicts, Pakistan's military is not green. However, since 1989, Pakistan has led to cross-border terrorism. Pakistan's ongoing engagement in Kashmir may be traced back to General Zia's 'Operation Topaz. Pakistan uses this tactic because they recognise that they are at a disadvantage in conventional armaments and that widespread public opposition is to resort to war as a solution. As it had in 1948 and 1965, Pakistan used the instability in the valley after 1989 to further its agenda in Kashmir. Bhutto anticipated political support for Pakistan's military plan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto urged a people's war against India through a coded letter to Tikka Khan. The next fight will pit us against an adversary that is not as superior in terms of workforce or strategy as they are in raw firepower. Bhutto was aware that Pakistan might indirectly impact Kashmir's foreign policy. He said no separatist movement could succeed without external backing in Pakistan's National Assembly. Due to their immense authority, modern governments cannot allow for a peaceful internal succession. Pakistan may be able to disclaim responsibility if it supports jihadists in a low-intensity conflict. They justify the military-driven goal by calling cross-border terrorism a “freedom war” (Ahmed1, 2012).

#### 5.1 Kashmir's Return is a Military Possibility.

Kashmir's geography is ideal for guerrilla warfare. Kashmiris might annihilate six divisions of the Indian army with minimal help from neighbouring countries. Pakistan's determination to enforce its claim over all of Kashmir by whatever means, including military force, has prompted armed conflict with India (Latif, 2021).

#### 5.2 Sino-Indian conflict Kashmir's best chance



Many Pakistanis consider the Sino-Indian War of 1962 to have been their best opportunity to retake Kashmir. Pakistan could have used military force to settle the Kashmir dispute had Ayub Khan rejected American pressure. In 1965, Pakistan made its final sincere effort to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The military operation was planned and carried out in secret, without consulting Pakistanis, Kashmiris, or the general public. An elite group in Pakistan believes that a military solution to the Kashmir problem is possible (Haqqani, 2003).

### **5.3 Pakistani Government Morally, Materially and diplomatically help Kashmir**

Due to Pakistan's conventional armament imbalance and Muslim racial and military superiority, low-intensity conflict is urged. The popular perception is maintained alive to boost Pakistan's military at the expense of socioeconomic growth. Kissinger asked Pakistan in 1970 if it could defeat India. Yahya Khan and his colleagues said Muslim fighters were historically superior. Popular idea about Pakistanis' martial supremacy is based on this strength rating, with a mix of Mughal rule (Asoori, 2020).

### **5.4 Pakistan's Militarism in Helping Kashmiris**

Pakistan's push for a military solution, whether through a tribal invasion or by supporting militants, underlines how it views Kashmir and how to solve it. International pressure prompts bilateral negotiations.

## **6. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY AND NATIONAL WEAKNESSES**

The use of a military option and an internationalization approach to put pressure on India may be seen in Pakistan's Kashmir policy over time. The UN Resolution (UNR) is supported by Pakistan's adherence to political rhetoric. This fact is demonstrated by Pakistan's lack of commitment to upholding the demands of the UN resolution. Pakistan ignores Clause II in favor of relying solely on Clause III of the 1948 UNR. The inability of Pakistan to remove its troops and tribal elements prevented Pakistan from complying with the UN verdict. There was disagreement over how much security should be provided in Kashmir before the referendum. Although several Pakistanis experts accuse India of not carrying out the UN decision, the Pakistan National Assembly's The Jammu and Kashmir White Paper placed the whole blame on Pakistan for its inaction. It claims that the ruling regimes in Pakistan are no longer interested in Kashmir. "The UN organization was preoccupied and failed to advance the referendum-related procedures in Jammu and Kashmir."

Pakistan hasn't substantially changed its stance on however, a military solution to the Kashmir issue its efforts to implement the UNR Pakistan reliance on UN decisions is therefore dubious. Since 1989, Pakistan has actively contributed to the instability in the valley by reenacting the 1948 tribal invasion there in 1965.

A similar tactic was employed during the 1999 Kargil battle. A dual strategy has been used by Pakistan in Kashmir. It makes use of the potential for a military assault, which now relies on low-intensity warfare. Concurrently, engage in bilateral diplomacy centered on a negotiated resolution of the issue if the circumstances warrant it. In dealing with Kashmir throughout Pakistan's history, this method has remained constant. Additionally, Pakistan has ensured that the two-way discussions on Kashmir will fail. This tactic has restricted the range of bilateral discussions in which both sides reaffirm their current stances because Pakistan has not changed its historical stance on Kashmir while appearing to be ready to do so.

Bhutto's biographer, Salman Taseer, asserted that Bhutto was aware that by supporting an armed uprising in Kashmir in 1965 when there was little significant discontent among Kashmiris; Pakistan risked a full-scale invasion across the international border. He asserts that he did so because he believed that his plan would successfully inspire opposition to Indian sovereignty over the valley on a worldwide scale. Pakistan received little advantage from the Tashkent Declaration, which the Soviet Union made possible. There was no reference to Kashmir in the Tashkent Declaration. The problem was a component of the larger bilateral dispute between Pakistan and India.

The war of 1971 and Bangladesh's rise to power served to highlight Pakistan's weakness as a nation. The Kashmir issue's potential for globalisation was constrained by the Simla Agreement, which restricted it inside a bilateral framework. Furthermore, Pakistan did not want to openly participate in causing unrest in the valley at the time due to regional political considerations. The Pakistan army was severely demoralised after East Pakistan broke away; therefore, the military solution to the Kashmir problem was temporarily dropped. After the Simla Agreement, Bhutto said in Pakistan's National Assembly that there was only one way to "obtain" Kashmir, and it wasn't through negotiation or the UN. The Kashmiri people must struggle for their right to self-determination if you want them to have it. There is nothing else to do. As history has demonstrated, the ability to determine one's own fate cannot be exercised by proxy.

If the people of Jammu and Kashmir wish to live as free people in fraternity, friendliness, and comradeship with Pakistan, they must first achieve their independence. They must take the initiative. 20 Bhutto said, "We have demonstrated India's military dominance, at least for the time being, via the conflict," ruling out the use of force to resolve the Kashmir dispute. "If we haven't acquired anything through nonviolent means, we must surely have done so through violence".

Bhutto's policies after Simla produced a tenuous peace. The political prognostication regarding Kashmiris' involvement in resolving the Kashmir issue gave rise to hyperbole as internal opposition to Bhutto's leadership increased. There were doubts about Bhutto's dedication to the Simla Agreement. A Western analyst claimed that Bhutto's adherence to the Simla Agreement was not flawless. "Bhutto's promise made in Simla about Kashmir was meaningless because, despite what was written on the contract he signed, he had not backed Indira Gandhi's position." He was realistic enough to recognise the frailty, diminutive size, and current weakness of Pakistan. Since Kashmir was a Muslim state and hence by definition "belonged" to Pakistan, he had no reason to doubt that Pakistan would rise once more to retake Kashmir. This reality, which was deeply ingrained in Zulfikar Bhutto's cerebral maze, was unchangeable by whatever arrangement. Pakistan participated in the 1980s Cold War as a frontline nation fighting alongside the US against the Soviet Union. Pakistan saw the Soviet participation in Afghanistan as

a continuation of the Indian threat due to India's close ties to the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union posed a threat on the North-West Frontier, Pakistan could not afford to have hostile relations with India.

The challenge for Pakistan is that it cannot allow Kashmiris to resolve the conflict on their own. Pakistan is certain that it can contribute to the peace in Kashmir. Pakistan is averse to entrusting Kashmiris with the resolution of the conflict because it will not accept a solution that is not in its best interests. Up until the late 1980s, Pakistan pursued a charade of bilateral diplomacy while waiting for a fair chance. Pakistan was given a once-in-a-lifetime chance to pursue its Kashmir policy on its terms, i.e., by giving material support, training, and employing some militant groups to accomplish its foreign policy objectives in Kashmir, as a result of the shifting geopolitical environment and internal political developments in Kashmir during the late 1980s. Pakistan's Kashmir policy changed as a result of evolving political conditions.

Kashmir is an issue, an idea, and a tenet that, in the words of Javed Jabbar, then-Minister of State for Science and Technology, is as fundamental to Pakistan as Pakistan itself. The biggest challenge to Pakistan's foreign policy—possibly even more so than Afghanistan—is Kashmir. “After a 40-year hiatus, Pakistan faces significant challenges in reestablishing Kashmir as a top priority” (Crisisgroup, 2003).

## 6.1 Kashmir's Internationalization

Pakistan has argued for third-party mediation because bilateral negotiations have failed. Its articulation of the Kashmir issue in international forums implies a lack of bilateral commitment. The policy posture largely maligns India and offers no real solutions beyond restating its previous viewpoint. Lt. Gen. K.M.Arif summed up Pakistan's strategy: (Asoori, 2020).

## 7. PAKISTAN POLICIES FOR KASHMIR

An examination of Pakistan's perspective would illuminate the country's current policy posture, which is founded on a set of core convictions and may be better understood with this clarity. A few of the beliefs have developed over time due to carefully crafting and articulating their expression. It, in and of itself, is reinforced by generated public opinion favourable to Pakistan's stance (Ahmed1, 2012).

The following presumptions serve as the foundation for Pakistan's postulations and policies for Kashmir:

### 7.1 Quaid-e-Azam policy for Kashmir

1. Jinnah believed Pakistan was incomplete without Kashmir. He worked to free Kashmir from India's illegitimate occupation because he was committed to its people. Quaid's view point is clear on Kashmir. He saw Kashmir's relevance for Pakistanis and Kashmiris with clarity. He vehemently criticized Indian aggression in Kashmir after seeing the plight of Kashmiris when no one else was listening.
2. Quaid-Azam In addition to seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was adamant about freeing Kashmir from Indian control. His orders to General Douglas Gracey to send Pakistani forces to Jammu and Srinagar were a clear indication of his boldness regarding the Kashmir issue.
3. Quaid-e-Azam reportedly declared, “Kashmir is Pakistan's jugular vein, and no nation would allow its jugular vein to be under the enemy's sword,” in his doctor Dr. Riaz Ali Shah's notes while he was unwell in Ziarat.
4. The enemy has been trying to sever ties with Pakistan and Kashmir since 1958. The explanation of Pakistan's name given by Quaid-e-Azam to Mountbatten on May 17, 1947, which reads: “P for Punjab; A for Afghan (i.e., Pathans of the NWFP); K for Kashmir; I for nothing because that letter was not in the word in Urdu; S for Sindh; and Tan for the last syllable of Baluchistan,” makes it clear that he had a strong interest in Kashmir. Quaid-e-Azam supported Kashmir prior to Pakistan's independence. He wished for socioeconomic justice and rights for Kashmiris, especially Muslims. Muslims and women in Kashmir were treated like animals by the Dogra Raj.
5. When Quaid travelled to Kashmir in 1926, he discovered that Muslims from the region had dispatched a delegation to the viceroy to express their plight. Their lands had been stolen when they returned.
6. After Quaid's return, the Muslim League meeting in Lahore unanimously urged the maharaja to defend the economic and educational rights of Muslims. Like Quaid, Allama Iqbal observed Kashmiris being mistreated. Allama Iqbal, the president of the Muslim League, declared August 14 as Kashmir Day in 1931.
7. Quaid's three trips to Kashmir show that he was interested in the political situation there. “M.A. Jinnah, unlike Jawaharlal Nehru, was extremely unwilling to involve himself directly (or the Muslim League he commanded) in the internal affairs of the Princely State; such action would have been constitutionally wrong,” Alastair Lamb wrote of the Quaid-e-Azam's visit to Srinagar in 1944. He always followed the rules and avoided taking a position on any matter that he thought was unworkable.
8. A leader's choices are sound ideologically after extensive deliberation. After much thought, Quaid-e-Azam chose Kashmir. On Pakistan's objective, he adopted a brave stance, activated it, and ultimately succeeded in his task.
9. By all means necessary, India wanted Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan's worldview is known as “Two-Nation Theory,” but Hindu leaders in India disagreed with it. They made an effort to persuade Quaid-e-Azam to renounce the “Two-Nation Theory,” but he resisted.
10. In order to refute the “Two-Nation Theory,” India forcibly invaded Jammu and Kashmir, a state with a majority of Muslims that is close to Pakistan. The people of Kashmir are committed to and aware of the value of the “Two-Nation Theory.”
11. The Quaid cautioned Kashmir's Sheikh Abdullah not to fall prey to Congress's snares, and time proved him right. Sheikh Abdullah was also not paid for his services to India, and India continued harassing Kashmiris. The leadership in Kashmir acknowledges that Sheikh Abdullah's desire for power aggravated the issue.
12. The situation in Kashmir after Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was revoked in August 2019 demonstrated Jinnah's validity, and

13. Quaid had morals. He was successful as a result of his duties and belief in Pakistan's mission; we require the same conviction. A deviation from Quaid's vision will jeopardise Pakistan's stability. If Kashmir is not included in Pakistan, the nation will experience serious issues.

14. Pakistan remains steadfast in its correct and long-held position that Kashmiris should be granted their right to self-determination under Prime Minister Imran Khan. South Asia will be unable to live in peace and progress unless Kashmir is resolved. Our decision-makers must adhere to the Quaid's position on Kashmir. Kashmir should take precedence in any conversation Pakistan has with India. A clear national policy regarding the Kashmir issue must be developed by the political leadership, and it must be continuously and religiously implemented by the government. As Quaid did during his lifetime to defend the Two-Nation Theory and the Kashmir issue, the current administration should adopt a strong stance and speak out bravely in support of its moral position in every arena.

15. In order to equalise Jammu and Kashmir with other Indian states, India removed Jammu and Kashmir's distinctive status and completely eliminated any state nomenclature. In an effort to alter the demographics of Jammu and Kashmir, which it has illegally occupied, India has been settling Hindu migrants there. To date, it has granted around 3.4 million non-Kashmiris, especially Hindus, residence permits. Pakistan should therefore speak out against this flagrant transgression of justice and fair play. Sadly, Quaid-e-Azam passed just a year after Pakistan was founded. If he had lived a few more years, Kashmir would have been incorporated into Pakistan. Let's emulate the Quaid and conduct a political and diplomatic war against the unconstitutional Indian annexation of Jammu and Kashmir on this Kashmir Solidarity Day on February 5. Let's put aside our little personal interests and work together as a nation to strengthen Pakistan in order to achieve this. Fulfilling Quaid's promise to Kashmiris, a politically united, socially stable, and economically thriving Pakistan will pave the road for Kashmir's liberation from illegitimate Indian oppression (Ahmad, 2022).

### 7.2 Pakistan's policies for Kashmir after Gibraltar War

What seemed to be an indigenous uprising in August 1965 spread like wildfire over the part of Kashmir under Indian authority? Invasion by India allegedly occurred a month later with no provocation from Pakistan. A victory day is celebrated annually in Pakistan on September 6 to honour the day the country fought a much greater adversary in a war that ended in a draw. However, was the Kashmiri uprising against Indian rule local?

Over their month there, they managed to take out an entire bridge and multiple supply depots for the Indian army.

He claims that most of the 180 individuals in his squad were recruited from the general public. We were a mixed bunch, with six women and six guys for every ten males. The fact that similar gangs had infiltrated other districts of Kashmir was news to Mr. Ali and his fellow foot troops.

Mohammad Nazeer, who is now 64 years old, was one of them. He had just been a teenager of 14 when he was enlisted. More than a dozen Indian stations in the Poonch area were assaulted while he was a part of the team. He explains that he and his fellow recruits had no idea where they were going after leaving the training centre.

They came over from the Kahuta side of the advance and worked primarily out of the city of Mandi in the Poonch area. When asked about the male members of his organisation, he said they were mostly "just youngsters like me." Although they had seen much death at such a young age, they kept their spirits up.

Our morale was good whenever there was gunfire and activity. However, when it was peaceful, we started becoming restless. Those were times when we gave little thought to the afterlife.

The idea of Operation Gibraltar was to incite an uprising among the Muslim majority population of Indian-controlled Kashmir, the vast majority of whom had wanted to join Pakistan since the partition of British India in 1947.

Rawalpindi, Pakistan, serves as the transmitter for a rebel radio station that airs aggressive coverage of the "Mujahedeen" and their successes in inciting an uprising in the region of Kashmir.

The people of Indian-administered Kashmir were unprepared for a general revolt and suffered at the hands of the invaders. According to military historians' accounts, many people were harmed or murdered, and some infiltrators were turned in.

India has increased its troop strength in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, closed off infiltration routes, and taken possession of strategic heights from which to threaten Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Pakistani soldiers began an incursion into Jammu to cut off India's supply line to reduce Indian pressure. The incident provoked Indian attacks on Lahore and Sialkot.

Most infiltrators were found, caught, or killed off by August. Those who managed to escape India's onslaught on Lahore were given the command to go. According to Qurban Ali, "we were told they could no longer replenish us, and we were on our own" (Haqqani, 2003).

### 7.3 Pakistan's Policies for Kashmir Tashkent War

The deal resulted in nothing more than a ceasefire. However, the war was significant in many ways.

- First, this was the first successful operation that not only prevented Pakistan's effort to seize Kashmir but also occupied a strategically crucial area that put Pakistan under tremendous pressure. Pakistan's gambit to alter the situation in Jammu and Kashmir failed.
- Second, conflict enhanced India's worldwide standing, especially after the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The Times editorial predicted that India would become Asia's dominant nation.
- Thirdly, it considerably enhanced relations with the Soviet Union and reaped benefits during the 1971, War.
- Fourthly, India shifted its focus to its nuclear program in response to the Chinese threat.
- Fifthly, India boosted its defense procurement program to strengthen its capabilities.

- Sixth, India eliminated the shortcomings in its intelligence collecting and evaluation capabilities identified during the conflict. India established a distinct external intelligence agency and placed the Joint Intelligence Committee within the Cabinet Secretariat to comprehensively assess all dimensions. These changes later yielded substantial returns (Latif, 2021).

Recent attention has been focused on who won the battle, and this aspect must be addressed. The evaluation of victory and defeat is based on objectives. Pakistan's attempt to foment issues in Kashmir and guarantee its secession from India utterly failed. It also lost in critical places, proving it to be a loser. Its internal standing weakened, resulting in its dissolution. Indian objectives were reactive: to thwart Pakistan's attempt to grab Kashmir and to teach Pakistan a lesson about the repercussions of its nefarious plans. India accomplished these objectives, and as a result, India earned victory (Action, 2022).

#### 7.4 Shimla War 1965-1988

A large portion of Pakistanis wanted Islamabad to unilaterally revoke the 1972 Shimla Agreement after India revoked IIOJK's special status. It was not taken into consideration at the time. Some claimed that the agreement was still valuable because it obligated the two nations to find a peaceful solution to the Jammu and Kashmir conflict. The Kashmir conflict persisted regardless of what India did. India would eventually be able to resolve the conflict thanks to the Shimla Agreement.

But there's not much hope in reality. India used the Shimla Agreement as justification to put off dealing with Kashmir for 50 years. On August 5, 2019, it came dangerously close to destroying the Shimla Agreement.

Every time Pakistan discussed Kashmir in public forums, India erupted, denouncing Pakistan for violating the Shimla Agreement. It is essential to review the contract and put an end to persistent disagreements (Asoori, 2020).

#### Pakistan has always followed the Agreement.

- First, India's assertion that Pakistan cannot even say "K" is misleading. Pakistan never gave up its right to update the international community on bilateral and IIOJK developments by agreeing to settle the dispute bilaterally. The agreement makes no such restriction on Pakistan.
- Second, India changed the situation on the ground in 1984 by seizing Siachen Glacier. It violated the agreement mentioned above provision. India could counter by mentioning the 1999 Kargil conflict. Siachen belatedly triggered Kargil.
- Third, New Delhi also violates the Geneva Conventions and UN Security Council decisions by changing the region's demographics. If not halted, IIOJK's Muslim majority may become a minority in their territory. Nearly 4 million Indians have been granted residency in the disputed territory.

Given the above, the Shimla Agreement is useless. India has sanity by the balls in Kashmir. India reverted to July 27, 1949. India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing the Kashmir "ceasefire line" Shimla Agreement renamed the "ceasefire line" "Line of Control."

Pakistan must adjust its Kashmir discourse. The Shimla Agreement has hindered regional peace for the past 50 years. As Pakistan's former high commissioner to India, I do not see how Jammu and Kashmir could be settled without sub-rosa third-party mediation.

As India's economy grows, its stance on Kashmir hardens. Pakistan is cautious. If Islamabad can put enough pressure on India to settle Kashmir remains to be seen. Candy-floss diplomacy and ignoring Kashmir are over (Piotr Balcerowicz, 2022).

#### Pakistan and Azad Kashmir must take three Immediate Steps:

i). A Special Envoy on Jammu and Kashmir should be appointed by Islamabad, with a clear mandate to put pressure on India to resolve the conflict. ii). IIOJK must be added to Article 2 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir provisional constitution. iii). Azad Kashmir Jammu and Kashmir's president ought to appoint a "Plebiscite Advisor" right away. Not unusual in 1990, Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore was chosen as a Plebiscite Advisor.

These three actions, in my opinion, will benefit the Kashmir cause. Pakistan and Kashmiris must take action. If we do not support Kashmir, we cannot expect the rest of the world to. Our diplomacy in relation to Kashmir shouldn't be negative. Despite the challenges, we can still compel India to open negotiations on Kashmir right away. "Those who wish to sing will find one," says a Swedish adage (Wirsing, 1995).

#### 7.5 Pakistan's Policies for Kashmir During 1989 to 2019, New Phase of Freedom Movement Kargil

Pakistan and India are still at odds over Kashmir. Kargil was twenty years ago.

The region is still tense twenty years after nuclear-armed neighbours engaged in conflict in Kashmir.

India is in charge of Kashmir and Kargil. Drass, in India-administered Kashmir, was the second-coldest inhabited place on earth on January 9, 1995, with a temperature of -60 degrees Celsius. Famous also is Kargil's Drass. In 1999, a battle between India and Pakistan took place close to the western frontier of the Himalayas.

In 1999, the Indian military launched a counteroffensive after the Pakistani military and Kashmiri insurgents captured significant sites on India's side of their de facto border.

500 Indian and 400 Pakistani soldiers died during the more than three-month-long Kargil conflict, which was finally won by India by driving Pakistani militants past the Line of Control. India's operation to seize Indian outposts along the Line of Control was known as Operation Vijay. The war took place in the era of satellite news. Due to the broadcasts, Drass came to represent Indian nationalism, which spawned jingoistic Bollywood blockbusters. Since 1999, the Indian army has celebrated July 26 as "Vijay Diwas" (Victory Day); this week is the 20th anniversary of this practice (C-r.org, 2016).

#### India is making a Threat towards Pakistan



In remembrance, the Indian army took commemorative hikes to the mountain summits where the most significant fighting had taken place.

Pakistan was warned by General Bipin Rawat not to attempt a similar invasion “anytime, anywhere”.

He asserted that Pakistan was unaware that the Indian political class and military would prevent them from succeeding.

In Kargil, the Indian and Pakistani militaries maintained a loose winter armistice until 1999. During the chilly winters, both sides abandoned frontline positions. (Wirsing, 1995)

### **Shuaib Bashir / Al Jazeera**

Drass, located 150 km east of Srinagar, and the Kashmir valley are now separated by the Himalayas. People from Central Asia who dwell here speak Balti and Dardic and maintain a similar way of life to their forefathers.

When the fighting was over, Mohammad Hussain and his family returned to a home that had been shelled. Very few people had ever visited this desolate place. Now, he asserted, some stay up all night.

Hussain claimed that the region's harsh climate helped to cure battle injuries. He added, War is easy to forget.

The future of Kashmir is uncertain because although Hussain may have moved on from the Kargil conflict, it still looms over ties between the neighbours who possess nuclear weapons.

Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), which has its base in Pakistan, attacked an Indian military convoy in Kashmir in February.

At least 40 Indian soldiers were killed in Pulwama, which also sparked air attacks, dogfights, and a threat of war between India and Pakistan.

Conflict is improbable because of the acrimony between the nations, which has slowed negotiations. Kashmir, which is governed by India, has remained turbulent since a 1990s uprising. Armed terrorists and demonstrators throwing stones are common foes for Indian security officers. Kashmir, according to security experts, has not altered in 20 years.

According to Rahul Bedi, a security expert in New Delhi, Kashmir “drives India's military budget”. Regarding the federal authority imposed in the disputed region earlier this year, he continued, “The political situation in Kashmir has worsened, and nobody knows when state elections will be held”.

The conflict has intensified because to New Delhi's position on lifting the population restrictions in Kashmir. Bedi issued a warning that such conduct might inflame Kashmir. The idea that India supports the Kashmiri rebels is disputed by Pakistan. “The likelihood of another Kargil is quite low,” Indicated Bedi.

Indian soldiers rejoice after their victory in Kargil. Zahid Hussain, an analyst with Shuaib Bashir/ALJ Islamabad, believes that direct communication between India and Pakistan, as opposed to using intermediaries as Trump suggested this week, is the key to a resolution. “Let Kashmir be. It was crucial, he claimed.

Ajai Sahni, a military and security analyst from New Delhi, warned Al Jazeera that “political incompetence” could cause tensions to rise.

In contrast to [Indian Prime Minister Narendra] Modi, Imran Khan believes that promoting connection with India benefits his constituency, the speaker claimed. “I'm worried that Kargil did not alter us” (Action, 2022).

### **7.6 Post 5 August 2019**

This Report describes the situation that occurred in the Kashmir valley following the events of August 5, 2019. The paper clarifies the effects of the repeal of Article 370 on the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir. The study describes the political history of Jammu and Kashmir and the state's entrance to the Indian Union. In addition, the article examines the background of Article 370 and its inclusion in the Indian Constitution. It also provides a comprehensive analysis of its periodic erosion by the Indian State.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been under siege and lockdown since the Indian Parliament repealed Article 370; the lockdown has severely impacted the daily lives of the Valley's inhabitants. Since the lockdown, there has been a restriction on communication, and internet services have been blocked for the past four months<sup>1</sup> with no end in sight. The lockdown has directly influenced every aspect of life, including access to health care, education, justice, business, and jobs.

Even though schools have been shuttered for four months, board exams have been administered despite the challenging conditions. The health sector has been overburdened by a lack of specialists and basic medical supplies. The Jamia Masjid, the most significant legislative mosque in Srinagar, has been closed for 17 weeks. The Valley's courts and other judicial institutions are virtually unavailable to the average Kashmiri, denying them access to justice. This Report provides a comprehensive account of life under siege in the Kashmir valley. This Report will be followed by a more extensive report regarding the abuses of human rights in the Kashmir valley from August 5, 2019 (Naidu, 2000).

#### **• Kashmir 5<sup>th</sup> August a Black Day**

Shabbir Ahmed Shah from Tihar Jail and Ghulam Ahmad Gulzar from Srinagar Central Jail have called for a Friday closure, a civil curfew, and massive demonstrations.

According to them, August 5 is one of the saddest, most agonising, and darkest days in Kashmir's modern history. Kashmiris will always observe this day as exploitation day, grief day, and black day. They also exhorted people to pray for the victory of the independence cause.

The deprivation of IIOJK's special status by India on August 5, 2019, was cited as one of the worst instances of Indian colonialism.

Senior APHC leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, under house arrest since August 4, 2019, vowed Kashmiris would continue their struggle till they win self-determination. India's oppression will not deter them from claiming their right (C-r.org, 2016).

#### **• Pakistan's Response on 5<sup>th</sup> August 2019**

Pakistan retaliated on August 6 in multiple ways. India's revocation was illegal, the Foreign Office said. Pakistan's army leader vowed the army would back Kashmiris "to any degree." A joint parliamentary session condemned India's move on August 7. The National Security Committee deteriorated relations between Pakistan and India. Samjhauta Express and Thar Express both made a stop. All cultural contacts with India, including film and theatre presentations, were severed. On August 9, Pakistan prohibited most trade with India. Imran Khan likened the Indian government to "Nazis" and warned that inaction over Kashmir would be like "appeasing Hitler."

Pakistan's government revised their political map on August 4, 2020, claiming Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh, the Siachen Glacier, the eastern banks of Sir Creek, and Junagadh and Manavadar in the Gujarat region of India. When the Jammu and Kashmir issue is resolved, Ladakh's boundary with China will be codified. Pakistan accepted the map. Through Islamabad, the Kashmir Highway was renamed Srinagar Highway. Pakistan observed Youm-e-Istehsal ("Day of Exploitation") on the first anniversary of the revocation of Kashmir's special status. Protests and lectures demonstrated sympathy for Kashmiris.

### **7.7 Pakistan Won't Leave Kashmir**

Pakistan has concluded that the UNR cannot be carried out since Pakistan has no desire to withdraw from occupied Kashmir. However, Pakistan brings up the UNR to appear in a higher moral position. It is well aware that India will not consent to a referendum on the issue. As a result, Pakistan will not be required to carry out the second clause of the resolution. To appear to be a faithful guardian of the interests of Kashmir's Muslim population, it is, therefore, a good idea to bring up the UNR and reference it. In Pakistan, a school of thought maintains it is OK to discuss the UNR, despite the fact that a large number of people are aware that it cannot be carried out (Dawn, 2010).

### **7.8 UN-led Plebiscite after Tribal Invasion**

Pakistan has never once mentioned Clause II of the UNR, which calls for the troop withdrawal from portions of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir. In order for the UN to oversee a plebiscite, Pakistan had invaded the area using tribal forces. As a result, rather than discussing the entire UNR in Pakistan, many individuals do so in relation to its self-determination section (Crisisgroup, 2003).

### **7.9 UN Resolution**

The UNSCR 47(1948), states that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India and Pakistan should be decided "through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite". Because the UNR presents the people of Kashmir with only two choices, many people in Pakistan believe that if there were an opportunity for self-determination; Kashmir would most likely choose to remain a part of Pakistan (Abby Pokraka, 2019).

### **7.10 The Two-nation Theory Places Kashmir in Pakistan.**

Pakistan has recently been prosperous in presenting that the disputed territory is the valley, which according to the logic of the two-nation concept, should belong to Pakistan due to its overwhelmingly Muslim population. Pakistan has proposed this as a viable means of achieving an agreement. It would also exclude Pakistan from complying with Section II of the UNR. Because many Pakistanis feel that the logic behind the two-nation concept has already addressed the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir problem. 65 Since India's claim over Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir is limited to formal bilateral discourse, India's stance has helped spread this notion (Action, 2022).

### **7.11 India Forcefully Control the State of Kashmir**

Pakistan has succeeded in creating the impression that only the portion of Kashmir that India controls has contested territory and that India is only able to maintain control of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and, in particular, the Kashmir valley by the use of force.

## **8. PAKISTAN POLICIES FOR KASHMIR IN FUTURE**

### **8.1 Pakistan's Kashmir Plans are Quixotic.**

Pakistan anticipates that the Sino-Indian conflict in Ladakh, rather than any military action, will bring Kashmir back into the spotlight on a global scale. Pakistan unveiled its new Kashmir strategy a year after India withdrew Article 370. Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir are shown as being a part of Pakistan on a recent map. The Kashmir highway has been renamed the Srinagar highway, and the matter will be discussed around the world. What was once a disputed area is now referred to as "illegally seized by India." The policy, which is aggressive in tone but empty in substance, relies on the absence of a military option to keep the issue alive for both the local public and New Delhi. Options for Islamabad depend on how Kashmiris and the rest of the world feel about India's new stance. A deeper, more damaging historical clash with India has grown as a result of Delhi's actions in Kashmir (Namra Naseer, 2022).

### **8.2 Quixote Moment**

It was a Don Quixote moment for Islamabad when Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi spoke passionately about the Imran Khan administration's commitment to force India to change its ways and expose the world to Kashmir's horrible realities. Some made light of the new Pakistani map by suggesting that Delhi or China might also be shown.

Television host and actress Sana Bucha reminded the prime minister's special adviser on national security, Moeed Yusuf that even a small-town elementary school teacher might decide to observe a minute of silence in Kashmir on August 5. Many Pakistanis' frustration at the government for not providing Kashmiris with significant assistance was captured in Bucha's tweet.

The state's sudden discovery of itself in a corner from which it cannot meaningfully push back and regain space on an issue that has preoccupied the nation and the region since 1947 and has been the source of a skewed security-versus-development discourse for all these years has left many in Pakistan, especially in the area known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), feeling betrayed (Wirsing, 1995).

### 8.3 Huge Gap between Desire and Reality

When discussing the “Kashmir issue,” it was commonly stated that while India controls Kashmir, Pakistan controls it. Due to its inability to take action, there appears to be a genuine danger that Islamabad might lose even this part of the equation. Like Don Quixote, Pakistan faces a tremendous disparity between what it desires and what it can accomplish. It is vital to emphasise that Cervantes' Spain is pertinent to this topic because, just as ancient chivalry gave way to absolutism in that nation, so too are ordinary Kashmiris experiencing a new reality in which cruelty – and hence terror – has grown significantly. Concurrently, little room exists for pushback (Alam, 2020).

### 8.4 Shocked by Dehli move in August

Given New Delhi's financial woes and terrible reputation, Pakistan was surprised by its August move. Farooq Haider never misses an opportunity to criticise the inaction of the Imran Khan administration. Even the Army faced opposition. Haider's criticism of the lack of action is not a result of his friendship with the opposition PML-N but instead of his understanding of the discontent on the Pakistani side of Kashmir as a result of Islamabad's inaction. Haider is furious because Islamabad did not consult AJK Kashmiris.

Historically, the Line of Control and Muzaffarabad were a part of the Valley; thus, many relatives resided on the other side. It causes them to be concerned about India's transformations and exasperated with Islamabad's inactivity. Some individuals I spoke with stated that India's withdrawal of Article 370 was the lone military opportunity for the Pakistani military. It is too late now. General Qamar Javed Bajwa and Imran Khan dislike being reminded of their lack of action (Action, 2022).

### 8.5 The Views of Dr. Ateeq-Ur-Rehman

How could Pakistan persuade the world and the P5 that India's occupation of Kashmir is not a domestic matter? said Dr. Ateeq-ur-Rehman, an assistant professor at NUML. In response to his question, Ambassador Qazi said that India has asserted that Kashmir is a local issue, a position they extend to include Pakistan's Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The UNRs, however, explicitly rejected the Indian position, and after August 5, the UN Secretary-General emphasised that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved by the UNRs. India's international attitude as a result includes a reluctance to recognise Kashmir. Many countries have made attempts to assert that Azad Kashmir is a part of Pakistan and Indian-occupied Kashmir is a part of India for geopolitical reasons, and that the Line of Control should be treated as an international boundary even if this is false. India's unilateral modification of Jammu and Kashmir's status has made the issue worse. Pakistan's diplomatic efforts won't be sufficient to stop India's activities in Kashmir, even if they are excellent.

Ms. Zenia Satti asked His Excellency Sardar Masood Khan about the state of the globe today in light of the pandemic and other pressing issues including the upheaval in American politics and India's unchecked murder in Kashmir. Masood Khan claimed that while the world community may not be allowing India to carry out acts of genocide, their silence and lack of attention to India's barbaric behaviour in Indian-occupied Kashmir can be construed as support for those behaviours. Although the Kashmiri genocide has been going on for years, a new, more brutal phase just started in August 2019. The monster, which is only getting scarier, is being placated by the western administrations. Because of their economic ties to India, powerful nations have disregarded the actions of India in Kashmir (Ahmad, 2022).

### 8.6 Ambassador Qazi Views about Kashmir as a Single Entity

In addition, we see Kashmir as a single entity, Kashmiris see themselves as a single entity, and all UNRs are applicable to the entire region, said Ambassador Qazi. Kashmiris would exercise their right to self-determination if given the option to choose between India and Pakistan. If Kashmiris were given independence as a third choice, it would harm the UNRs that support Pakistan's position as a disputing party.

India is unconcerned with what the rest of the world thinks about Kashmir. Only if Pakistan started emphasising that we should seek a peaceful resolution and respect the aspirations of the Kashmiris could this world community be roused. India has been rejecting it for the last seven decades, despite this.

He declared that the policies of the Obama administration would be continued by the Biden administration. While opposing the war between India and Pakistan, some people supported India, while others supported India only somewhat. As two nuclear-armed states, the Biden administration will place a strong emphasis on conflict prevention. If Pakistan were to propose talks to India, India would ostensibly decline without justification.

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Naeem Khalid Lodhi, the event's chair, commended the speakers and participants for enlightening the audience on the critical subject of Kashmir and Pakistan's options. He also praised the attendees for showing up to the webinar and asking insightful questions (Namra Naseer, 2022).

## 9 PAKISTAN'S OPTION FOR FUTURE THE SOLUTION OF KASHMIR

### 9.1 Kashmir's Independence

The most recent and least likely way to end this war is with independence for Kashmir. Nearly all Kashmiris favoured independence from Pakistan and India. In surveys conducted in 2010, it was discovered that 44% of people in Azad Kashmir and 43% of people in Jammu and Kashmir would vote in favour of independence. Less than 1% of people in Jammu, 30% in Leh, and 20% in Kargil want independence, while 74% to 95% of people in Jammu and Kashmir live in the Kashmir Valley.

It would be much more challenging to win support for Kashmir's independence outside of the region given how divisive sentiments on independence are within the region. Many believe that in order to change the perception of Kashmir as a "Muslim-majority province under a secular, Hindu-dominated Indian state," the relationship between "state, country, and territory" must be the topic of a national discussion in India (Naidu, 2000).

## 9.2 Kashmir Peace

A referendum is not an option for India, even with a significant shift in mentality, whereas it is unavoidable for Pakistan. In Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf "understood that [plebiscite] is not possible at this time," whereas Indian authorities consider a plebiscite on Kashmir's status to be "irrelevant, obsolete," and they fear backlash if Kashmir is granted independence. Since India, Pakistan, and even half of the Kashmiri population do not want independence for Kashmir, it is not possible to find a peaceful solution to the dispute (Haqqani, 2003).

## 9.3 Kashmir's Partition

A formal split between India and Pakistan has been discussed in Indo-Pakistani peace talks, but the two countries' perspectives on the matter are at odds. The formal partition of Kashmir is predicated on the idea that India and Pakistan will agree on and recognise an international boundary in the region, either the current Line of Control (LOC) or an adjusted and negotiated border, with each country maintaining "sovereign control" over the parts of Kashmir that fall under their jurisdiction. Kashmiris' lives could normalise with the implementation of "soft borders" and demilitarisation thanks to an internationally recognised boundary between the States (Ahmed1, 2012).

## 9.4 The Challenge of Borders Redrawn

From the outset of formal negotiations, these partition plans have ignored key realities in Kashmir. First, proponents of the division in India and Kashmir have a "strong preference for transforming the LOC into an international border" and are against any renegotiation. To the contrary, in Pakistan there is "virtual consensus... for a fundamental renegotiation of the LOC" to incorporate the Muslim-dominated portions of Jammu and Kashmir into Azad Kashmir. Even within Pakistani Azad Kashmir, just 50% of the people would opt to be a part of Pakistan, although 85% of the region as a whole stated they would vote for Kashmir to join Pakistan in a referendum (Bradnock 28). Muslims in Kurr are to blame for the rift between Pakistani and Indian Kashmiris because of their observations. Kashmir Valley is "predominantly moderate, diverse in religious ideas and morality, and has integrated certain aspects of Hinduism" and "predominantly Sufi, whose theological emphasis is pacifistic," in contrast to Pakistan's military and fundamentalist Muslims. It illustrates the disparity between Muslims on both sides of the Line of Control (Namra Naseer, 2022).

# 10 PAKISTAN DEMANDS INDIA RETRACT AUGUST 5 ACTIONS

## 10.1 Kashmiris and their Pakistani Allies had a Rough Day on August 5.

Since India revoked the constitutional status of Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir on August 5, Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan Ali Amin Gandapur has declared that it is another terrible day in the history of Kashmir. He told reporters that he believes anti-Muslim bigotry in India stems from Hindutva ideology, which is largely inspired by the right-wing RSS. He said Pakistan would support the Kashmiris until they were granted independence (Alam, 2020).

## 10.2 Brutality on Kashmir's Solidarity Day

On the eve of Kashmir Solidarity Day, the first Hindu Dalit woman ever elected to the Senate presided over a portion of the session as a symbolic gesture. Kesho Bai, or Senator Krishna Kumari Kohli, remarked that this was the biggest slap in Modi's face possible.

During the speeches about Kashmir, Senate Chairman Sadiq Sanjrani asked the senator from Tharparkar to preside over the session.

As she took the helm of the Senate, her colleagues greeted her with desk thumping and cheers. Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) Chairman, Dr. Babar Awan paused his speech to welcome Senator Kohli to her seat.

A special debate is led by Senator Krishna Kumari on the eve of Kashmir Day, during which she declares that Modi will not be tolerated for much longer.

In her few words, Senator Kohli told Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that "this is the true face of Pakistan, which has allowed a Hindu to preside over the Senate session."

"We want Modi to know that he has had his way for far too long, and we will no longer tolerate him," she said.

Later, on the eve of Kashmir Solidarity Day, Senator Kohli, who was elected to a reserved seat in 2018 on a PPP ticket, tweeted, "It is a tremendous honour to have chaired the Senate session to debate the current situation in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK)" (Asoori, 2020).

## 10.3 Resolution Passed

In a resounding vote on August 8, the House of Representatives condemned India's "illegal and unilateral action" on August 5 and demanded that it be reversed, calling it a "gross breach of all UNR on Jammu and Kashmir."

The resolution blasted India for its continued abuses of IHL, ICJK law, and human rights. There have been hundreds of killings, illegal detentions, and mass arrests of innocent Kashmiris since August 5, the resolution claims.

The Senate sent India a message that not even state-sanctioned terrorism of the worst kind can break the will of the people of Kashmir to fight for their rights.



The House has called on the Indian government to end the unlawful killings of Kashmiris through staged encounters and cordon-and-search operations, and has demanded that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his “fascist RSS organisation” be held accountable for their crimes against humanity.

It criticised “efforts to maintain a facade of normalcy” and called for the immediate release of all political prisoners in IIOJK. The Senate resolution also called on the world to take note of “India’s belligerence, stubbornness, and flagrant persistence of cruelty against the Kashmiri people, including the internationally recognised risk of genocide.”

The resolution served as a reminder to the people of Kashmir that the government, people, and parliament of Pakistan will always stand with them in their just fight until it was resolved in accordance with the demands of the people of Kashmir and the relevant decisions of the UNSC.

With this resolution, the Pakistani Senate says again that it stands with the Kashmiris “in their struggle for the fundamental right to self-determination.”

Sadiq Sanjrani, chairman of the Senate, ordered that the signed resolution be sent to top world officials like the UN secretary general (Abby Pokraka, 2019).

#### 10.4 United Front

Yousuf Raza Gilani, the Senate's opposition leader, opened the floor to talk about Kashmir by saying that a solution to the conflict that respects the wishes of the Kashmiri people was necessary for lasting peace in South Asia.

Both House Leader Dr. Shahzad Waseem and Parliamentary Advisor Babar Awan have been outspoken in their condemnation of Indian criminal activity in the valley. The time has come when self-determination cannot be denied. Therefore, it is asked that the “illegal and immoral actions” taken beginning on August 5 be undone.

Dr. Shahzad Waseem said former Indian Prime Minister Imran Khan showed the world India's dual nature. He said the UN secretary-general and General Assembly president discussed Kashmiri self-determination.

In the absence of a real and honest discussion between India and Pakistan, global powers will continue to manipulate them for their own ends, he added.

PML-N leader Azam Nazir Tarar said Kashmir couldn't be freed with slogans. The administration has time to unite all political parties to advance the Kashmir cause.

Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri of JUI-F criticised the PTI for its weak Kashmir policy, saying it “sold off its people.”

Senator Ejaz Chaudhry of the PTI blasted the JUI-F member for making “baseless claims,” alleging the Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir performed poorly even under Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman.

Raza Rabbani lamented the international community's silence over India's rape-as-warfare in occupied Kashmir.

In view of US aspirations to become India the region's China-containment policeman, he said New Delhi could take any action it wanted.

He ascribed this strategy to a rise in terrorist attacks in Pakistan.

Last month, Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q) Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed noted Dr. Gregory Stanton's remarks before the US Congress: “In India, there are the makings of a genocide against Muslims, beginning with Kashmir and Assam.”

Senator Mushahid urged the administration to create a clear India strategy (Dawn, 2010).

#### 11 HYPOTHESIS

Nearly 90% of inhabitants in the summer capital of Indian Kashmir favour independence. India and Pakistan have fought over the Himalayas since 1947, yet 87 percent of Srinagar's people do not back either side.

According to the most recent survey, just 3% of the predominantly Muslim city's population desire Pakistani control over Kashmir.

In Jammu, the predominantly Hindu winter capital of the state, 95 percent believe Kashmir should be a part of India.

Both nations assert sovereignty over the whole territory and have rejected independence. India claims 45% of the former princely state, Pakistan a third, and the remainder, a high-altitude desert, is held by China. 47% of Pakistanis support the independence of Kashmir.

Since 1947, when Kashmir's Hindu king wavered between joining India or Pakistan, its fate has remained undetermined. Since the start of a separatist uprising by militants in 1989, over 42,000 people have perished. According to, human rights organisations, 60,000 dead or missing. Since 2002, 7/10 Kashmiris believe the situation has improved (Akhtar, 2023).

Locals in Srinagar are concerned that the security forces have too much authority. The army is frequently accused of murdering innocent people and committing other human rights violations; a unique statute shields soldiers from accountability.

84% of the people of Srinagar desire the return of Kashmiri analysts, a Hindu population that has fled Islamist fundamentalists. Numerous refugees reside in India.

Many Pakistani observers believe Pakistan's participation in the conflict in Kashmir has benefited the nation politically despite its comparatively mild intensity. In contrast, Pakistani academics and the media have not given much attention to the implications of such a program on the land. When viewed from this aspect, it is necessary to analyse the domestic cost of pursuing such a program. Would Pakistan accept such an internal financial load for Kashmir? What should additional alternatives be considered? (Abby Pokraka, 2019).

#### 12. CHALLENGES AHEAD

Maintaining the status quo in Kashmir is in the best interests of several groups. Money is a driving force for some of the militants in Kashmir. The recruiting agency is responsible for the soldier's family in the event of his or her death in Kashmir. No staffing firm would ever offer perks like that to their employees. Such facilities, despite their inherent danger, are appealing

because to the lack of alternative work opportunities in a country like Pakistan, where unemployment and population expansion are big challenges. Pakistan reportedly has the largest Islamist private army in the world. Several different political groups, religious groups, and armed organisations have benefited greatly from Kashmir. The media has given some once-obscure groups a newfound hero status. If this 'problem' didn't exist, these communities wouldn't be given any attention. It's safe to assume that these organisations would fight back against any political solution that would force them into the background. These armed mercenaries are not restricted by local regulations because of the relatively low cost of their foreign support. Financial goals drive foreign governments, but keeping tabs on the activities of radicals is difficult. It poses a danger to the stability of Kashmir.

The Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration both forbid limiting Indo-Pakistani talks to a single topic; therefore, Pakistan's goal of focusing only on Kashmir is unrealistic. Kashmir is seen as unsolvable by Pakistan. For Kashmiris, this raised doubts about the accession document and kept their hope for independence alive if the UNR was not carried out. In the event of Kashmiri independence, the valley will be split between Pakistan and India. Some parties' use of emotional appeals to Kashmiris' loyalty to their causes has kept the conflict in the spotlight. Since India would reject such a strategy, the zero-sum game may be played for a longer period, which would be good for the insurgency business. Because of this, the Pakistani military will play a major role in domestic politics and in raising money for the country's whole defence budget. The unique culture of Kashmir is a popular topic of conversation among Kashmiris and Indian specialists. There is a clear cultural, racial, and political divide between Kashmir and the rest of India. It's true that every part of India has its own distinct history and culture. Although Hinduism is widely practised in India, the religion's tenets and observances vary from region to region. Historical uniqueness and autonomy cannot sustain separate entities today. Although isolation and incompatibility are concepts often brought up in discussions of Muslim majority countries, religious minorities in India coexist peacefully with members of other faiths. This is a political, rather than cultural, identity issue. Independentism groups in Kashmir use this to promote their cause.

A Pakistani expert claims that both governments would continue to exploit Kashmir for their own ends. The Kashmir dispute might drag on for decades due to opposing viewpoints. Pakistan has promised to undertake open and honest talks about Kashmir "anytime, anyplace," yet it is unclear whether or not it will suggest a new strategy. More negotiations won't accomplish anything if positions aren't unified first. As long as the country's army-dominated decision-making system permits, Pakistan will continue to pursue its foreign policy aims through low-intensity war.

Is it possible for Pakistan, in spite of the consequences of growing extremism at home, to achieve domestic stability by maintaining a jihadi policy against India in Kashmir? When Pakistan supports jihad in Kashmir, it undermines its own efforts to maintain domestic stability and deal with sectarian conflict.

The term jihad means the same thing anywhere it is used. The greatest option for a free border at this time appears to be the Line of Control. The people of Pakistan require more and better educational opportunities. Occupied Pakistan will be returned to Indian control. For lack of clear public discourse, Pakistan does not view Kashmir as a potential area of compromise. In private conversations, words like "compromise," "give and take," and "through the media" may be heard, but saying such things in public would be political suicide, as one veteran ambassador put it: "the Kashmir problem has been built up to the point that cannot see Pakistani leadership dilute its concentration." Any Pakistani leader with the intestinal fortitude of Sadat or Rabin who seeks to break the impasse should be prepared to meet the same destiny (Rulac, 2020).

### **13. FUTURE OF KASHMIR REGARDING PAKISTAN'S POLICIES**

#### **13.1 Pakistan's Kashmir Implications**

Pakistan thinks that India never acknowledged its existence due to the geographical position of Kashmir. Kashmir straddled the border between India and Pakistan, but its religious makeup and economic and logistical ties to the area were crucial. When the demand was granted, the All-India Muslim League (AIML) had few reservations about the entrance of Kashmir into Pakistan.

Jinnah chastised the Hindu leaders and their British backers for Kashmir not "falling into their laps." India's claim to Kashmir demonstrated its ambition to undermine and rule Pakistan and its conviction in Jinnah's two-nation theory, according to Pakistan. Kashmir's struggle was against Indian hegemony and deceit.

Pakistan claimed that Kashmir was an attempt by India to shame it, and the partition conflict revealed British support for the Hindu agenda. Mountbatten attempted to assist Jawaharlal Nehru in Kashmir. The perception that India's activities were part of an Indo-British strategy to undermine Pakistan impacted Pakistan's attitude to the Kashmir conflict (Ahmed1, 2012).

#### **13.2 Pakistan's National Identity Challenge**

Pakistan's Kashmir policy was impacted by its ideology, emotions, and internal politics. Pakistan's independence-era identity crisis shaped its policy. Prior to 1947, none of us was Pakistanis, according to Ayub Khan. Jinnah's vision of two nations partitioned the subcontinent along religious lines, but Islam alone was insufficient to foster nationalism. The secular leadership of Pakistan feared ceding control to religious authority if Islam were the primary basis of national identity. The new secular government of Pakistan envisioned a secular Islamic state, but placing too much emphasis on Islam may give religious authority political control.

#### **13.3 Imbalance Institutions**

Pakistan's stubborn position on Kashmir was influenced by nationalist goals and a struggle amongst institutions in the formation process. After the division, Jinnah's death diminished Pakistan's possibilities for a strong, secular, civilian administration. The British military and bureaucracy soon seized control of the situation. Before 1956, the Governor General was the dominant figure in politics. The prime minister and government lacked authority. The governor-general appointed

them. This early institutional mismatch affected Pakistan's policy in Kashmir. Politicians appealed to public sentiments to make up for their lack of ultimate power. In conjunction with the Pakistani identity crisis, politicians applauded widespread outrage over Kashmir.

#### 14. CONCLUSION

The transition from Kashmir to Pakistan is like moving from brightness to darkness. Punjabi elites govern a bankrupt Pakistan. Other Pakistanis are ignorant and ostracised; they have no access to education or healthcare. Pakistan is an oppressed and dissatisfied country. Even Pakistani states governed by the descendants of rest while Nawabs and Punjabis lack a unified development objective.

The majority of land in Pakistan is owned by the army and feudal class, depriving the populace of land rights. The majority of aristocratic and wealthy Pakistanis prioritise themselves and their families.

Even with this solution, the situation will become more problematic since extremism is increasing in both nations. The issue that must be answered is whether Pakistan can have a policy on Kashmir that is both implementable and sustainable without incurring domestic costs. Clearly, and especially in light of this, Pakistan must reconsider its Kashmir policy (Naidu, 2000).

#### 15. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan has been a longstanding issue in the region, causing immense suffering and instability for decades. To resolve this conflict, diplomatic dialogue must be prioritized as a means of fostering mutual understanding and cooperation between the two nations. Engaging in sincere and constructive discussions, facilitated by impartial mediators if necessary, can help address the grievances and concerns of both parties while exploring potential avenues for peace and reconciliation.

Mutual respect is another fundamental element that must underpin any efforts to resolve the Kashmir conflict. Recognizing each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the rights of the Kashmiri people to self-determination is essential for building trust and fostering a conducive environment for peace talks. Respectful engagement also involves refraining from provocative actions or rhetoric that could escalate tensions and undermine the peace process.

Furthermore, adherence to UN resolutions pertaining to the Kashmir issue is imperative for achieving a lasting solution. These resolutions provide a framework for addressing the dispute in a fair and just manner, and both India and Pakistan should commit to fulfilling their obligations under international law. Upholding the principles of justice, equality, and respect for human rights as outlined in these resolutions is essential for achieving a sustainable resolution to the Kashmir conflict.

In conclusion, resolving the Kashmir conflict requires diplomatic dialogue, mutual respect, and adherence to UN resolutions. By embracing these principles and demonstrating a genuine commitment to peace, India and Pakistan can work towards ending the cycle of violence and insecurity in the region, paving the way for a better future for all stakeholders involved.

#### REFERENCES

1. Abby Pokraka. (2019, 11 26). *History of Conflict in India and Pakistan*. Retrieved from Armscontrolcenter: <https://armscontrolcenter.org/history-of-conflict-in-india-and-pakistan/>. accessed on 10 January 2024
2. Action, C. f. (2022, 05 12). *Conflict Between India and Pakistan*. Retrieved from cfr.org: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan>. accessed on 12 January 2024
3. Ahmed, S., & Chakma, A. (2012). Kashmir conflict: A critical analysis. *Society & Change*, 4(3), 20-36.
4. Ahmad, I. (2022, 02 06). *Missed Opportunities In Kashmir: How A More Proactive Policy From Pakistan Could Have Yielded Results*. Retrieved from The Friday Times: <https://www.thefridaytimes.com/2022/02/05/missed-opportunities-in-kashmir-how-a-more-proactive-policy-from-pakistan-could-have-yielded-results/>. accessed on 11- January 2024.
5. Ahmed1, S. (2012, 07 03). *Kashmir Conflict: A Critical Analysis*. Retrieved from bellschool: [https://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2019-03/chakma\\_kashmir\\_conflict.pdf](https://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2019-03/chakma_kashmir_conflict.pdf)
6. Akhtar, Z. (2023). Kashmir's Right to Self-Determination: UNSC Resolutions, Human Rights Violations and Culpability under International Law. *Athens JL*, 9, 139.
7. Alam, M. (2020, 06 09). *Pakistan's Kashmir Policy Post-Article 370*. Retrieved from thediplomat: <https://thedi diplomat.com/2020/07/pakistans-kashmir-policy-post-article-370/>.
8. Ansari, S. F., Effendi, M. S., & Haque, R. (2019). Problem Solving Decision Making Model in Kashmir Conflict Resolution: Prospects and Challenges. *NDU Journal*, 11-20.
9. Asoori, P. (2020, 10 07). *A Look into the Conflict Between India and Pakistan over Kashmir*. Retrieved from <https://www.e-ir.info/>: <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/10/07/a-look-into-the-conflict-between-india-and-pakistan-over-kashmir/>
10. C-r.org. (2016, 12). *Jammu and Kashmir: the conflict in focus*. Retrieved from c-r.org: [https://www.c-r.org/programme/south-asia/jammu-and-kashmir-conflict-focus?gclid=Cj0KCQiAsoycBhC6ARIsAPPbeLu7ioY6-ePehqaF8ECYdrhUyrf7rhfUimN5AqV1nIK-xFDYdvnkwVUaAgNUEALw\\_wcB](https://www.c-r.org/programme/south-asia/jammu-and-kashmir-conflict-focus?gclid=Cj0KCQiAsoycBhC6ARIsAPPbeLu7ioY6-ePehqaF8ECYdrhUyrf7rhfUimN5AqV1nIK-xFDYdvnkwVUaAgNUEALw_wcB). accessed on 19 January 2024.
11. Crisisgroup. (2003, 12 04). *Kashmir: The View From Islamabad*. Retrieved from crisisgroup: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/kashmir/kashmir-view-islamabad>
12. Dawn. (2010, 11 26). *What are the major issues between India and Pakistan?* Retrieved from dawn: <https://www.dawn.com/news/585862/what-are-the-major-issues-between-india-and-pakistan>. accessed on 11 January 2024.
13. Haq, I. (2020). Partition and Legacies of Violence: A Study of Kashmir Conflict. *Displaced Voices: A Journal of Archives, Migration and Cultural Heritage*, 1(1), 112-130.

14. Haqqani, H. (2003, 07 01). *Pakistan's Endgame in Kashmir*. Retrieved from carnegieendowment: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2003/07/01/pakistan-s-endgame-in-kashmir-pub-1427>
15. Latif, A. (2021, 03 31). *Pakistan says no change in stance on Kashmir*. Retrieved from asia-pacific: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pakistan-says-no-change-in-stance-on-kashmir/2194440>
16. Naidu, M. (2000, 05 02). *The Kashmir Dispute and India-Pakistan Relations: The Untold Story of Cold War Diplomacy*. Retrieved from jstor.org: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23607737>
17. Namra Naseer, R. S. (2022, 05 02). *What Political Change in Pakistan Could Mean for its Relationship with India*. Retrieved from southasianvoices: [https://southasianvoices.org/what-political-change-in-pakistan-could-mean-its-relationship-with-india/?gclid=Cj0KCQiAsoycBhC6ARIsAPPbeLvKaWSpMyXENS8a-Re2dykgBJOwlvW1AEfNAVpetv3FcB7a7dd1jJwaAuSmEALw\\_wcB](https://southasianvoices.org/what-political-change-in-pakistan-could-mean-its-relationship-with-india/?gclid=Cj0KCQiAsoycBhC6ARIsAPPbeLvKaWSpMyXENS8a-Re2dykgBJOwlvW1AEfNAVpetv3FcB7a7dd1jJwaAuSmEALw_wcB). accessed on 19 January 2024.
18. Pattanaik, S. S. (2008, 04 03). *Pakistan's Kashmir policy: Objectives and approaches*. Retrieved from Tandfonline: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160208450039>. accessed on 21 January 2024.
19. Pattanaik, S. S. (2012). *Pakistan's Kashmir Policy: Objectives and Approaches*. Retrieved from ciatotest: [https://ciatotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa\\_apr02pas01.html](https://ciatotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_apr02pas01.html)
20. Piotr Balcerowicz, A. K. (2022, 05 27). *Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies*. Retrieved from routledge: <https://www.routledge.com/Kashmir-in-India-and-Pakistan-Policies/Balcerowicz-Kuszevska/p/book/9781138480124>
21. Piotr Balcerowicz, A. K. (2022, 05 26). *Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies*. Retrieved from Taylorfrancis: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781351063746/kashmir-india-pakistan-policies-piotr-balcerowicz-agnieszka-kuszevska>. accessed on 10 January 2024.
22. Qadeer, M. A. (2017). United Nations resolutions on Kashmir and their relevance. *Journal of Strategic Affairs*, 2. 73-81.
23. Rulac. (2020, 02 04). *International armed conflict between India and Pakistan*. Retrieved from rulac: <https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/international-armed-conflict-between-pakistan-and-india>. accessed on 15 January 2024.
24. SETA, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, 2022, Experts Respond: Political Crisis in Pakistan | The Reasons behind the Turmoil and Its Implications. <https://www.setav.org/en/experts-respond-political-crisis-in-pakistan-the-reasons-behind-the-turmoil-and-its-implications/>. accessed on 29 February 2024.
25. Thaakar, B. D. (2021, 02 04). *Kashmir Imbroglio Resolved: Strategic Options for Pakistan*. Retrieved from Air University: <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2493118/kashmir-imbroglio-resolved-strategic-options-for-pakistan/>. accessed on 12 January 2024.
26. Wirsing, R. G. (1995, 06). *India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution*. Retrieved from foreignaffairs: [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1995-05-01/india-pakistan-and-kashmir-dispute-regional-conflict-and-its?gclid=Cj0KCQiAsoycBhC6ARIsAPPbeLvqnzi7XwoiVGteRIJdrMHNi2T9y0t5yMghETASy0pKUBuNQIuxT5YaAoD-EALw\\_wcB](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1995-05-01/india-pakistan-and-kashmir-dispute-regional-conflict-and-its?gclid=Cj0KCQiAsoycBhC6ARIsAPPbeLvqnzi7XwoiVGteRIJdrMHNi2T9y0t5yMghETASy0pKUBuNQIuxT5YaAoD-EALw_wcB). accessed on 17 January 2024